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PART I.
Own Forces—Before the outbreak of war with Japan.
1. On the outbreak of war with Germany the garrison consisted of three infantry battalions and one machine gun battalion which permitted the employment of only one infantry battalion on the mainland; its role was to cover a comprehensive scheme of demolitions and to act as a delaying force.
With the arrival on 16th November, 1941, of two Canadian battalions a new defence plan was brought in which had been originally outlined in 1937. It had never been fully practised, as troops had never been available in sufficient numbers. It employed three infantry battalions on the mainland on a front of 10.5 miles—the so called " Gindrinkers Line " sited on very commanding country but with certain inherent weaknesses. It had necessarily little depth, which in two localities was particularly dangerous, viz., Customs Pass and the Pass between Golden Hill and Laichikok Peninsula.
2. Owing to the extensive front, each battalion's layout consisted of a line of platoon localities, the gaps between which were covered by fire by day and by patrolling at night. One company only of each battalion could be kept in reserve and this was normally located in a prepared position covering the most dangerous line of enemy approach. The reserve company of the centre battalion (2/14 Punjab Regt.) was employed initially as " Forward Troops " on the Taipo Road to cover the demolitions and to delay the enemy's initial advance.
3. Directly the news arrived of reinforcement by two Canadian battalions, reconnaissance was carried out by commanding officers only, in order to maintain secrecy. The existing garrison carried out detailed reconnaissances down to platoons later, and worked out the exact defence plan for holding the Gindrinkers Line. A considerable amount of work was found to be necessary, for (except for the centre sector) the line was in its partially completed form of three years previously, when the. general policy of defence was altered and the Gindrinkers Line abandoned.
4. A few days before the Canadian battalions arrived large working (parties were found by the mainland battalions and a little later the three battalions occupied their sectors permanently to push on the work faster.1 It was in these battle positions that the 5/7 Rajput Regt. (Right battalion), the 2/14 Punjab Regt. (Centre battalion) and the 2 Royal Scots (Left battalion) were located when war against Japan broke out.
The time was too short, however, for either of the (new) flank battalions to be practised properly in their defence roles by a series of four day exercises which had been the custom in the past. These battalions, therefore, were not familiar with the successive rear defence positions. It was indeed unfortunate that the timing of events occurred in such a way that the Japanese attack developed when of the six battalions in the garrison, only two knew their roles in exact and practised detail. (The Middlesex Regt. throughout had retained its role of beach defence and: the 2/14 Punjab Regt. had been "Mainland battalion " centred on the Taipo Road.
This Island Defence Plan had been developed in great detail in co-operation with the Royal Navy over a period of years. It needed extremely careful study to get full value from every man in the extensive defence sectors (especially in the South East and South West), and it needed careful rehearsals, as had been done in the past. The date of attack, however, forestalled combined training with the Canadian troops.
The change over to holding the Gindrinkers Line necessitated a change of policy redeployment of artillery. Previously it was too risky to deploy any of the Hong Kong Regiment H.K.S.R.A., i.e., the mobile artillery, on the mainland, when the one 'battalion only could not hope to cause more than 48 hours delay if the enemy attacked hi strength.
The new plan deployed the following on the •€ mainland: —
One Troop 6 in. Howitzers;—4 guns (2 Scammels for haulage).
One Troop 4.5 in. Howitzers—4 guns (hired vehicles).
Two Troops 3.7 Howitzers—8 guns, one troop only had mule transport.
Troops were sited for support as follows: —
One 3.7 in. Troqp to cover the Right battalion.
One 3.7 in. Troop and the 4.5 in. Battery to cover the Centre and Left battalions.
The 6 in. Troop was to cover from the centre of the Right battalion to the extreme left on the Castle Peak Road. Additional support could 'be 'given to the Right 'battalion by two Sections of 6 in. Howitzers on the island.
5. The infantry organisation was also changed. Brigadier C. Wallis was appointed Mainland Commander, and the Island Commander (the two Canadian battalions and the 1 Middlesex Regt.) was Brigadier J. K. Lawson.
6. The evacuation of the mainland battalion under the former plan was the task of the Royal Navy (" Operation W/M "). It was not easy and had 'been practised three times. There was obviously no opportunity to work out full detail and to practise the new withdrawal operation. It was to the credit of all concerned that the eventual withdrawal from the mainland was earned out without any loss of guns and with less than forty men being cut off and captured.
Communications.
7. The change over to three (battalions to hold the Gindrinkers Line necessitated complete reorganisation of the mainland communications and the carrying on of buried routes from the partially completed system that existed. Contracts were not completed when war came, in spite of the 'best endeavours of the Royal Corps of Signals which did excellent work.
8. It was unfortunate that the equipment situation in other theatres of war had not permitted earlier despatch of the garrison's infantry mortars and ammunition. For instance, the worst case, the 2/14 Punjab Regt. had had one 3 in. mortar demonstration, of a few rounds only, but ammunition in any appreciable quantity did not arrive until November and then only 70 rounds per battalion both for war and for practice.. Hence these mortars were fired and registered for the first time in their battle positions and twelve hours later were in action against the enemy.
The 2 in. mortar situation was worse, for there had been no receipt even of dummies, consequently the men had had no instruction in detonating. There had been no preliminary, shooting and the 2 in. mortar ammunition was delivered actually in battle.
For 3 in. mortar there was neither pack mule nor carrying equipment for the men, consequently everything, including ammunition, had to be manhandled.
Notes
1 The urgent necessity for speed called for this to be done in spite of it being a malarial time of the year. The 2 Royal Scots were in an area which was highly malarial and they had many cases. This weakened them considerably and, the hospital being full, many were sent back without the normal ten days convalescence The battalion was 771 strong but only 600 effective.
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