Part III-c

51. During this day (15th December) the last of the " Priority A " anti-personnel minefields was completed by Fortress R.E.

The morale of the civilian population, remained shaky, chiefly due to rice distribution difficulties. The Chungking Government representatives had been most helpful in assisting in the maintenance of order.

52. News was received from the Chinese General Staff of the advance of Chinese forces towards Hong Kong. This fitted in with the plans which I had previously received via Chungking of the proposed attack of General Yu Han Mou's 7th Army. However, the information now was modified by the statement that effective assistance could not be available until early January. Information of intended help from Chinese forces from the North was circulated to formations and units.

53. At daybreak 16th December observation revealed no enemy movements along the mainland waterfront between Kai Tak and the Kowloon Star Ferry, but launch activity in Kowloon Bay continued.

54. Bombing and shelling by the enemy were now showing a higher standard of accuracy and increasing in intensity, being confined mainly to military objectives The first air raid occurred at 0900 hours and lasted thirty five minutes.

In the afternoon, 16th December, seventeen enemy planes bombed Mount Davis, which was also heavily and accurately shelled: an unexploded 9-in. shell entered the Fortress Plotting Room and damaged the instruments. A bomb dropped in Shaukiwan caused 150 civilian casualties. Shek O, Lyemun and Aberdeen were also bombed; some casualties to Royal Navy personnel and damage being caused at the last named.

By the end of the day more than half of the pill boxes along North shore from Lyemun to Bowrington had been knocked out. Moves to alternative positions were carried out during the night (sixteen were now prepared but were .not yet on the telephone system). The maintenance of communications to the North shore pill boxes, and on other subsidiary routes there, was proving extremely difficult on account of repeated breaks from hostile fire.

55. One enemy plane was seen at 0930 hours 16th December to crash into the sea (three sources confirmed) near Tatong, hit by the 3.7-in section at Wong Nei Chong

At 1030 hours a fighter-bomber was hit by the Brick Hill 3-7-in. gun and crashed in a gulley (two sources corroborated).

56. Civilian morale improved somewhat.

The arrest this day of a prominent Chinese merchant for defeatist talk was expected to have a salutary effect—which in fact it did.

Fifth columnists were still active. Their methods consisted of shining lights to bring shell fire to bear on concentrations of transport, etc., sniping, spreading false rumours, inducing desertion from " essential services " and inciting to riot. They also again attacked the isolated A. A. searchlight position at Shaukiwan.

57. During the hours of darkness and early hours of 17th December mortar fire from Kowloon Peninsula continued on to the North shore pillboxes.

A force of 14 Army light bombers made two separate attacks at about 0930 hours 17th December—the first on Shaukiwan and Wanchai, and the second on the Peak Wireless Station, Garden Road, and Central District in Victoria. These were followed by a short but relatively severe artillery and mortar bombardment on Central District.

Shortly afterwards two Japanese launches flying a white flag crossed the harbour. The delegation 'brought written proposals for surrender, similar to those of 13th December. It "was thought that the Japanese supposed our morale to be shaken. The proposals were signed by Lt. General Sakai and the Naval C.-in-C Vice-Admiral Niimi. The envoys appeared genuinely surprised and disconcerted when the proposals were again summarily rejected. They left with the hint that future bombardments might not be so discriminate.

This second delegation coming within four days of the first suggested that either (a) they disliked the prospect of attacking across the water or (b) that the Chinese threat in their rear was taking effect, or (c) that it was an attempt to undermine our morale by thoughts of peace and quiet. The Japanese delegation announced on arrival that there would be no hostilities until 1600 hours by which time they expected a reply. Advantage was taken of this very welcome lull to repair communications, etc.

Considerable activity seawards was reported during the afternoon of the 17th December, including a 2,000 ton freighter operating in the shelter, westward of Lamma. On the mainland there was activity round Kai Tak aerodrome, tooth launch and motor transport and at Bailey's yard the following were seen—three ferry vessels, three barges, one large water boat, one steam tug, one motor boat.

During the 17th December our artillery suffered no damage or casualties for the first time for 'many days. Our counter battery fire silenced hostile artillery on Devil's Peak, Gun Club Mill, and also three mortars on the Kowloon waterfront.

58. Aircraft identified to date were of the following types; Navy Reconnaissance Flying Boat, type 94—Heavy Navy Bomber, type 96 —Army light Bomber, type 98—Army Fighter, type 97, unidentified fighter, now known to be the Navy O. Heaviest bomb dropped, identified, 250 Ibs.—but from deduction (fuze caps, size of crater, etc.) it was considered that some of 500 Ibs. were also dropped.

59. Morale of civilian population continued to improve and the rice distribution was getting better.

60. At 2100 hours 17th December hostile artillery fire started a severe fire at the large paint works at Braemar, causing a heavy smoke pall. Owing to its proximity the ammunition of the 18-pounder Beach Defence section nearby had to be moved to an alternative position, and at about midnight the guns themselves were forced to follow to the same position behind the Police station in that vicinity.

The shelling of the North East sector was particularly heavy and lines were being constantly cut and repaired. At 2000 hours many pill boxes were still out of touch and field cable had to 'be substituted for the buried system that night.

At about 0100 hours Aberdeen came under shell fire from seawards and the Industrial School (HQ of the Aberdeen portion of the R.N. Dockyard) was hit.

61.

(a) At first light 18th December a Japanese destroyer was sighted sixteen miles South of Aberdeen.

(b) A considerable movement of small craft between the Kowloon wharves and piers was observed.

(c) In the early hours a 60-pounder gun which, had been brought up into the North Point under cover of darkness (Lt. J. S. Vintner commanding) attempted to sink three freighters in Kowloon Bay suspected of being used as observation posts or being prepared as " jumping off places " for an attack. Only shrapnel was available but by obtaining hits on the water line one 4000 ton ship was holed and settled down.

62. At 1000 hours an air raid of considerable intensity developed on the Central District Victoria. The Anglo-Persian Company's petrol and oil storage tank's at North Point were set on fire and subsequently shelled at intervals throughout the day. The attack seemed to be directed particularly against the Government Offices, where the" Secretariat was hit, and many casualties were caused in the neighbourhood. During the early afternoon Causeway Bay area was very heavily shelled, the water front from that place to Lyemun now becoming a tangle of fallen tramwires and standards and almost impassable for vehicles and despatch riders.

At noon 18th December the Braemar beach defence gun position (para. 60) was shelled, received several direct hits, and the two 18 pounders destroyed beyond repair.

Further air raids occurred from 1500 hours onwards and the Saiwan artillery observation post was dive bombed and also shelled.

Between 1700 and 1800 hours a party of about two hundred enemy was seen working; down from Haiwan to Devil's Peak pier and were engaged by our artillery. Just before and after dusk an extremely heavy bombardment by artillery and mortars on Lyemun Peninsula was earned out.

At night fall it was reported that the North Point fixed beam (across to Kowloon Point) could not function owing to the intensity of the heat and the dense smoke arising from the burning Anglo-Persian Company's oil installations.

This fire continued for days and was a severe handicap to observed fire.

63. Landing on- Hong Kong Island —

(a) At 1900 hours 18th December three armoured cars of the HKVDC were sent to Tytam Gap to be a mobile reserve in the hands of the Commander East Infantry Brigade at his HQ there, and two other cars remained in hand at Leighton Hill close to i Middlesex HQ.

(b) At 1930 hours a report was received that the Saiwan A.A. position and Old Redoubt had been under heavy shell fire (9-in. Howitzer) for half an hour, that the whole fort was badly damaged and that the structure would not stand up to further shelling.

(c) At 2000 hours pillboxes 41 and 42 (Shaukiwan) and also the narrow 2 Royal Scots front at Bowrington were bombarded.

(d) At 2130 hours the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. reported difficulty in getting in touch with the Lyemun fixed beam and asked for illumination in area Quarry Bay- Aldrich Bay. The Braemar A.A. searchlight was ordered to come down on to a shore defence role but (not known till later) the telephone lines to its position were knocked out by shell fire and the motor cyclist despatch rider sent in lieu was badly wounded and never got through. The communications to the fixed beam at Lyemun had been giving difficulty throughout the evening, owing to breaks from shell fire, and Captain C. E. Otway, R.E., had finally been sent to make personal charge there.

At about 2130 hours 18th December the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. moved a reserve company from the area South of his HQ⁹ to a forward area closer to him. The remaining company (B) in battalion reserve was in the Tai Hang Road area, but communications to it had again been cut. Verey lights were seen going up from North Point and Lyemun, and shelling and machine gun fire was heard in considerable volume along the North shore water front and in the area of the Electric Power Station and the Anglo-Persian Company installation.¹⁰

(e) It was learnt later that at 2200 hours Captain Otway observed sampans lighting smoke flares in the harbour, and motor boats and small craft plying 'between Devils Peak and Lyemun pier. His light was twice attacked by an enemy patrol with hand grenades and after beating off a third attack he left the light exposed, locked the doors, and at about 2330 hours withdrew his six men through the Japanese lines to join the nearest infantry in the defence of the Saiwan 6-in. Howitzer position in Lyemun Gap. When he left, the Japanese were shooting straight down the beam with an " Infantry gun," 50 per cent, of the shots; hitting the concrete surround of the light.

(f) The landing of the enemy between Lyemun and North Point appears to have been simultaneous, for at 2200 hours night 18/19th December pillbox N. 4 at Taikoo was reported in the hands of the enemy and a little later 5/7 Rajput Regt. was overheard reporting the occupation of the Sugar Factory by the enemy.

At 2205 hours 1 Middlesex Regt was ordered to .send a mobile machine gun platoon to North Pomt to form a defensive flank from pillbox 49 (Power Station) to join up with the 5/7 Rajput Company in that area (" D " Company). An armoured car was also sent. Defensive artillery fire was promptly put down on Taikoo Dockyard and the Sugar Factory, and the Commanding Officer of 5/7 Rajput Regt. on the spot reported that the results were most effective.

(g) At 2242 hours pillbox 55 crew in Causeway Bay reported that the alternative position in which they were located was being shelled and also sniped at from their right flank.

(h) At 2330 hours Brigadier Wallis reported that the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. was still at Taikoo HQ and that on the other flank the intention was to recapture Saiwan Redoubt with the bayonet. The 6-in. Howitzer Section on Mount Parker was still in action.

(i) At midnight 18-19th December, B. Company (battalion reserve) of the 5/7 Rajput Regt. was now moving to the area of pillbox 53,. a. machine gun platoon of 1 Middlesex Regt. was in area otf pillbox 50 and one platoon of B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt was still holding out in North Point area. The Power Station itself was held by a force known as the " Hughesiliers ", under the Hon. Major J. J. Paterson, which was formed before the outbreak of war from men of 55 and over who felt the call to duty though they themselves were outside the terms of the Compulsory Service Act. It contained many prominent men of considerable standing in the colony and their role was the prevention of sabotage to the electric plant. It was reinforced about the 16th December by 45 Hong Kong Electric Company employees (HKVDC), China Light and Power Company employees, from Kowloon (numbering 30) plus two officers and seven other " Free French." The two officers were Captains Ega and Jacosta. This force was instrumental in holding the Power Station this night and fought in the streets next day until the late afternoon: when the house-to-house fighting and mopping up by the Japanese caused their surrender by encirclement, except for a few who escaped. The delay the force imposed was very valuable to me.

(j) Just after midnight it was reported that the armoured car sent to reconnoitre towards the Power Station had been knocked out by a mobile anti-tank gun.¹¹ It is clear from reports since made that at that time the Japanese were in possession of the ridge overlooking and dominating the Power station and the approach along King's Road from the West. It was from this direction that the reinforcing platoon of 1 Middlesex Regt. came, as it was judged that the road nearer the water front was impassable owing to the flames from the Anglo-Persian Company's installations. The platoon ran straight into the same anti-tank and machine gun fire, the Platoon Sergeant-Major and others were killed and the remainder got into action in the vicinity of the Power Station where they fought excellently. When the bulk of the Hughesiliers withdrew, three 1 Middlesex N.C.O.s rallied and collected a mixed party of Regulars and Volunteers, nine strong, and fought fill 1400 hours in the main office building of the Power Station.

(k) At about 2200 hours 18th December the Royal Artillery at Lyemun Gap reported that propaganda from a loud speaker from Saiwan Redoubt was being broadcast—" We Japanese have captured Saiwan Hill," " It is useless to resist," etc The area was promptly put under small arms fire

At about 0100 hours it was reported that a counter attack by one platoon of Canadians had been carried out on Saiwan Redoubt, organised and led by an Artillery officer. The counter-attack did not succeed, as was discovered subsequently. This officer then took a Tommy gun and carried out active local defence on his own, round the 6-in. Howitzer position at Lyemun Gap, in a most gallant manner.

(l) At 0145 hours the Hughesiliers (see subpara, (i) above) reported the Power Station surrounded, but were ordered to hold on at all costs as other posts were holding out near them and it was hoped that B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. (Captain R. G. Course) would at any moment make its presence felt.

(m) At 0200 hours igth December Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. was back in his vicinity South of Leighton Hill—the reason given being that the Company had gone forward into the Braemar reservoir area but had been unable to locate D Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. holding that sector, i Middlesex Regt. was still holding pill boxes 53 and 54 (Causeway Bay) and had sent officer reconnaissance patrols forward to North Point where the Hughesiliers had again reported that they were hard pressed.

(n) At 0300 hours R.A. (East) reported two Canadian platoons had tried to capture the Saiwan position about midnight under an accurate barrage on the hill top but that this counter attack was a failure.

The fighting here in the dark was very confused. Later Major Fielden, R.A., reported the road junction at Shaukiwan held by armoured cars and that he was trying to work round West of Saiwan observation post (on the top of the redoubt); he had thirty men covering the 6-in. Howitzer position in Lyemun Gap and he said that pill box 40 was still firing

(o) Between 0400 and 0600 hours 19th December reinforcing platoons of the Royal Rifles of Canada were sent forward on to the Mount Parker high ground.

(p) To give increased defence in Victoria against possible landing on that water front which, supplemented by fifth columnists, would constitute a grave danger from the West and perhaps overrun Government House area, a company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. had been deployed on a line running from pill box 63 southwards past and including the Central Police Station. The situation now developing on the East of Victoria was judged to be serious enough, however, to warrant taking risks in the Victoria area, and so this company (about 0400 hours) was called in from its positions to be in hand at HQ of 2/14 Punjab Regt. at Garden Road. "A" Company Winnipeg Grenadiers was already in hand at Wong Nei Chong Gap for emergency use.

(q) Captain R. S. Cole, 5/7 Rajput Regt., during the early hours was waiting for troops of his battalion on the track from Braemar to Mount Butler when a party of Japanese, headed by three Chinese with rifles approached. They were dressed in uniform and obviously acted as guides. He challenged, shot the Chinese, and dispersed the party. This incident corroborates others, accounting for the speed with which the Japanese troops covered country, supposedly unfamiliar, in the dark.

(r) At 0400 hours 19th December I arranged with the Chief Engineer for the despatch of an R.E. party for an infantry fighting role, viz.: to reinforce the Wong Nei Chong Gap area and to come under orders of Commander West Infantry Brigade on arrival there. Seventy- British and Chinese was the eventual composition of this party.

(s) Shortly after 0400 hours the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported the enemy working round the hills by Tai Hang village and going East, that D Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. was still near the Reservoir, that Causeway Bay area was securely held, and that there was no signs of enemy action down the road from Taikoo. At this time I ordered 2/14 Punjab Regt. to send a company forward to help fill the gap between the Winnipeg Grenadiers and i Middlesex Regt.

(t) At 0430 hours Major E. de V. Hunt, R.A., reported the situation to be well in hand at Lyemun Gap.

(u) At 0500 hours a small party of enemy was encountered at the Filter Beds. This showed with what vigour the enemy was pressing the attack.

(v) At 0600 hours personnel of Fortress R.E. (see sub-para, (r) above) left, and (so it transpired later) arrived in the vicinity of Wong Nei Chong Gap, only to find West Infantry Brigade HQ under heavy enemy machine gun and mortar fire. Three mortar positions were located in folds of the ground but the Royal Engineers had no suitable weapons with which to reach such dead ground. Access to Brigade HQ shelters was out of the question and the Royal Engineers took up a position nearby.

(w) 0650 hours 19th December. I had previously consulted with the Commodore R.N. with a view to active participation by the Royal Navy in the land fighting. He now informed me that arrangements had been completed for the Royal Navy to take over infantry posts in the area Aberdeen-Little Hong Kong. This released A Company Winnipeg Grenadiers¹² from the Little Hong Kong Sub Sector, and it moved off at 0500 hours. The Royal Navy however did not take over these infantry posts, for the bulk of the naval party was used in an attempt to reinforce Wong Nei Chong Gap from the South.

(x) At daylight laden junks, barges, motor launches and ferries were observed crossing to the vicinity of North Point, but the exact area of landing was not under observation as " low level " observation posts had been over-run, and buildings, etc., obscured the foreshore from the view of the upper observation posts.

(y) Between 0800 and 0900 hours small parties of enemy were observed on Jardines Lookout, coming down on to Wong Nei Chong Gap. In this area confused fighting was taking place, troops of various units participating, as well as the Canadian Brigade H.Q. staff. Brigadier J. K. Lawson (about 1000 hours) reported that the H.Q. shelters were over-run, firing into them was actually taking place at point blank range and that he was going outside to fight it out, after destroying telephone exchanges, etc. He did so, and I regret to say was killed, together with his Brigade Major. Major Temple and personnel of H.Q. West Group, R.A. were also killed. During the next thirty-six hours the groups of shelters here changed hands several times, but in spite of every effort the enemy secured a definite lodgment.¹³ Part of the enemy attack came on to Stanley Gap and involved the 3.7-in. A.A. Section there. The Royal Artillery of the nearest 3-7-in. Howitzer positions were called on to assist, and leaving their gun position were drawn into the fighting with their small arms. Unfortunately, as it was thought that a temporary counter attack only was involved, steps were not taken to remove small essential parts, e.g., locks, or firing levers, and these guns together with ammunition later fell into enemy hands and were used against us. ¹⁴

64. The Officer Commanding R.A.F. had some time previously requested that his officers and men should be used for ground defence, and at this time the Royal Air Force were taking up positions with the Royal Navy in the Aberdeen area, where they assisted materially in the subsequent fighting.

65.

(a) It now became necessary to form a new West Group R.A. This was done at Wanchai Gap, and communications -readjusted by 1500 hours, Major Duncan being appointed Commander. This small group of artillery gave admirable support during the next few days, being continuously in action though repeatedly shelled and dive bombed. Such counter battery work as remained possible was undertaken by R.A. HQ at Fortress HQ.

(c) At 0845 hours, 19th December, the Mount Parker 6-in. Howitzer Section 600 yards North of Tytam Gap was firing with one of its howitzers straight down the road towards Lyemun Gap.

66. At 0730 hours six motor torpedo boats were sent to the vicinity of Green Island to be ready to attack enemy vessels ferrying troops from the mainland to the' island. On the arrival at the rendezvous they were orderered direct by the Commodore to attack in pairs. The first attack by M.T.Bs. 07 and 09 was successful and sank one enemy landing craft set another on fire and forced a third to turn back (each held about forty troops). Whilst returning 07 was hit and damaged, and was towed in by 09. The second pair of motor torpedo boats had already been ordered to attack, but by the time of their arrival ferrying across the harbour had ceased. Whilst returning M.T.B. 12 was badly hit and ran ashore out of control in Kowloon Dock area. The third pair were ordered not to attack, but by mischance (or deliberately) M.T.B. 26 did so and was sunk with all hands in the middle of the harbour. During these Operations these craft came under fire from both sides of the harbour, and in the final stages enemy fighter aircraft joined in by attacking them with light bombs and with machine gun fire. Our casualties amounted to 50 per cent. It was not considered that adequate results would accrue from further attacks by day or by night, the harbour being full of wrecked shipping and underwater obstacles.

67. At 1000 hours, 19th December, Lieut. Colonel J. L. Willcocks (who as previously arranged, was commanding the Defence Force around Stanley Prison of which he was Superintendent) reported that the Stanley platoon of prison officers was in its prepared position on Stanley Peninsula, covering the batteries.

68. At this juncture I conferred with Brigadier Wallis about the stabilisation of the position. The situation was that at 0800 hours the Royal Rifles of Canada were finding it difficult to maintain their positions on Mount Parker and they were attempting to hold the 6-in. Howitzer positions in that area, together with the R.A. personnel who had taken up local defence dispositions. Some of the R.A. personnel consisted of those from the .6-in Howitzer Section at Lyemun Gap which had been over-run. No British officer was available for this latter section. Owing to the lack of mobilization transport and the 40 ft. haul up to the road by which, the guns had been abandoned and small parts removed.

These defensive positions round the Mount Parker 6-in. Howitzer position were obvious not adequate to act as a serious " stop " to the enemy. They had been hastily improvise Mount Parker not being held by us, they we overlooked by high ground on two sides, and were only six hundred yards in front of the Combined Headquarters of East Infant. Brigade, the infantry battalion in the South East Sector, and R.A East Group. Infantry available for reinforcing in this area had been employed towards Mount Parker and were not out of touch. There was thus the grave danger if the enemy staged a serious attack here, of the loss of all these Headquarters and the cutting off of all the troops in the area Collins Battery—d'Aguilar Peninsula—Obelisk ,included in which were the wireless personnel of the Civil Government at d'Aguilar Wireless Station. Accordingly I authorised Brigadier Wallis to withdraw his HQ to the Stonel Company HQ and to time his withdrawal so that the last troops left the Tytam Gap area at 1300 hours.

At 1145 hours 19th December his HQ there closed down. There was the possibility of carrying out offensive operations from the area of Red Hill and the Tytam Reservoirs and connecting up with Wong Nei Chong Gap when cleared. This would involve capture of the important features Mount Butler and Jardines Lookout. The enemy, so far as could be ascertained, was distributed in small groups on that line of high ground and it seemed to me doubtful if their total strength on the island was more than two battalions. It was realised that the alternative might be necessary, viz.: to operate via Repulse Bay area in order to link up with West Infantry Brigade. Shortly after noon a message was received from the Officer Commanding 2 Royal Scots that one company in a counter-attack had reached a point 200 yards northwards of Wong Nei Chong Gap shelters, where they were holding out with only thirteen effectives left. At this time the 3-7-m. Howitzer section at the Gauge Basin was engaging the enemy over open sights, which it continued to do until small arms fire prevented the service of the guns. One gun was brought away.

69. At 1100 hours I ordered Lt.-Colonel G. R. Kidd to counter attack with two companies (" A "¹⁵ and " D "¹⁶ Companies) in an easterly direction from Leighton Hill to link up with " D " Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. and enable it to withdraw for more active employment. At the same time such an attack would cut in at the enemy's rear, thus limiting his exploitation and obstructing further landings and movements in and from the North Point area.

70. At 1130 hours 19th December I was visited by H.E. The Governor and C.-in-C. who stressed the importance of fighting it out to the end however bad the military outlook might be. Every day gained was a direct help to the Empire war effort.

71. At 1300 hours a force of R.A.S.C. and details collected in the Pokfulum area, seventy strong, was moved to Bennets Hill to take up an emergency defensive position in case further exploitation by the enemy was attempted: then to move forward to the close support of the Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wong Nei Chong Gap.

At 1330 hours I issued orders for a general advance eastwards at 1500 hours to reach as a first objective Middle Spur—.Wong Nei Chong Reservoir—Clementis Ride and then to join up with the objective reached by the 2/14 Punjab Regiment's counter attack already referred to in para. 69. The 2/14 Punjab Regt. was to co-operate by exploiting Northwards to relieve the " Hughesiliers "¹⁷ and others in the Power Station. The central axis of attack was to be Middle Gap—Wong Nei Chong Reservoir-Gauge Basin. 2 Royal Scots were to include Jardines Lookout. Only eight field guns were available to support this advance.

At about 1630 hours 19th December 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that Leighton Hill was being heavily shelled, that " B '.' Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. was forward on their right and that Major Kampta Prasad's " B " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt. was further to the right.¹⁸ R.A. reported enemy in the Police Station at Wong Nei Chong Gap, on the ridge just to the North, and moving South of Wong Nei Chong Reservoir. From other reports it became clear that the general advance had not been successful and that the enemy was in greater strength than had been believed.

72.

(a) At 1820 hours it became necessary to withdraw the crew from pillbox 53 at Causeway Bay (North East end) as it was isolated much in advance of the general line. The pillbox itself had been destroyed, the officer had been killed, and 50 per cent, of the crew had become casualties.

(b) Enemy transport vessels were still crossing the harbour and artillery action was taken.

73.

(a) At 1900 hours the R.A.S.C. personnel at the transport pool at Repulse Bay were ordered to hold on to and defend their transport area and not to withdraw.

(b) At 2000 hours the party of R.A.S.C. moved forward from Bennets Hill. Its numbers had now been increased to about 150. The party, being unable to reach Wong Nei Chong Gap, joined the R.A.O C. party at the Ridge

(c) At 2000 hours 19th December it was reported that some of No. 3 Company HKVDC who had been surrounded- in Jardines Lookout pillboxes, had managed to escape, after fighting all day, to the Blue Pool area. They were ordered to join 1 Middlesex Regt. at Leighton Hill which they did at 0800 hours next morning.

(d) At 2100 hours heavy mortar bombardment of the China Fleet Club area took place.

74. Just before midnight 19-20th December the Commissioner of Police reported that reliable secret information pointed to the likelihood of enemy landings in the Central District and Kennedy Town, and that Police patrols had been sent out. All military units concerned were warned

75. The troops had now been in action eleven days with no respite. Owing to the shortage of hot food and sleep, and the impossibility of providing reliefs because of the lack of troops, signs of strain were beginning to appear.

My A A resources were now very reduced— luckily only three raids of any intensity were carried out by the enemy during the day of the 19th, but the last raid on Stanley was very severe. Two Bofors guns were still in action but were powerless to prevent the enemy bombing selected targets. His bombing throughout was confined to day bombing and my A.A. searchlight detachments were never employed in their true role.

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