Part III-a

14. During, the early days of December as the situation progressively deteriorated so were more and more troops deployed, until on the evening of 7th December all were in their battle positions. By evening very definite reports were received of concentrations of Japanese forces in the villages bordering the frontier. The company of 2 /14 Punjab Regt. at Fanling had been in position for some days with constant watch maintained from the frontier observation posts.

At 0445 hours 8th December intelligence sources reported hearing on a Tokyo broadcast code instructions to their nationals that war with Great Britain and U.S.A. was imminent at any moment. His Excellency the Governor was immediately warned and the message was passed on to all concerned. The frontier company (Major Gray, 2/14 Punjab Regt.) was telephoned and orders were issued for the forward demolitions to be blown, i.e., to the East and North of Fanling. Subsequent events showed that all these forward demolitions were blown successfully.

By 0645 hours the garrison had been informed that the British Empire and Japan were at war.

Command HQ had moved into the underground Battle HQ.

At 0800 hours Japanese aircraft dive attacked Kai Tak aerodrome (down to 60 feet, showing first class standard) and destroyed and damaged the following grounded planes: —

R.A.F.—3 destroyed, I seriously damaged and 1 slightly damaged.

Civil—1 Clipper and 7 others (D.C. 23 Condors, etc.).

Shamshuipo barracks were also attacked and bombed but very few casualties were caused, owing to full deployment.

By 0900 hours Fortress Engineers and administrative services were on the move to their dispersal areas in accordance with plans. Japanese machines on to Kai Tak and over Kowloon numbered respectively 36 Fighters and 12 Bombers. During the day subversive pamphlets, addressed mainly to Indian troops, were dropped. They were poorly drawn up and carried no weight either with British or Indian troops.

15 Action of Forward Troops on the Taipo Road, commanded by Major G. E. Gray, 2/14 Punjab Regt.

At 0800 hours 8th December the Japanese began bridging at Lo Wu and our observation posts reported hundreds of Japanese crossing into Laffans Plain. This was later estimated to be a battalion and it seems fairly certain that a two battalion front was adopted—the other battalion going later straight down the Taipo Road. The tactics were almost invariably to push a strong body up the nearest hill and round a flank directly any line of approach was found to be blocked. The threat of a battalion moving round his right flank was a constant menace, and necessitated Major Gray's decision to make sure of the big demolitions No. 731 and R 94 one mile North of Taipo and not to attempt any real delaying action forward of this. It was thus 1500 hours when the first enemy attacks developed in this area and were beaten off by fire. Outflanking movements developed immediately, necessitating withdrawal to South of the causeway, Taipo.

A platoon had been posted wide on the West flank as left flank guard. A Japanese detachment headed by three women (Chinese) attacked here at 1830 hours. All were shot.

At 1930 hours the mechanised portion of Forward Troops, composed of two armoured cars and four Bren carriers, co-operated most effectively in ambushing a Japanese platoon in close formation. It was virtually wiped out by machine gun and light automatic fire from one hundred yards range. The enemy never relaxed his pressure during the bright moonlight night. It was obvious that his small columns, using cross country tracks, were led by guides who knew the ground intimately, thus enabling the attack to develop quicker than had been thought possible, especially as this was combined with a high standard of night training. I was subsequently informed by a Japanese Staff officer (Major Nishiyama) that a month had been spent on concentrated night training for the attack on Hong Kong. At midnight Forward Troops withdrew to Taipo Mei where an important demolition was duly blown, followed by another withdrawal an hour later to Fo Tan Valley, this being necessitated by small parties of the enemy having reached" positions on the road behind the Forward Troops' dispositions.

16. By 0330 hours 9th December all demolitions were successfully blown except one at Taipo where Japanese forward patrols were extremely quick in following up and cutting the leads to the abutments after the withdrawal of the final covering party. The safety fuze used for the piers, however, had burned too far for interruption and these piers were successfully destroyed.

At dawn Forward Troops were on Monastery Ridge just forward of the Gindrinkers Line, where they maintained themselves all day, withdrawing by order at dusk. During the day many excellent artillery targets offered themselves and were engaged with success. The Forward Troops had fulfilled their role admirably, and had inflicted some 100 casualties to the Japanese at no real cost to themselves.

17. On the other main line of approach, viz.: Castle Peak Road, late in the evening 8th December enemy transport was seen banking up at the road 'bridge North of Au Tau,  showing the success of the demolition there. 5.9 in. guns were seen to be tractor drawn up to the bridge and then manhandled into a village to the East. This battery fired at intervals during

the next fifty-six hours on Hong Kong Island and was calculated by the Royal Artillery to be on Kam Tin aerodrome. Several shells passed over the main ridge of the island and landed near Aberdeen Reservoir; the .firing was at too long a range to be taken seriously and in any case was out of range of our artillery.

At 1340 hours on 8th December a large formation of Japanese planes carried out another raid, this time on Stanley, dropping a few bombs Little material damage was done.

18.

 (a) At 0600 hours 9th December I ordered Mainland Infantry Brigade to move the reserve company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. across to fill the gap East of Smugglers Pass, previously only patrolled until the direction of the main enemy thrust should be disclosed.

(b) Enemy action during the day was chiefly confined to patrol action. 2 Royal Scots had strong patrols on the tracks leading South East from the Kam Tin area which confirmed the use of Chinese guides by Japanese advanced troops. Later information from the Chinese member of " Z Force " was to the effect that these Chinese guides were drawn from the village of Tsun Wan Wai which he said was largely pro-Wang Ching Wei. " Z Force " was a band of local volunteers which had been trained beforehand for work behind the Japanese lines and was led by Mr. Kendall. Dumps of arms, supplies, medical stores, etc., had been made beforehand at three points in the new territories.

(c) It transpired at this time that the Japanese scouts and snipers were highly trained and extremely difficult to detect. Their uniform consisting of quilted material with cross stitching was particularly adapted to the insertion of twigs, grass, etc., obtained locally— thus blending perfectly with the surroundings. Others encountered later on the island had a camouflage net rolled up and carried high on the back, from which position it could be quickly drawn over head and shoulders.

(d) The demolitions on Castle Peak Road were blown successfully, except the one at the Dairy Farm, where the leads were cut by a saboteur who slipped in immediately the last sentry was withdrawn. He moved to the next demolition, close by, and was blown up and killed whilst standing on top of it.

(e) During the night gth/ioth arrangements were made with the police to evacuate the villagers from places where the front line posts ran through or too near to villages—a matter of great difficulty owing to the trip wires of anti-personnel mines which had been put out to  supplement the thinly held front.

19. At 2200 hours the CNAC planes left for Free China. In one was despatched Lt.-Colonel H. Q. Hughes (HKVDC) who was to act as our liaison officer with 7th Chinese Army.

20. At about 2300 hours on the night of 9th/10th December a report was received from the Company Commander 5/7 Rajput Regt. (whose company had been moved across from being reserve company in the Right battalion Sector) that he could hear enemy moving in the Shingmun Valley on his (immediate front, and later the nearest 2 Royal Scots Company (" A " Company) reported hearing explosions from one of the pill boxes constituting " Shingmun Redoubt." Within the hour it was clear that Shingmun Redoubt ha'd fallen, including the artillery observation post and the HQ of "A" Company 2 Royal Scots.

The capture by surprise of this key position, which dominated a large portion of the left flank and the importance of which had been so frequently stressed beforehand, directly and gravely affected subsequent events and prejudiced Naval, Military and Civil defence arrangements. The possibility of mounting an immediate counter attack that night was considered with Commander Mainland Brigade but was ruled out as the nearest troops were a mile away, the -ground precipitous and broken, and the exact situation round the Redoubt very obscure.

At about 0315 hours an artillery concentration was put down on the area of the western portion of the Redoubt and this was heard to take toll of the enemy.

21. At midnight 9th/10th December I decided to move the reserve company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers across from Hong Kong Island. It was placed at the disposal of Brigadier Mainland Brigade and arrived at his HQ at 0400 hours Confused fighting took place South of Shingmun Redoubt, and a further enemy advance next morning was stopped by artillery support and by the vigorous action taken by Captain 'H. R. Newton, commanding the 5/7 Rajput Company there. About one enemy company attacked and was driven back into Shingmun Redoubt which was then shelled by 6 .in.kHowitzers. Captain Newton was confident that severe casualties had been inflicted upon the enemy.

A counter attack by Captain Newton's Company was considered, but this would have caused a serious gap between the 2/14 Punjab Regt. and Shingmun, where the enemy had already made attempts to effect penetration. The enemy success, however, caused dangerous exposure of the centre (" B ") and left (" C ") Companies of 2 Royal Scots, and at 1530 hours I sanctioned their withdrawal from the Pineapple Road ² and Texaco Peninsula positions (a mile in front now, and with ah open flank) to the strong Golden Hill line which reached the sea at the Laichikok Peninsula. This withdrawal was carried out without incident at dusk— though the two companies required a certain amount of adjustment before dawn.

22. 10th December.—During that day I ordered the R.A.F. to evacuate Kai Tak aerodrome and to destroy machines and equipment. I had at no time contemplated 'the serious use of obsolete 100 m.p.h. aircraft which would have been shot down immediately by modern fighters, but in any case by this time only one machine was fit to operate. Demolitions there were practically completed, and were finished later by No. 1 Company HKVDC allotted for aerodrome ground and air defence (together with 4 Bren* carriers). This company under Captain A. H. Penn performed its duties very well. The aerodrome was left obstructed by using concrete sections of drains, railings from the " surrounds " and derelict M.T. Enemy air activity was spasmodic, but our first A.A. success, iconfirmed from three sources, was recorded; an enemy plane over Causeway Bay was hit and fell into the sea in Tide Cove.

23. By now the special warning system was in operation and proved most satisfactory. The arrival of enemy aircraft was forecast and known to within a couple of minutes.

An intense shelling of Stonecutters Island began during the day. At first the fire wais inaccurate but later became extremely accurate and the attack was also taken up from the air. Much damage was caused by 5.9 in. fire in particular, one "round landing between the two 60 pounders which had been moved over to Stonecutters a week previously for firing in enfilade down the Taipo Road, which they had been doing very successfully during the past thirty six hours.

During the day a fair amount of movement seawards was observed—Japanese torpedo boats, minesweepers and one destroyer. Later three more destroyers and a cruiser were observed.

H.M.S. " Cicala " had 'been covering the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots on the Castle Peak Road during the last three days, and on this day (loth December) discovered a Japanese working party clearing demolitions at Brothers Point. Fire was opened with 6 in. guns and direct hits obtained. Several Japanese attacks from the air were beaten off but eventually the ship received a direct hit which necessitated docking for repair.

At 1742 hours the last of the Eastern Telegraph Company cables between' Hong Kong and the outside world was cut by enemy action. Orders were now issued to put in hand, starting with a " Priority A " group, the laying by Royal Engineers of anti-personnel minefields on beaches, etc., on the southern shores of the island.

24. 10th / 11th December.—Intermittent shelling of both mainland and island continued throughout the night, and before. dawn the Bowen Road Hospital was hit four times. The first air raid ³ of the day took place at 0800 hours.

25.11th December.—On the mainland at dawn the enemy opened up mortar fire and then attacked the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots ³, driving them back in disorder and exposing the junction of the Castle P'eak and Taipo Roads, thus seriously endangering the withdrawal of all the troops based on the Taipo Road (2/14 Punjab Regt., one company 5/7 Rajput Regt., troop 4.5 in. Howitzers, troop 3.7 in. Howitzers). The situation was critical but the company of the I .Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Bren carriers from Kad Tak aerodrome defences were moved into position covering the gap.

At midday 11th December I ordered withdrawal from the mainland under cover of darkness— except for 5/7 Rajput Regt. detailed under the scheme of defence for occupation' of Devils Peak Peninsula. The withdrawal called for a difficult operation by the 2/14 Punjab Regt.—a move by night across the whole front, along the line of the passes (Kowloon Pass, Shatin Pass, Grasscutters Pass) and down the Devils Peak Peninsula—a move not practised beforehand. Brigade Headquarters, 2 Royal Scots and various administrative detachments were to cross from embarkation points on the East side of Kowloon Peninsula. The West side of the Peninsula was free ⁴ for evacuation of civilians, civil stores of the food in the Godowns, etc. The notice I could give was regrettably short but unavoidable owing to the  rapidity with which the situation had deteriorated. In spite of the short notice the Royal Signals personnel successfully evacuated 49 miles of D8 cable and 20 tons of buried type cable.

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