MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

3. General Considerations Affecting the Campaign

 (a) Assesment of the Enemy

 (b) Lack of Air Support

 (c) Propaganda

 (d) Utilisation of Man Power

 (e) Civilian Morale

 (f) Fifth Column Activities

 (g) Civil and Military Co-operation and Co-ordination

(a) Assessment of the Enemy

Equally disastrous in its consequences and incredible in its inaccuracy was our estimate of the Japanese Army and Air Force.

Presumably observers based their opinions on inferior units seen during the early fighting in China or, through a misunderstanding of the real nature of the war in China, concluded that failure to subdue the Chines was due to a low standard of training and efficiency.

Whatever the cause , it is difficult to believe that our  military policy   in Malaya and even our high policy could have been accepted as it stood, had our estimate been even partly in keeping with the facts. This applies particularly to the Japanese Air Force.

Even admitting that a Power may construct secretly new types of aircraft, there is little justification for a policy of disparagement of both the quality of machines and efficiency of personnel. This attitude was adopted by at least one influential newspaper in Malaya, thereby encouraging popular complacency and resulting in an equally dangerous drop in morale when the true facts became known.

From the outset it was obvious that Brewster Buffalo in Malaya was no match for the best Japanese fighter and that their best bombers were good. Equally their pilots were enterprising and skilful and their high-level bombing accurate. That they would be completely outclassed by our best machines is equally true, but our Hurricanes arrived too late, when command of the air had passed to the enemy, and in insufficient numbers to right the balance.

The sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales proved a thorough mastery of the handling of torpedo bombers. As regards their other arms, while due weight must be given to the overwhelming natural advantages they enjoyed owing to the circumstances under which the campaign was fought, it must be admitted that all round the standard was far higher than had been expected and that in some respects (e.g., landing operations, choice of equipment and military engineering), their work was of a very high order. Tactical methods are dealt with elsewhere..

(b) Lack of Air Support

This was one of the major causes of failure and has been classed as the chief cause for the alarming lack of will to resist noticeable during the final phase.

The effect of  finding ourselves  not only very  heavily outnumbered generally outclassed in the air was all the greater because of the prevalent conviction that in this sphere the Japanese would be speedily dominated. The number of aerodromes constructed was alone an indication of the part our air force was intended to play, and yet almost immediately our air force in the North was either overwhelmed or forced to withdraw. Our fighters were outclassed and both bombers and fighters were destroyed in large numbers on or over their own aerodromes. In this the Japanese Fifth Column took a prominent part. Times of departure of our bombers from their aerodromes was communicated to the enemy and by calculation of fuel capacity or by means of further signals, the enemy contrived with an, uncanny accuracy to reach the aerodrome when our machines were on the ground or about to land for refuelling.

Alor Star, most northerly  aerodrome in Kedah, was actually bombed before the personnel were aware that Japan had declared  war. The  wires  to Kota Bahru had been cut to prevent news of the landing getting through. As a result, within 48 hours of the outbreak of hostilities petrol was being fired buildings destroyed and the runway mined prior to evacuation. Simultaneously at sea, inability to provide fighter protection led to the loss of our capital ships.

As the five northern aerodromes fell into his hands so the enemy's domination of the battlefields increased. His attacks on ground targets were not heavy, but the nuisance value was great and moral effect on young troops still greater. The cumulative result on tired men was to be seen later — in the south and on Singapore Island where dive and low-level bombing and machine gunning became more and more persistent.

Inability to protect Penang from the air had far-reaching results.

Deliberately ruthless bombing and machine-gunning, particularly of the Chinese quarter, inflicting thousands of casualties, causing panic which affected the whole country.

Whether our loss of air superiority was due to a calamitous underestimate of Japanese air efficiency, to the absence of expected reinforcements owing to enerny advancing date of attack by 3 months, or to a combination of these, results were equally disastrous.

(c) Propaganda

Conditions   in   Malaya — political, military and racial - were peculiarly suitable for the development of effective propaganda. The Japanese took full advantage of the situation. Enjoying unbroken success they were in a position to add threats to persuasion, threats which the population realised might shortly be implemented. This would induce a more cautious attitude among the Chinese, who were impervious to any form of blandishment. Chinese waverers might even go over wholeheartedly to the Japanese Camp. To the Malays the Japanese represented themselves as liberators from the British, who had no right in the country anyway and under whose protection the Chinese were stealing the wealth of the land.

One of their leaflets read : —

'Malays, we are your friends, and intend to drive out the Europeans, who have enslaved you, also kill off the Chinese who have taken the wealth of your country. So that we can identify you at all times. wear your hats." Asia for the Asiatics ! `

The ground had been well prepared. Japanese employers of labour, planters, mine owners, managers of trading concerns, had been just and very liberal to their people and had promised that those who assisted them would be suitably rewarded when the country was conquered.

In some States — particularly those formally belonging to Siam- an anti-British bias already existed and it needed little effort to convert this into a  definite pro-Japanese attitude.

To the Tamil coolies they promised a continuance of employment with wages and rewards for help, while harping on the theme that Asia was for the Asiatics. In the case of the Australian they worked on a known or suspected lack of cordiality between themselves and the British whose officers, ran the wording of a leaflet, “regarding the Australian as an uncouth sheep farmer.”

“Go home,” it continued, “or be killed mercilessly by us.”

The line taken in the case of Indian troops was that the Japanese quarrel was with the British only and that if they (Indians) would come over they would not be harmed but given the choice of helping to drive out the British or laying down their arms and going free.

Two Gurka officers, captured at Jitra, were actually released after interrogation and allowed to return to their unit to spread this message among their men.

Backed by unvarying success in the field, these obvious lines of propaganda, in spite of some very crude and badly-prepared examples, were certain to be effective.

Our task was more complex and the machinery should have been correspondingly more suited to the task. Unfortunately the organisation - lacking centralised control over all the forms of propaganda - was quite unable to make an effective reply.

(d)Utilisation of Man Power

One of the most far-reaching results of complacency - of a conviction that war could not come to Malaya - was the failure to organise man-power in time. 30,000 coolies could have been given military work on Singapore Island alone during the campaign. This number was never available and during the critical days of the siege only 1,000 were working, and only in broken periods, owing to air raids.

The need to organisation of Chinese labour was recognised by Malay Command as early as 1938 and the civil authorities were approached then and again the following year, but they refused to consider the scheme. Had there been available at the outbreak of hostilities even 5,000 labourers, organised under vernacular speaking British officers, much of the chaos of December and January might have been avoided. Aerodromes could have been repaired rapidly, ships unloaded and ammunition sent up-country in time; lastly, and most important, some defences, at least, could have been completed on the unprotected north and north-west coasts of the Island. Under modern conditions, where all are in the front line, only comparatively highly organised labour will suffice and workers must be induced to undertake dangerous jobs, such as repair of aerodromes, by making provision for their families in the event of death or injury.

Some observers have attributed the lack of such labour in Singapore as a main cause of disaster. The Chinese community, even before the outbreak of hostilities, had asked to be allowed to form fighting units, but the administration refused to consider the project.

No doubt the whole question of the status of the so-called “Straits” and other Chinese, and our relations with the Government of Chunking, in respect of their subjects required careful handling. However, when the situation became critical sanction was given for the formation of a Chinese guerilla force under British officers. Chinese Communists, particularly when the ban was removed, took a prominent part. Quite untrained and armed with an assortment of sporting weapons, this Chinese Corps acted as scouts and watchers on dangerous stretches of the Island shore, where some were involved in the fighting and suffered heavy casualties. They were steadfast, intensely anti-Japanese and, if properly trained, would have been of great value on the mainland as well as on the Island. The project was undertaken too late.

Another source of man-power not utilised to the best advantage were Englishmen, such as planters, mine managers or prospectors, Forest Officers and Engineers, who had lived for years in the country. A large proportion of these men belonged to various volunteer corps and as such were embodied on the outbreak of war with Japan and employed chiefly on routine duties. Meanwhile troops in the field, ignorant of language, customs or topography, were at a grave disadvantage. They could not utilise the jungle paths, wasted valuable time bringing in harmless inhabitants for interrogation, were unable to make the simplest inquiries.

While it would have been impracticable to have taken planters and others with local knowledge from their employment long before the outbreak of war, such individuals could have been registered in advance for the duties they would be called upon to perform in the areas in which they were acquainted. Such men were used on the Thai border, but not extensively. As a critical stage in the campaign was reached, volunteers were commissioned and attached to units for liaison work and as interpreters and, in general justified their appointment.

The experiment was made too late.

(e) Civil Morale

Considering that the enemy was in a position to bomb centres of population when and where he wished, the morale of civilians was better then might have been expected.

The unexpectedness and severity of the Penang raid certainly caused a panic, which was not surprising, seeing that thousands of dead were lying about the streets unburied for days. Under this ordeal all the municipal services came to a standstill, except in so far as some Europeans managed to keep hospitals open, electrical plants working, and so on. The Police and A.R.P. workers proved quite unreliable; widespread looting took place after the bombing. The evacuation of Europeans alone - it was, of course, impossible to move the entire Chinese and Indian communities - was the subject of severe criticism and a deputation waited on the Governor with a protest. Both in Penang and in the country as a whole members of the civil service seldom remained to the last.

As far as Penang is concerned, it was difficult to see how a debacle could have been averted under the circumstances. The Governor himself had believed that our air strength was sufficient to protect the town and neither Malaya Command nor any other authority believed that the Jitra position would be forced and Penang uncovered in a matter of days.

A further complication in Malayan towns was the preponderance of “foreigners” - i.e, British, Chinese, Indians - who looked on the Government to arrange for the removal in the event of bombing or invasion.

A vast organisation, prepared well in advance, would have been required to deal with the evacuation on such a scale and, as war itself, much less a rapid over-running of the country, was regarded only as a remote possibility, no such scheme was in existence.

The lessons of Penang were given effect to immediately in Singapore; A.R.P. organisation overhauled and a senior military officer appointed as Director-General. He was assisted by a prominent civilian who had himself experienced the raid in Penang. The result was that Singapore was well prepared, except in the matter of shelters in the crowded Chinese quarter, and the population as a whole stood up well to the moderate bombing of the first weeks. As a sequel to the killing and wounding of 500 to 600 in one air raid, small restaurants and cafes, on which the Chinese largely depend for meals in addition to small stores, were closed, but speedily reopened under threat of confiscation. Thousands of town dwellers - Chinese, Malay and Indian - made a practice of leaving the town every evening to sleep in the outlying villages.

To the end the European population remained calm. Of the Asiatics, the Chinese showed least inclination to panic. During the last phase, from the 10th to the 15th February, when the town, in addition to heavy bombing, was subjected to shelling, morale gave way entirely, wounded were too numerous to receive attention; the town was largely on fire. The breakdown was complete.

(F) Fifth Column Activities

The opinion was widely held among the troops that the Malay was an active or potential fifth columnist, while some, with previous experience of the country, have occasionally taken the exact contrary view, maintaining that the Malays as a whole were loyal.

It is naturally difficult to find where the truth lies between these two extremes, particularly owing to the Japanese habit of clothing a large proportion of their “stalker scouts” in Malay dress.

Another difficulty arose owing to the impossibility of clearing local inhabitants from areas in which operations were taking place. At Gurun, in Kedah, for example, a large number of Malays and others had been rounded up, but it was found impossible to evacuate them, with the result that when the Japanese launched an attack these inhabitants commenced running through part of the area occupied by the 11th Division. Large numbers of Japanese in disguise would have no difficulty in passing into our lines under these circumstances. Similarly, between the 11th and the 15th February on Singapore Island, during the operations of the 18th Division round Bukit Timah village and the Race Course, local inhabitants, apparently frightened from their homes, were constantly wandering through the lines, often at dusk, and it would be quite impossible for newly arrived British troops to distinguish bona fide villagers from Japanese scouts.

That there was latterly a great deal of fifth column activity on the Island is proved by the detection and execution of nine Malays between the 9th and the 14th February, by one Field Security Officer. One of the men shot was caught placing twigs bearing red and white strips on the positions of a unit of the 18th Division. He carried a supply of identical strips inside his pagri.

Unquestionably the number of Malays working for the enemy varied according to districts. As explained under “Propaganda,” the Malays of the ex-Siamese States, particularly Kedah and Kelantan, were easily persuaded to assist the Japanese, and there were innumerable instances of Headquarters, defended localities and so on being marked in various ingenious ways so as to be visible from the air. In addition, enemy parties were guided through the thickest jungle and across swamps by paths known only to local inhabitants. These activities, though frequently noted, were not so common in the South. The landing craft at Kota Bahru were enabled to hit off the beaches exactly by lights arranged among the trees. Perhaps the most serious form of activity was that directed against the aircraft, and the heavy losses sustained at the very outset can be attributed to information sent from the vicinity of the Northern aerodromes. By this means many machines were destroyed either on the ground when refuelling or when about to land. At least one European was detected using a secret transmitter for this purpose. On Singapore Island a very efficient organisation enabled the Japanese to bomb aircraft dispersal areas, no matter how well concealed or how often changed. Lights concealed in hollow tree stumps, were used to guide enemy aircraft. Of several transmitters known to be working on the Island or neighbourhood, a few were never located owing to absence of a detector.

Considering the exact knowledge of the country and people acquired by the Japanese over a period of years, their known organising ability and their declared intentions, it would have been surprising had their fifth column been less numerous and efficient than was, in fact, the case.

The only counter - an impracticable one under peace conditions - would have been to forbid or limit stricly their entry into Malaya.

(g) Civil and Military Co-operation and Co-ordination

Given the general belief that war in Malaya was unlikely, it was hardly to be expected that the military authorities would press, or the civil authorities accept, without protest, the drastic changes entailed in establishing unified military control. In practice, unified control was never fully established; to the very end the Governor enjoyed a large measure of authority.

We now know that the only satisfactory solution would have been the appointment of a supreme authority (a Military Governor) over all the services and the Civil Administration. The appointment should have been made in good time and Martial Law should have been introduced earlier than was the case. Without these measures, and notwithstanding goodwill on both sides, smooth working was an impossibility. Under the circumstances the problems were too intricate and too urgent to be solved by conference. Machinery should have been in existence long before the emergency arose.

Many instances could be cited of the harmful effects of divided control, as for instance, the turning down by the Civil Administration of the military proposal to enrol Chinese for military works and, later, as fighting men. The first, certainly, put in hand in good time, might have had a profound effect on the course of the operations.

The evacuation of Penang was the occasion for acute disagreement, confusion and recrimination, owing to the issue of orders on which the Civil authorities considered they should have been consulted. The Penang catastrophe did, however, have one good result, namely, the appointment of a senior officer as Director-General of the Civil Defence Services in Singapore, leading to an immediate improvement of defence measures.

As to the attitude of the civil authorities up country, military officers reports varied between gratitude for whole-hearted co-operation and condemnation of deliberate obstruction. In Singapore there was the case where a special court set up under the War Ordinance to try civilians was declared illegal by the Chief Justice under a statute of James II.

In regard to rationing of food, petrol, street lighting restrictions and the evacuation of civilians, civil officers on one side, and the military on the other, were responsible to different chiefs.

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