|
PART II
Enemy Forces.
9. Appreciations of the situation at varying times during the preceding two years estimated two to four divisions of Japanese as available for the attack on Hong Kong.
On the evening of 6th December Chinese reports showed the arrival of three Japanese divisions at To Kat 8 miles from the frontier, on the previous day.
Information from the Far East Combined Bureau Singapore showed that attack was likely by one division, with another division in reserve. This I believe to be incorrect, as a Japanese Staff Officer informed me after the capitulation that two divisions had been deployed on the island and a third was held in reserve.
10. Three to four weeks before the outbreak of war all intelligence sources pointed to very unusual activity in Canton and Bocca Tigris, but the best efforts could not ascertain the contents of the shipping employed—the activities being equally explainable by either: —
(a) a concentration for an advance North West from Canton on to Kunming, or,
(b) development of a base of supply and staging depot for attack on Thailand.
The shipping was not universally fully laden towards Canton, and empty outwards. Information also showed that the Japanese defence lines round Canton had been drawn in so as to encircle the city more closely. It is clear that the Field Security Police of the Japanese Army had a high degree of efficiency.
Available information led to the following conclusions. That the: —
(a) Japanese night work was poor.
(b) Japanese preferred stereotyped methods and fixed plans.
(c) Japanese light automatics were not as numerous as ours nor so up to date.
(d) Japanese "Combined' Operations" were thorough and that they had excellent boats and equipment but that their successes against the Chinese were flattering as there had never 'been real opposition.
(e) Japanese Air Force was not up to first class European standards, that their bombing was poor, and that they would not go in for night bombing
(f) Japanese fifth column activities would be encountered, though no actual proof of such organisations existed. The proximity of Formosa, with its mixed population of Japanese and Chinese Formosans, and Canton, furnished the enemy with admirable intelligence bases.
11. About 1st November a Japanese deserter came across the frontier and gave himself up at a civil police post. He gave a certain amount of detail about the Japanese forces, which definitely indicated preparations for the concentration of troops North of the frontier, and the presence of large calibre artillery, indicating that of a Corps.
12. From Tokyo, ambassadorial cablegrams did not indicate immediate impending hostilities, in fact the telegrams from there were extremely moderately phrased in comparison with those of June, 1940. Consular reports also were not particularly disturbing.
13. Such intercepts of enemy aircraft movements as were received during the weeks previous to hostilities showed no abnormal activity. Intercepts from other sources showed normality.
|
