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VII. THE INTERNAL SITUATION.
54. Civil Officials: In view of the fact that I and most of my staff were entirely new to Burma we were naturally dependent on civil officials for assistance in those cases where local knowledge was required. I should like therefore to pay a tribute to the unfailing support and assistance I received throughout from the Honourable Mr. John Wise, Defence Counsellor, and by Mr. Potter, head of Military Finance.
55. Internal Situation. As regards the internal situation there were from the beginning, many alarmist reports. There is no doubt that the enemy had thoroughly organised their sympathisers in Burma before the outbreak of war, and received very great assistance from them. On the other hand, a larger proportion of the population and subordinate officials remained loyal than many of the British officials expected, and though there were many treacherous attacks on our troops there were also many cases of willing assistance being given to stragglers and others.
The worst feature of the situation was the attitude of undisciplined elements towards the unfortunate Indian population who were robbed and maltreated in a most shameful manner, in spite of the efforts of many well disposed Burmans to help them.
With the progress of invasion and the organisation of the so-called Free Burma Army, the situation naturally grew worse, but it is fair to say that during the period covered by this report, the traitor forces achieved remarkably little, though their presence was a constant threat which imposed a corresponding strain on our military organisation.
56. Martial Law. Throughout the period covered by the Report, the Government were opposed to the institution of Martial Law, partly owing to its association in the minds of the people with the civil rebellions of former years.
During the last days of Rangoon when looting, arson, etc., were already rife, it was decided to hand over the town to the military. A military commandant was appointed, but this was too late in the day to enable him to make any material improvement in the situation.
57. Policy as regards Evacuation. The policy of H.M.G. as regards evacuation was quite clear. If it proved to be impossible to hold Rangoon it was essential that the demolition of the oil refineries, oil storage and other important installations should be as complete as possible. It was also laid down that it was not desirable that the Army should become bottled up in Rangoon, which was in itself indefensible, but that it should if necessary withdraw in order to carry on the war in Upper Burma.
This would in any case retain for a time the possession of the oilfields, cover the projected road to India, protect important aerodromes, and perhaps most important of all, ensure our continued co-operation with the Chinese forces. A considerable period was also required to complete the necessary arrangements for the denial of the oilfields to the enemy. As regards the oil it was found possible by moving certain plant from Rangoon to develop a very considerable output of M.T. petrol and 87 octane spirit in the oilfields—amounting possibly to about two million gallons a month—a most valuable example of foresight on the part of my staff.
58. Demolitions. At that time all the information available pointed to the fact that if it was not possible to hold Rangoon and the oilfields, the greatest service that could be rendered to the Allied cause would be a complete denial of the oil and refinery resources of Burma. It had been suggested that the Japanese war effort might collapse for lack of oil.
This involved very detailed planning and a vast amount of highly technical preparatory work. This was carried out under the general supervision of Mr. Forster, whose enthusiasm and drive combined with his previous experience, was most valuable. He was most ably assisted by Captain- Scott, R.E., and members of the various oil companies who had undertaken the work. This work, to which- I gave considerable personal attention, was very fully justified by results both in Rangoon and in the oilfields. The destruction of the refineries and oil tanks was remarkably complete and all the personnel involved, military and civil, were successfully evacuated.
As regards other demolitions considerable planning and preparation was also necessary. Arrangements were made to destroy all port facilities and to sink a number of ships in places where they would prevent the use of the jetties. The power station, port and the telegraph installations, workshops, bridges, fixed defences, etc., were also successfully destroyed.
In view of the hardship involved for the civil population, without any material military advantages, of destroying the Rangoon water supply, this was left intact. The widespread destruction of rice mills or boats was avoided for similar reasons. A wholesale " scorched earth " policy was not practicable and would probably have created more problems for us, in the form of refugees, than it would for the Japanese.
59. Refugees. A considerable number of people, especially women and children, and including a large number of Indians, left Rangoon by sea during the early stages of the campaign. In order to provide increased facilities I took action to ensure that returning transports should be made available for this purpose. In view of subsequent events it is fortunate that evacuation on a large scale did take place.
A large number of Indians evacuated by walking across the hills from Prome to Taungup, whence they could be cleared to Chittagong in small craft. Lack of food, water and medical attention on the route caused much suffering and many deaths including a large number from cholera. Cholera was also present in the area south of Prome and a serious epidemic was anticipated.
60. Evacuation Plans. The arrangements for evacuating Rangoon were in three stages. The warning stage during which all non-essential personnel would be encouraged to depart leaving only those required to run essential services. The second stage in which the final arrangements for demolition, etc., would be completed and all civilians not required in connection with this work would be evacuated. Finally, the demolition stage on completion of which all the personnel concerned and the military for guarding them were to depart in transport for which special arrangements had been made.
61. Route of Evacuation. The route of evacuation for the majority of the population was inevitably the main Mandalay road and railway. The proximity of the enemy to this line after the battle of the Sittang and the small forces available to cover it rendered it very important that the first stage should not be left too late The unreliability of the railway transportation personnel was another factor and it was only by the closest margin that the last few trains succeeded in getting away. Evacuation by the Prome route was of course possible, but the fact that the railway ended at that point and the presence of cholera and serious unrest made it undesirable to use it more than necessary. Another factor was the importance of avoiding serious congestion on either route both of which were of course essential for military purposes.
A further difficulty arose from the fact that Rangoon was only 80 miles south-west of Pegu and that the Pegu road joined the Prome road 21 miles north of Rangoon. Unless therefore personnel were moved out of Rangoon City in good time they might well find themselves cut off from the north.
The preparation of the above measures naturally took considerable time and imposed a severe burden on an already overworked staff. In the event the interval between stage 1 and stage 2 was considerably longer than was anticipated, partly owing to lack of pressure on the part of the enemy after the battle at the Sittang and partly owing to the anticipated arrival of reinforcements which made it possible even up to the last moment that the position might be retrieved. During this period a certain number of people evacuated under stage 1 were brought back to keep essential services and transportation services in action till the last moment. During this period large quantities of personnel and stores were disembarked and moved up-country to Prome and Mandalay.
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