Part III-b

26. At 1000 hours nth December the enemy was reported to be landing on Lamma Island, and guns of Aberdeen and Jubilee Batteries were brought into action. This was followed at 1300 hours by a report that an enemy party in Chinese sampans was attempting a landing at Aberdeen Island. This was driven off by machine gun fire.

Again during the afternoon the Japanese were reported to be concentrating about one hundred junks off Lamma, which our artillery engaged.

27. Stonecutters Island.—Enemy bombardment of Stonecutters continued throughout the day, West Fort having forty direct hits before midday. Much material damage generally was caused, chiefly to buildings. Telephone communications were continually cut. In the afternoon, to conform to the withdrawal from the mainland, I ordered the withdrawal from this island and the destruction of 'guns and all immovable stores, according to a detailed plan previously prepared. This was successfully carried out.

28. During the day 11th December fifth column activities developed in Kowloon. Some of the fifth columnists were armed, ⁵ and rioting and looting occurred in the streets. A large number of launch crews and lorry and car drivers deserted, throwing a heavy handicap on the shoulders of the administrative services— civil, naval and military—particularly on view of the large and hurried evacuation for that evening and night.

Throughout the day nth December Hong Kong was subjected to bombing and spasmodic artillery fire The R.N. Dockyard, R.A.S.C. Camber and the R.A.O.C. Depot all suffered some damage, though casualties were few. The civilian population in Hong Kong remained calm, though naturally the news of early evacuation of the mainland came as a considerable shock.

29. Withdrawal of troops from the mainland (11th/12th December).—

(a) Careful plans had been drawn up 'by Brigadier Mainland Infantry Brigade, and all troops were 'employed on successive positions.

The operation was well carried out. However, HQ details of 2/14 Punjab Regt. and some others came down on to Kai Tak aerodrome by mistake in the darkness and became involved in street fighting in the outskirts of Kowloon City. A launch was, sent over at about oioo hours but could not gain contact with them. The bulk of the Company, however, were taken off at Star Ferry pier at dawn, breaking off a running fight with the enemy as they actually cast off from the pier side.

(b) Battalion HQ of the 2/114 Punjab Regt. and two Companies had been unable to maintain the timed programme during the night owing to enemy action, and at dawn they were withdrawing down the West side of Devils Peak Peninsula. They stayed that day dispersed in the foothills at the southern end, whilst two companies of 5/7 Rajput Regt. held the Ma Lau Tong line as planned, with one company on the rear position Hai Wan.

(c) The personnel of both Indian battalions were in good heart but somewhat exhausted after four days of continuous day and night vigilance and long night carries, over rough tracks and coolie paths, of many machine guns, light automatics and mortars. Owing to the simultaneous withdrawals of all three battalions, the 5/7 Rajput Regiment's transport had not been augmented by mules from the other battalions as planned, and this emphasised the shortage of mule transport which had always been apparent on peace exercises. It will be realised that units were on an improvised scale of trucks, lorries, and mules, as pooling of the inadequate " Colonial" establishments had been found to be necessary. The transport situation had .become much worse with the arrival of the two Canadian battalions, for their transport had -been shipped in a different vessel, diverted via. Australia, and had not arrived before war with Japan broke out.

(d) At midnight 11/12th December the Hong Kong Telephone Company cut all  communications between the island and the mainland.

(e) One troop of 3-7-in. Howitzers remained at the southern end of Devils Peak in support of the Ma Lau Tong position. Mainland Infantry Brigade HQ also remained on the -Peninsula pending further developments.⁶ Most of the Bren carriers and all the armoured cars were safely evacuated from the mainland.

(f) At 0600 hours 12th December military cables to Kowloon were cut at the R N. Yard cable hut.

(g) At dawn 2 Royal Scots temporarily took over the North East sector of the island defences, this being largely a precautionary measure only, as the occupation of the Devils Peak Peninsula by the 5/7 Rajput Regt. covered this sector effectively. This North East sector 'had previously been manned in skeleton form by some HQ personnel of 1 Middlesex Regt. plus a platoon of No. 3 Company HKVDDC. In the North West sector was " Z " Company 1 Middlesex Regt., consisting of spare men of machine gun companies plus battalion cooks, storemen, bandsmen, etc., manning forty machine guns from Fortress reserve stocks. This Company constituted a valuable fighting force enabling inter alia the I Middlesex Regt. to man the pill boxes on the entire perimeter of the island from nth to 13th December.

30. Air raids and shelling of the island continued throughout the day 12th December. The North shore Dockyard was badly damaged and also the R.A.O.C. Depot, which was hit on five occasions. Aberdeen and Green Island cables were both cut. By now many coast defence guns, especially 6-in., were being used for landward firing, calculations to hit one hundred points having been worked out in peace time. Harassing fire by night, and counter battery fire and the engagement of observed targets by day, was carried out.

The allowance of 25 rounds per gun for such landward firing was greatly exceeded. High explosive Mk XIIIA shell of 1918 manufacture was faulty, several bursting immediately in front of the muzzle.

31. A.A.—There were insufficient guns togive adequate gun density at any point. More 3-7-in. guns were expected shortly and also more Bofors (the garrison had but two), for "release telegrams" had been received from HQ Far East. The A.A. defences were well known to be inadequate, but I realised that the call for the European and Mediterranean theatres of war had prevented reinforcements. Targets were numerous (i2th December) but the A.A. positions extremely few owing to the mountainous nature of the country of Hong Kong Island. The enemy, with such good observation from Kowloon, was very quick on to any A.A. section opening up, and I consider that Lt. Colonel F. D. Field fought his command very well. The scarcity both of transport and roads severely handicapped the mobility of the guns and also the ammunition supply and administration of the sections. The shortage of British officers was very much felt. During the night one of the A.A. searchlights on Green Island acted as a sentry beam on receipt of a report that the enemy were landing near West Point.

At this juncture Wing Commander H. G. Sullivan, the Officer Commanding R.A.F., offered the services of one officer and 16 N C.Os. for wireless and telephone duties, which I gladly accepted. They were incorporated with Royal Signals.

The morale of the civilian population had been considerably shaken, and fifth columnists became more active. Rice distribution and the monetary situation caused anxiety and necessitated urgent measures.

32. During the afternoon 12th December the enemy was reported to be occupying George Island (off Lamma) and there was considerable activity seawards.

33. In the late afternoon a strong enemy attack (about one battalion) developed against the left company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. on the Ma Lau Tong line but was successfully beaten off, assisted by quick support provided by the Royal Artillery. Heavy casualties on the enemy were observed. The 5/7 Rajput Regt. was subjected to dive 'bombing and heavy mortar fire throughout the day. In view of the weight of the Japanese attack, the rapid development of their heavy mortar fire, the contricted passage across the Lyemun Strait, the shortage of launch crews, and as we now had no footing on the mainland except at Devils Peak Peninsula, I gave orders to Commander Mainland Infantry Brigade that the Ma Lau Tong line should-be evacuated during the night.

The first task was to be the evacuation of HQ and two companies of 2/14 Punjab Regt. which had been previously arranged. This was to be followed by the withdrawal of the 3-7-in. Howitzer troop R.A. The second and the shorter of the Devils Peak Lines (Hai Wan) was to be held by HQ 5/7 Rajput Regt. and two companies, the remainder of that battalion being evacuated last. The first withdrawal was timed for 1930 hours.

34. Shell fire died down at dusk (12th December) but the water transport difficulties were serious. Chinese crews deserted in the darkness from the W.D. fleet, though covered by rifles, engineers were deficient, and some launches were found to be in a sinking condition Administrative officers had been sent out from my HQ to accelerate matters and took personal charge and operated what boats they could, but serious delays occurred. It was not until 0130 hours that the 2/114 Punjab Regt., some 300 men, were all across.

At 0400 hours the bulk of the first troop R.A. (less mules) and one company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. were across, tout the Mule Corps was still to come. It was clear that the situation was critical if daylight crossings were to be avoided and I called on the Royal Navy to assist. Their response was prompt. Three motor torpedo boats were despatched from Aberdeen and one more was recalled from patrol in Junk Bay where it had been covering the right flank of the 5/7 Rajput Regt. from possible enemy attack in sampans from Hang Hau area (an operation which had been attempted by night during peace training and found feasible).

The destroyer HM S " Thracian " was also ordered round from" Aberdeen but could not be expected to arrive before 0600 hours, 13th December.

I ordered Brigadier Wallis to give full priority to personnel, and that there was to be no question of evacuating the 120 mules and further risking the operation. In any case the mule lighter crew had deserted, and the handling of this craft in the dark by personnel unaccustomed to it was a dubious proposition, and % moreover she was badly holed by enemy fire and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. Meanwhile the W.D.V. " Victoria " had been slowly and steadily evacuating personnel and equipment under Major A. J. Dewar and Captain C. .G. Turner. When the torpedo boats arrived at the 'small pier on the Devils Peak Peninsula it was found that the state of the tide did not permit them to " lie close to "— a risk that had been foreseen and accepted. This meant more delay and ferrying by sampans. Ferry trips were, however, made by the torpedo boats directly H.M.S. " Thracian " arrived, the tide having risen slightly.

35. At about 0400 hours 13th December I discussed with Bngadier Wallis the advisability of also including in the withdrawal the two companies of 5/7 Rajput Regt. holding the rear position. The enemy were in constant though light contact throughout, and after their severe handling would be temporarily disinclined to follow up. The water transport situation had already become more than precarious, it was extremely doubtful if any W.D. vessel, except perhaps the " Victoria " would be available next night, and I thus foresaw the greatest difficulties and even the impossibility of maintaining the 5/7 Rajput Regt. with ammunition and supplies in their isolated position. I decided that the risk was too great, and I also urgently required them to relieve and man the North East sector then 'held by 2 Royal Scots. This latter battalion was not in good shape, as they had lost many of their best officers killed or wounded, and I judged it to be necessary to withdraw them into reserve so that they could obtain a short respite in which to rest and re-equip. In addition they were unfamiliar with the ground, their previous sector having been the South West. One1 company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. was therefore ordered to cover the withdrawal of the remainder and then themselves embark in the last flights. Daylight had arrived by then, but they accomplished the evacuation without casualties, covered by artillery fire from various island positions.

36. It was not until 0920 hours that the last contingent of 5/7 Rajput Regt. from the mainland readied Aberdeen. The whole battalion was collected in the Tytam Gap area by noon and given twenty-four hours to rest and requip before taking over the North East sector from 2 Royal Scots The 2/14 Punjab Regt. took over the North West sector. During the night (12/13th December), at the urgent request of the civil authorities, arrangements were made with the Harbour 'Master to pass 9 tons of dynamite from Green Island to the Star Ferry for collection and distribution.

On its return, loaded, it left Green Island two hours ahead of schedule, with the result that it reached the Vehicular Ferry (not Star Ferry) unexpectedly, and the N.C.O. commanding the1 pill box there gave the order to fire, as no lights or distinguishing marks were visible. The launch blew up and all on board thus unfortunately lost their lives.

37. At 0900 hours 13th December a launch bearing a flag of truce was seen to put off from Kowloon. It arrived at Victoria Pier with a Staff Officer of the General commanding the Japanese Forces ('Lt.-General Sakai) bearing a letter addressed to H.E. The Governor. The letter demanded the surrender of the Colony and threatened severe artillery fire and aerial bombardment in the event of refusal. The demand was tantamount to unconditional surrender and was rejected categorically.

38. During the morning the Japanese were observed to be collecting launches in Kowloon Bay and concentrating them mainly at Bailey's Shipyard near the cement-works. The situation as I saw it was that the enemy, if he attacked from the mainland, might direct his attack on to:—

(b) or (c) seemed most probable m view of the short distance across, the easy support by artillery and mortars and the possible combination with Wang Ching Wei factions and others in, the congested area of the town. The number of derelict craft in the area of (a) lessened the likelihood of attack there.

Any attack from the mainland might well be in combination with an attack on the South shore. My available reserves were: —

(i) 2 Royal Scots, after relief and move from North East sector to the Wanchai Gap Filter Beds area, but temporarily unfit until they could be thoroughly rested and reorganised.

(ii) Two companies 5/7 Rajput Regt. North East sector.

(iii) One company Winnipeg Grenadiers in South West sector.

(iv) Two companies 2/14 Punjab Regt. in North Wrest sector.

(v) " Z " Coy. 1 Middlesex Regt. including one mobile machine gun platoon.

39. A.A.—In the early afternoon 13th December our A.A. guns brought down a large seaplane which crashed into the sea about 3000 yards West of Lamma (confirmed later by the Japanese).

40 During the day the enemy artillery fire increased in intensity (up to g-in. calibre), one 9-2-in. gun at Mount Davis was knocked out by a direct hit, and at dusk Belchers Fort was heavily shelled and set on fire. Other serious fires were started at West Point and Kennedy Town.

Fifth columnists⁷ had been active during the day and a large number of army transport drivers deserted, some of them taking their lorries with them. Police dealt with these in due course The civilian population showed signs of strain, and food queues in some districts became disorderly The question of rice distribution presented a grave problem in the overcrowded quarters.

41. At 0200 hours 14th December great anxiety was caused by the speed of the fires at Belchers and Kennedy Town. The civil fire brigades had been fighting the fires for many hours and asked for military assistance. At various times three parties were accordingly sent but on each occasion were returned without any work having been performed on demolitions (a detailed series of " fire lanes " had been worked out and calculations completed before the war broke out). On the fourth occasion, however, some houses were blown down. Fires were under control by midday Elements of the civil population made these disasters an occasion for disorderly conduct; fifth columnists became more active and great care was necessary in checking telephone calls. The civil police found difficulty in maintaining guards over vulnerable points, and negotiated with the Chungking Government secret societies for assistance.

42. Certain movements of enemy warships were observed during the day (i4th December), steaming on far distant courses.

43.

 (a) There was a marked increase in the intensity and accuracy of hostile shelling on the 14th December. Two 4.7-m. guns at Belchers had been hit and put out of action, and one 9.2 in. at Mount Davis had its communications cut for two hours. Also at Mount Davis, one 3-in. A.A. gun was hit and permanently disabled, causing about 30 per cent, casualties to the A.A. personnel. Many Chinese gunners deserted as a result.

(b) Pak Sha Wan Battery (Chinese volunteers) came in for particular attention, being both shelled and mortared. Its Battery Command Post and all internal communications were destroyed and the Battery Commander was wounded and evacuated. The guns were reduced to independent autosight control. At this juncture owing to an imperfectly conveyed message and an error of judgement of the junior officer left in acting command, the personnel were given the option of going to Stanley. All but two Chinese left; seventeen British and Portuguese stayed. A few regular British gunners were later sent up as reinforcements.

(c) A very heavy concentration on Magazine Gap cut eight main cables involving 195 circuits, severing communications between Fortress Headquarters and all terminals to the South of that Gap. Within 20 hours the Royal Corps of Signals, working magnificently, restored all lines

44. Civil Population —The civil police found their hands more than full in maintaining order in the city but had the situation generally under control except in the A R.P. tunnels, where in certain cases armed gangs of robbers were operating. Pamphlets were dropped by the Japanese

45. H.M.S. " Thracian " carried out an excellent operation during the night (15/16th December) making her way past Green Island, across the Japanese front on the Kowloon Peninsula, and then sinking two ferry boats at anchor full of enemy troops one thousand yards East of the Electric Power Station, Kowloon.

46. By now the new organisation of the island defences had been carried out viz.: division into two brigade areas—East Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Wallis) and West Infantry-Brigade (Brigadier J. K. Lawson). The North-South dividing line approximated closely to the former dividing line between the easterly and westerly island sectors. At the northern extremity, however, it was placed further East to increase the front held by the 2/14 Punjab Regt. now considered a safer sector owing to the " anti-boat fence " or boom which was in position from Sheung Wan to Green Island. The continuation towards Kellett Island had been prevented bythe desertion of Chinese crews and there had been no opportunity of carrying the complete scheme through, i.e , a third portion constructed across to Kowloon Point.

1 Middlesex Regt. was given a small but important sector based on Leighton Hill Ridge Causeway Bay area. No preparations, however had been possible on the Ridge before hostilities, except a little wiring and three shell-slits, as the property was Government owned and housed many Government officials who could not be dispossessed or inconvenienced before the " precautionary period " of the Defence Scheme (which actually was never declared owing to the rapid development of full war conditions).

1 Middlesex Regt. came directly under command of Fortress as '' Corps, Troops '' for defence purposes. This eased the situation for Brigadier Wallis, who had the larger half of the island to command, and for Brigadier Lawson who was unfamiliar with the ground.

During the night 14/15th December the 5/7 Rajput Regt. relieved the 2 Royal Scots in the North East sector. The latter moved later to the area Wanchad Gap-Filter Beds to refit and re-organise, but one company took over a narrow front just West of the naval hospital.

47. During the early hours 15th December a broadcast from Kowloon could be hoard of European songs and music; the talks, however, were not clear. They were probably from loud speakers on vans in the streets, as the radio transmitting station in Kowloon had been destroyed before evacuation. Several traitors, with lamps of primitive design operated from a dry battery, with a small but adequate mirror, were reported signalling from the island to the mainland. When these operators were intercepted they were shot.

48.

(a) There was a systematic shelling of pill boxes along the North shore during the morning 15th December: three were knocked out and one badly damaged. One had forty holes drilled right through by a high velocity gun of small calibre located on Kowloon Peninsula, firing from a concealed position inside a water front " Godown." The provision of alternative emplacements for the pill boxes of the North shore defences had already been taken up and some ten to twelve were completed. They should of course have been completed in peace time but it would have meant requisitioning valuable " Godown " and office properties, and requisitioning had not been sanctioned by Government until the proposed " Precautionary Period."

(b) By nightfall all military and civil telephone routes in the North East sector, including those to pill boxes Nos. 40 to 53 were severely interrupted. Night repair work was at once put in hand.

(c) Aberdeen Island and the A.A. positions at Lyemun (Saiwan Hill) were heavily shelled, one gun being-put out of action temporarily.

(d) At noon 15th December the -enemy was observed preparing sandbagged positions on the water front by the Kowloon Godowns, probably for mortars. Later, mortar fire fell in the vicinity of the R.N. Dockyard, Command H.Q., and Lower Peak Tramway Terminus.

(e) By now a " Command Observation Post " with direct lines to Fortress H.Q. was operating well from the Peak, manned by HKVDC, and also two special observation posts (pill box 69 and Kennedy Rd.) manned by 2/14 Punjab Regt.

(f) Enemy was observed collecting small craft in Kowloon Bay—possibly for a raid; special arrangements were made to counter this viz.: a .concentration was fired by 6-in. Howitzers and two craft were set alight. Orders were also issued from Fortress HQ to the A.A. searchlights at Saiwan and Braemar to cease their normal role at any time if they heard continuous machine gun fire on the North shore and to turn their lights down to illuminate the harbour.

49. At 2100 hours, 15th December, an attempted landing was reported by the Pak Sha Wan Battery (HKVDC). It was ascertained later from several sources that a very bold attempt was made by the enemy who, with small rubber boats and petrol tin rafts, for equipment, swam across in fair strength— estimates varied from one to three Companies. All were shot in the water, the depleted battery (see para. 43 (b) contributing about defence.

50.

(a) For four hours on 15th December Pinewood A.A. Battery was shelled by calibres up to 9-in. One gun was smashed irreparably and the other so badly damaged that it was out of action for the remainder of the battle. All instruments were rendered useless. Casualties to personnel were not numerous and men not hit were employed on salvage, and in an infantry role with 2/14 Punjab Regiment. We claimed two hits on enemy aircraft during the day.

(b) The general impression of Japanese artillery fire was that their gunners were extremely accurate on targets which were obviously well known from our peace time dispositions and under direct observation, but inaccurate in picking up new targets needing predicted fire, in spite of abundant air reconnaissance. About 30 per cent, of the ammunition burst defectively and of the heavier natures at times 50 per cent, failed to explode.

 Turn Page