MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

Military Considerations:-

 (a) Physical Condition

 (b) Morale

 (c) Japanese Tactics

 (d) Training

 (d) Information

(a) Physical condition

Comparisons were frequently made in Malaya between Japanese toughness and frugality and the apparent softness of British and Indian troops.

It is true to that, even under very trying climatic conditions, they displayed a higher standard of endurance than our men, but it is equally true that this superiority derives from the nature of Japanese life itself, from the social and, in particular, the economic structure of the country. The Japanese is frugal because his country, per head of population, is poor. He eats rice, one of the cheapest of foods, and fish. In comparison, the fighting classes of India, in their own homes, live in luxury. The Indian, and these are numbered in millions, who lives on a level approximately to that of the Japanese peasant, lacks the stamina and fighting qualities of the latter. This is a difference, militarily a very significant one, between the two races which we have to accept.

The British soldier, as far as standard of living is concerned, belongs to a category too far removed for comparison.

The question is whether any measures we could have taken in Malaya, or which we may take in future, can bring us appreciably nearer to the Japanese in toughness and frugality.

It is true that, in conformity with changing standards among the people both at home and in India, the army ration has tended to improve steadily in quality and in variety, if not in quantity. Those with pre-1914 experience of rationing in the Indian Army will be inclined to criticise this tendency; in the case of British troops the scale is now a luxury one, but a policy of this nature cannot be suddenly and radically altered, with the result that in Malaya between 80 and 90 different ration commodities were being issued. While an all-round lowering of scale is essential, even the most drastic curtailment could not, and will not, enable the Indian soldier, let alone the British, to approximate to the Japanese standard under the conditions obtaining in Malaya.

In the matter of endurance two vital considerations are apt to be over-looked: firstly, that the Japanese had found it possible to train their troops for his particular campaign under conditions of climate and terrain approximating to those of Malaya; secondly, that among the Indian troops was a large proportion of very young soldiers, and the young Indian commonly outgrows his strength. A fairer comparison could be made between any seasoned battalion in, say, Waziristan, and a good Japanese unit from Malaya.

But even when all the factors peculiar to this campaign are given their true value, it is clear that in the matter of frugality our troops must compare unfavourably with the Japanese, while in endurance - admitting that he sets a very high standard - much will depend on circumstances (for instance, under conditions prevailing in Burma the disparity was less marked than in Malaya.

Inequality is to be offset, not in attempting to outdo the Japanese in the sphere where he enjoys peculiar advantages, but where we hold, or ought to hold, the lead. e.g., in better aircraft, more of them, and better pilots.

(b) Morale

Observers have been puzzled at the admittedly low level of morale during the campaign on the mainland and astounded at the collapse on the Island between the 12th and 15th February. They speak and write of the caving in of 80,000 men as something sinister and mysterious.

Now from a little distance, the explanation is clear.

Most of these men were desperately tired, and they knew that for the time being no ship could come in. They had been looking to Singapore as a haven, instead of a rest the most tired of them, the 11th Indian Division, had to dig and wire. The Australians had to dig, too, but they had not fought for long nor come so far.

Few of these troops could boast of a success; all had been out-numbered, out-manoeuvred, and never a friendly plane in the sky. They had seen whole brigades melt away in a few hours in the Jungle, so thoroughly destroyed as a fighting body that a few hundreds of foot-sore are all that would reach Singapore by jungle path or country boat.

The enemy, as well aware as ourselves of the condition of men, calculated that shelling, increased bombing and a steady advance would crack them.

(c) Japanese Tactics

The keynote of Japanese tactics was simplicity. They discovered the location of flanks and defended localities and proceeded to carry out wide turning movements while infiltrating into the position. They realised that the road was the vital tactical feature and the flanking movement might come in as much as five miles behind our forward troops. As an alternative they would sometimes attack frontally down the road on a narrow front, the leading troops being cyclists.

They appreciated correctly the superiority of mortars over artillery in the Malaya country, and attained a high degree of accuracy combined with the speed in getting on to the target. The moral effect of this fire was even greater than the casualties inflicted.

Enjoying complete air superiority, they frequently bombed from a height of only 1,000 feet, with marked effect on inexperienced troops. Their tanks, light and medium, on the only occasion they were used in strength on the mainland (Battle of Slim River), broke into the position to a depth of five miles, completely disrupted a Brigade and inflicted severe casualties. They exploited the effects of noise on inexperienced or shaken troops in the jungle by letting off crackers, opening bursts of heavy and probably unaimed fire from unexpected directions and even shouting and howling.

Their methods showed a correct appreciation of the factors peculiar to jungle warfare and attention to detail. They were eminently successful, but, as remarked elsewhere, in considering the success of their tactics full weight should be given to the overwhelming advantage they enjoyed in numbers and air superiority, ability to live off the country, mix undetected with the inhabitants, and so on. Their men were seasoned and they were in a position to train specially for this campaign; in fact, the whole tactical edifice rested on the skill of their specially picked and trained light troops. These were the men, lightly clad, often in Malay dress, who drew fire from our forward troops even if it entailed riding bicycles through the jungle. They were bold, fearless, fanatical and highly skilled in jungle craft, made use of the tree-tops for observation and field of fire and even perfected a system for climbing, They could maintain direction and always know where they were.

The current exaggerated estimate of Japanese efficiency is very largely based on the skill of these picked men. The bulk of their troops, while undoubtedly specially trained for the campaign, were not in the same class as these “stalker scouts” as they have been called.

In two other respects the Japanese have attained a very high standard - engineer repair work and landing operations. As regards the former, it has been stated that our demolitions delayed them on the average just one-third of the time anticipated. This is partly explained by the use of repair material collected by us near bridges for use in case of damage from bombing during our intended advance northwards. The enemy’s crackers and fire from flanks and rear would fail to draw a reply from steady troops, but in circumstances fire discipline was non-existent and positions were given away with extraordinary regularity. In depth on the road was the answer to the enemy’s methods and yet we adopted a stereotyped layout suitable to normal conditions.

(d)Training

From the very opening of hostilities it was obvious that there was something seriously wrong with our training, for not only was the method unsuited for meeting Japanese tactics, but individually our men were inferior as jungle fighters. In conjunction with other serious disadvantages, including inferiority in numbers, and lack of air support, weakness in training was little short of disastrous.

The reasons for this state of affairs could be classed as either basic, that is allied to our state of unpreparedness in every field, civil as well as military, for war in Malaya, or as immediate reasons arising from mistakes our omissions of those on the spot. While the first group cannot, because of their bearing on the immediate causes, be ignored, they will be treated as briefly as possible.

The first of the basic causes for our weakness in training was the failure to realise in time that, to fight successfully in Malaya, troops must undergo a highly specialised form of training. The minimum period suggested by one authority for this training was 6 months, the concurrent acclimatisation of the men being of course, almost as important as the lessons themselves. Even allowing that exigencies of the war as a whole would permit of only half this period being made available, could we have the solution ? The ideal would have been to maintain in Malaya, say, four or five infantry divisions for a period long enough to allow of maximum efficiency being reached and short enough to avoid staleness. Alternatively, a smaller force could have been maintained in the country, while intended reinforcements were being trained for jungle warfare on the most suitable terrain available in India. It is unnecessary to labour the point that war with Japan was not expected in 1941 and that, even if it had been, there was little we could do about it.

Troops of the Empire may be called on to fight in the Arctic, or on the Equator, on snow fields, in jungles or in the deserts, and we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of narrow specialisation in the case of large bodies of men. Warfare in Malaya unfortunately calls for a high degree of specialisation.

Libya, Iraq, Persia, were the theatres in which the British and Indian troops under training in 1940 would most likely be called to fight, and in all these theatres mechanisation was the key to success and, accordingly, the Indian Army, if it can be said to have specialised at all, concentrated on motors; in Malaya over-reliance on motors meant defeat. It is not difficult to picture the case of the Indian soldier, which in the eyes on Libya or Persia, had been rushed through an intensive course of motorisation. The vehicle saved time and toil, it won battles; it must be used on all occasions, everywhere. In Malaya the climate discourages the manhandling of loads, even over the shortest distances; men who were soft, unless continually checked, would tend to keep the transport too far up and they would also shirk the erection of tank obstacles likely to keep their own vehicles at a distance. The Japanese, quick to note this, put road blocks at a comparatively short distance behind the troops, with the result that a stiff action had to be fought over the block. If this failed, vehicles, wounded and much valuable equipment had to be abandoned. The classic instance is the action of Parit Sulong, between Muar and Batu Pahat, where a force was practically wiped out and whole lorry loads of wounded abandoned. This worship of the lorry was vicious; it stultified our efforts to cope with an enemy who was exceedingly mobile on foot. It became the master, instead of being the servant, of tactical method. Transport should have been parked miles in rear (Japanese flanking movements would hit the road 4 or 5 miles behind the forward troops), then our men would have had to march more often and would have been tougher.

Outstanding among the immediate (remediable) causes of our faulty training was a lack of guidance from the Malaya Command. This in turn was due to an unimaginative approach to the whole problem of jungle warfare, lack of detailed study necessary for the formation of a definite policy, with the results of their own theories, experiments and practice. In this connection it is remarkable that the only formation which consistently faced the Japanese with confidence, either in attack or defence, delayed them and inflicted severe loss, was a brigade which had been in Malaya since 1939. It suggests that experience counts more in this type of fighting than in any other. It was one of the tragedies that the very efficiency of this brigade necessitated their being employed until they ceased to exist.

An officer with long experience of Indian frontier militia corps once said “Put boots on an Indian sepoy and he ceases to think.”  He was of course, making a comparison between the regular Indian infantryman and his own Pathan scouts, who wear sandals, semi-native dress and carry 50 rounds in a leather bandoleer. In Malaya, we not only kept the sepoy´s boots on, but encouraged him to sit in a lorry, when he is by nature an irregular - the Pathan being supreme - a good marcher and frugal. We left him with the impedimenta for a winter campaign in North Africa and expected him to compete with an enemy who had discarded everything except vest, cotton trousers, gym shoes and small-bore rifle.

In considering our failure to evolve satisfactory tactical methods. allowance had to be made for the great disadvantages unconnected with faulty training or unsuitable equipment. Chief among these was our numerical weakness and lack of air support which compelled our commanders not only to fight always on the defensive, but reduced their men to a physical and morale condition not far removed from complete breakdown.

The experience in Malaya of troops being unable to get the measure of a new enemy and strange conditions is not unique. Wazirestan in 1929-20 is a parallel case. The troops employed were, in the main, those who had fought, and fought well, in the closing stages of the Palestine Campaign; they could dig trenches use hand grenades and Stokes mortars and were efficient with the bayonet. They were steady under shell fire and yet one unit after another was cut up during the advance up the Takki Zam against an enemy who had no artillery, no aircraft and no machine guns. He merely knew the secret of the use of ground and was an excellent rifle shot. These regiments of 1919 learnt their lesson in a month or two and advanced into the heart of the country. In Malaya there was no time or opportunity to put into practice what we had learnt.

(e) Information

The paucity of useful, op-to-date information from the firing-line was one of the marked features of this campaign. The main reason was certainly the conditions under which we were fighting, that is to say, continually being pushed back with dangerous situations following one another at such intervals so that all attention was devoted to avoid being cut off. Secondly, neither officers nor men realised the importance of gleaning every possible item of information - even the way their shoes were fastened - about the enemy. Even allowing for the difficulties in making captures when on the defensive and mostly retiring fast, enemy weapons and equipment must have fallen into our hands and very little of this ever sent back for examination.

With regard to prisoners, the position was still worse and the conduct of the force in this respect is still somewhat of a mystery. No more than 12 prisoners were sent back to the base, and these included pilots who had baled out. More must have been captured. It is a matter of training, till every officer and man, down to the youngest, realise that all information - however trivial - is important.

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