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Outline of Operations on the Mainland
On 6th December 1941. a large Japanese convoy was observed steaming into the Gulf of Siam; on the night 6th/7th landings were effected at Singora, Patani, in South Thailand, and at Kota Bahru, in North-east of Kalantan.
Singapore was bombed for the first time in the early hours of 8th December.
On the west coast, in North Kedah, 11 Division were at this period still uncertain in which role they would be called on to fulfil - offensive or defensive. Troops already detailed for the offensive, which was to anticipate the Japanese in Singora, were standing to ready to move at short notice.
It was understood that no move across the frontier was to take place unless ordered by Malaya Command, who in their turn had to await instructions from London.
The final orders, cancelling the advance on Singora and directing that the Jitra position be occupied, were received at 11 Division H.Q. on the afternoon of 8th December.
Obviously a surprise move of this description, allowing for only a narrow margin of error in time, should not have been subject to the risk of delay between Singapore and London.
Although the preparations had been made with all possible secrecy, the troops had more than an inkling of what was intended.
To this sudden abandonment of the offensive must be attributed in part, at any rate, the drop in morale in the 6th and 15th Brigades during the days immediately following.
In place of the larger operation permission was given for the despatch of two small columns, one to the North and the other through Kroh, to the North-west to enter Thailand, and carry out demolitions.
One of these columns was ambushed and the total delaying effect of both was negligible.
Judged in the light of what we now know of Japanese preparation, of their exact information of our strength and movements and of the true attitude of the Thais, chances of success against Singora would seem to have been highly problematical. Without delaying the enemy in any appreciable, degree, there was every probability of losing an entire brigade.
The Jitra position was admittedly not a good one, the most that could be said for it being that it was better than any other in that area. One of the main reasons for choosing to stand so far north was to protect Kedah State, the granary of Malaya.
Owing to the Japanese anticipating by three mouths the earliest accepted date for landings on the East Coast, work on the position was far from complete, though this in point of fact did not have a decisive bearing on the: issue, as the Japanese took advantage of an irremediable natural weakness - a thick jungle on the right flank of the position.
In finding their way through an area considered to be passable only by cutting a passage, the enemy not only effected a surprise but exploded the first of a number of erroneous ideas concerning the countryside in Malaya.
Contact between the forces was first made on the 9th December, and on the night the 11th / 12th the Division, already shaken, withdrew to Gurun, some 25 miles to the South. In this action the Japanese employed tactics which proved highly successful throughout the campaign. The method is dealt with in detail later. Briefly, it consisted in locating the areas held and the flanks by drawing fire, working round or through in small parties, threatening the road — the vital feature — and causing confusion by shooting from unexpected directions. At Jitra this was accompanied by comparatively heavy frontal attack pressed with great determination.
Even before it had been decided to withdraw from Jitra the ground staff of the Alor Star aerodrome, 16 miles south, had set fire to petrol and some buildings and were preparing to leave. The aerodrome had been bombed before news of the landings was received and the staff, hearing the planes, presumed they were friendly. H.Q. 11th Division had received no warning of intended evacuation prior to the firing of stores.
The landing at Kota Bahru on night the 6th / 7th December, under the conditions prevailing at the time, indicated a thorough mastery of this type of operation. It is doubtful whether any staff but the Japanese would have considered feasible an attempt at this season of the year and in the face of highly organised beach defences. Their losses were very roughly estimated at 1,500 killed.
No Japanese planes appeared until the forenoon of the 8th December, while our Hudsons and Buffaloes attacked and burnt out two transports and destroyed many landing craft. Once ashore in strength, it was only a matter of hours before they succeeded in worming their way to the rear of the beach defences. The coastal area is intersected with creeks and streams and there are extensive swamps and stretches of jungle.
The Japanese intelligence organisation was controlled by ex-settlers who had spent years in the district and who in turn controlled their own guides, spies and messengers among the local Malays. With the help of these they were able to move more rapidly and make dispositions than our own troops brought up as reserves from only a few miles to the South.
By night 7th / 8th December the situation generally, and Arial Times New Romanin particular the aerodrome, had so far deteriorated that it was decided to withdraw to a line behind the beaches. There was great confusion and scattering of units moving over this difficult ground in heavy rain and darkness.
By the 11th December the. 8th Brigade was at Chong Dong, 25 miles south of Kota Bahru and was withdrawing to the road and rail junction of Kuala Krai. In less than ten days the Japanese had obtained five first-class aerodromes — Kota Bahru, Lachang and Gong Kedah on the east coast; Alor Star and Sungei Patani on the west — they were thus able to make full use of their superiority in numbers, and largely in the quality, of their aircraft.
For the remainder of the campaign operations on the east coast were of minor importance, with the exception of the landing at Kuantan, which gave the enemy his first aerodrome within fighter range of Singapore and resulted immediately in sustained daylight raids on the naval base and town. Meanwhile on the west coast tired troops continued their withdrawal under constant pressure.
The unexpectedly rapid evacuation of Jitra and inability to stand at Gurun endangered Penang before the civil and military authorities had time to consider the problem of evacuation. Deliberate terroristic bombing from a low level completed the panic and confusion. Civilian morale received a very severe blow. 12th Brigade, in Command Reserve, was sent up from Singapore to the Grik area to attempt to hold up the Japanese, who, by making use of the salient in the Thai frontier between Kroh and Grik and striking south-west, were threatening the communication of all our forces in Kedah. This threat determined the speed of the withdrawal of 11th Division, which had reached the Perak River by the 20th December.
While there is an apparently monotonous regularity about the numerous rearguard actions in this 400-mile withdrawal, a closer study of detailed accounts will probably show numerous minor difference and changes in British and Japanese methods as the area of operations was shifted southwards.
The Kampar position, 90 miles north of Kuala Lumpur, occupied at the end of December, was the first position since Jitra was evacuated which offered an opportunity of holding the enemy for a reasonable period. With a good field of fire, strong flanks, and good observation, offsetting to some extent the enemy's advantage in the air, the Japanese were unable to use their usual technique and were several times beaten back with heavy loss. They eventually turned us out of the position by a landing near Telok Anson, some 20 miles from the sea on the Perak River. Troops were transported in country boats or in special barges which had been brought over land; these craft were towed by tugs or launches found undamaged in Penang Harbour after the panic evacuation. From Telok Anson a very real threat was, developing against main road and rail communication to the south. Kampar had to be evacuated.
From now until the extreme south of the peninsula was reached, landings on the west coast became a ruling factor in the operations and accounted, together with pressure from the north, for our continued rapid withdrawal.
At Slim River, the next important, position after Kampar, Japanese tanks were used in strength for the first time. As early as Jitra tanks had been in action, but only in very small numbers; at the Slim River they were estimated at thirty. They broke through a reasonably good position during darkness and completely scattered a brigade, inflicting heavy loss.
In Johore a further landing at Muar resulted in the almost total destruction of another brigade; at Batu Pahat, 30 miles to the south, the manoeuvre was repeated with heavy loss to 53rd Infantry Brigade.
The A.I F were in action for the first time in the Gemas area, and thereafter throughout the fighting in Johore. They were better acquainted with the ground they were fighting over than troops who had withdrawn from the north. They were able to profit by the experience of others and laid a number of effective ambushes. An attempt to hold the enemy on the Ayer Hitam - Batu Pahat line failed; landings on the east coast compelled withdrawal from mensing. The whole force crossed over to Singapore Island. The Johore Causeway was breached on the morning of the 31st January.
Owing to road blocks, hasty retirements at night, or the difficulty of finding them in thick country, many wounded were left in enemy hands on the mainland. Still larger numbers of unwounded men, British, Indian and Australians separated from their units during battle and unable to find their way back to Singapore, must have either fallen into the hands of the enemy or remained in hiding. Very large quantities of stores, ammunition and equipment of every description and a large number of vehicles were destroyed, but a great deal must have been left undamaged.
The speed of withdrawal made this inevitable, in addition. as each large centre was evacuated, all that could be lifted was back-loaded to the next point in rear , and in this manner the dumps grew to an extent which rendered their removal impossible.
In Arial Times New Romanal most exactly Arial Times New Roman seven weeks from the opening of hostilities a force of two Indian divisions with formations from the 18th British Division, and the Australian Division, had been forced off the mainland.
The 11th Indian Division had covered over 400 miles. The scale of this disaster, apart from its sequel — the fall of the fortress — would tempt one to search for some hidden, startling explanation, and yet, even with the facts now available, the causes are in the main clear enough. They are many and, though in no way mysterious, the inter-relation between them is complex and the contribution of each to the final result difficult to compute. They are dealt with below as general and military considerations affecting the campaign.
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