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Introduction.
The dramatic suddenness of Singapore's fall has naturally monopolised attention at the expense of the Malaya campaign as a whole — and the capitulation is commonly regarded as an isolated episode divorced from the events of the two months proceeding it. Responsibility is attributed recklessly to individuals and undue importance attached to minor factors; the resultant confusion has been heightened by the difficulty of obtaining information from those best qualified to give it. However, even from the incomplete facts now available it is possible to form definite opinions on major aspects of the campaign.
The first is that by November 1941 the situation in Malaya already contained many of the elements of disaster. It would appear that our plans were based on some factors which had ceased to be operative, and that the significance of other events such as the control of French Indo-China and Thailand by the Japanese and Russia's entry into the war, had not been given due weight. Yet Japan's new acquisitions increased the danger of an attack from the North, while Russia would be receiving equipment, and particularly aircraft, intended for Malaya.
The general feeling of security evident in Malaya at this time was based on the view, expressed officially by socialists, that Japan was most unlikely to risk hostilities with British and the United States simultaneously. In addition, the rapid increase of the number of aerodromes naturally suggested an increase in the air strength, and it was, in fact, officially announced that an attempted Japanese invasion from the sea would be frustrated by air action. This forecast may have been based on the date of arrival of extra aircraft before the Japanese could undertake landings on the East Coast.
Landings in this area were considered impracticable during the prevalence of the north-eastern monsoon, i.e. from December to the end of February; when the enemy seized Kota Bahra from the sea between the 6th and 10th December and launched at the same time a large-scale offensive on the West Coast, our programme of preparation was seriously disorganised.
The local press, by consistently disparaging the quality of the enemy's air force, and otherwise showing a poor opinion of his general efficiency, helped to build up a dangerously complacent attitude, and in Malaya ease and complacency flourish without outside assistance.
Though there were some specialists who distrusted this attitude, it is no exaggeration to say that from the Governor downwards, among civil servants and soldiers alike, there was a general belief that, at the best, there would probably be no war with Japan; at the worst, that they would make no move until February 1942.
In the face of this dangerous situation our plan was indefinite. It was hoped that a limited surprise offensive into Thailand would secure for us Singora and the important rail junction of Hatyai. thereby holding up the enemy for a considerable period. As an alternative, a defensive position was under preparation at Jitra, in North-West Kedah. It was due to be completed in February 1942. Further South a second position had been chosen at Gurun, but little work had been done at the commencement of hostilities.
On the East Coast an elaborate system of beach defences had been carried out in the Kota Bahru area and at Kuantan, but it was admitted that the 8th and 22nd Indian Infantry Brigades lacked the strength both to man pill-boxes and provide adequate reserves. This weakness was, however, offset by the assurance that landings would be broken up by air action.
Though not strong enough to man the long perimeter of Singapore Island, the Fortress troops, with the aid of very strong defences, were in a position to deal with attempted landings from seawards.
The Japanese problem was mainly one of time — to hit with superior strength initially and to maintain such pressure as would carry him to the southern end of the peninsula before adequate reinforcements, could be despatched to Singapore. Simultaneously, captured aerodromes would be used to increase progressively the effect of air superiority, until a point was reached when, communications between Singapore and the mainland would be disorganised and the Naval Base itself closed. Meanwhile, systematic long-range bombing of the town would pave the way for a breakdown of morale.
As an Asiatic Power, maintaining a European standard of efficiency, and at the same time operating on Asiatic soil, the Japanese had a great initial advantage, apart from almost complete command in the air, greatly superior numbers on the ground, and tanks. In addition, and unexpectedly, the Japanese gained freedom for their convoys at sea by destroying our two capital ships.
It was clear that this campaign had been planned in detail, troops specially trained for it. and best types of equipment provided. The inhabitants in the mass were, at best, a hindrance to us — at the worst, a help to the enemy. Japanese topographical knowledge was exact and up-to-date, and his day-to-day information of our movements very complete.
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