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VI. ARMY ADMINISTRATION.
41 Lack of Preparation. The following remarks are virtually a summary of administrative difficulties and of the reasons for administrative shortcomings during the period of the campaign under review. That there has not been an administrative breakdown is, in my opinion, entirely due to the efforts of my Major-General in charge of Administration, Major-General (E. N. Goddard, and his staff, to keep the machine working in circumstances of almost insuperable difficulty which persisted throughout the campaign.
A gloomy picture is portrayed, which is nevertheless considered to be accurate. If the campaign had been an advance, instead of a withdrawal, many of the defects and shortcomings would not have been evident (e.g. poor discipline) and others would have been of less importance.
The course of the campaign should be a warning that the civil and military administration must come on to a war footing before hostilities commence. It is unfair to the troops, to the civil population, in fact unfair to everybody, to expect our loosely knit peace time system of civil and military administration to adapt itself quickly to war conditions.
The main administrative lesson of the campaign during the period is to prove once again that unless the administrative conception from the outset is sufficiently broad operations will be hampered. This is particularly true in a withdrawal.
42. Basis of Administrative Plan. After I arrived in (Burma, the War Office laid down that administrative preparations were to be made on the basis of a force of four divisions. Demands were made therefore for L. of C. administrative and ancillary units, including a Corps H.Q. on this basis, but owing to the passage of events none of them materialised before the loss of Rangoon. Large amounts of equipment and personnel which had been urgently demanded by Burma before my arrival, were also sent out by the War Office, but practically all failed to arrive in time. Administrative difficulties were greatly accentuated by the necessity of giving fighting units the preference in the allotment of shipping, and also by the fact that certain ships had to be turned back owing to inability to handle them in Rangoon.
43. Insufficiency of Administrative Units. At no time during the campaign has there been an adequate number of administrative units; transport, supply, medical, transportation, provost, rest camps and mess, ordnance, and labour units have all been less than the number required to administer the force. Improvisation has been necessary on a scale which has made confusion inevitable. The problem would have been less complicated if the administrative layout had been set up before active operations commenced.
44. Civil Departments. The whole conduct of the military administration has been complicated by A.H.Q. having to deal with numerous civil departments and agencies who do not realise how quickly events move in war and are thus unable to realise that it is necessary to have unified control well ahead of any likely emergency. The civil railway and inland water transport agencies could not be persuaded, until it was too late, that it was vital to have unified control and to form some military operating units. The result was a breakdown in railway transportation which prevented the back loading of valuable and vital stores from Rangoon to the extent that would otherwise have been possible; and great confusion and waste of effort in the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.
45. The Base. The base must be far enough in rear of the zone of operations to obviate the need to move it. Rangoon was too far forward. Base installations should have been sited hi Upper Burma before the outbreak of war.
The force was too highly equipped with M.T. for the terrain which in the main demanded a very comprehensive employment of pack transport.
The tendency of many Burma units, including administrative units, to disintegrate has caused administrative confusion and inefficiency apart-from the effect on operations. Owing to demands for administrative units in the Middle East and elsewhere, Burma was advised to raise as many of such units as she could from available indigenous material. This is not generally possible under war conditions and the personnel available were quite unreliable.
46. Transport. Units landed without their transport which had to be improvised. Improvised transport impaired fighting efficiency and was instrumental in lowering morale. As the theatre of operations approached Rangoon it was essential that transport should sail in the same ship (or the same convoy) as the unit to which it belonged. As it was troops had to go into battle as soon as they landed, without transport, and much equipment was lost in consequence.
Transport has been very short and but for 620 lorries presented by the Generalissimo from Lease-Lend the force would have been immobilised.
Transport for supplying the Chinese armies was obtained by taking up large amounts of civilian transport employed on the Burma road. A complete firm with its staff, workshops, spares and lorries was eventually taken over as an army unit and proved invaluable. The drivers, however, were local civilians who proved of very doubtful quality.
47. Discipline. The continued withdrawal and the inevitable straggling resulting from fighting in thick jungle undoubtedly affected discipline to a considerable extent. The presence of a large number of young officers and soldiers accentuated this.
It is a mistake to '' make units up " with recruits and young officers just before they go on service. It would be better to send them into their first battle below strength and to make them up gradually later when the trained men have become accustomed to war conditions.
Similarly it would be better to send units into battle on a low scale of equipment and transport than to make them up to a new scale to which they are unaccustomed, when they are just on the point of embarkation.
48 Provost, etc The lack of Provost, Rest Camps and Mess Units has all tended to break down administration and, therefore, to impair discipline.
The units from India were undoubtedly handicapped owing to the lack of interpreters or liaison personnel who could speak the local language. Every effort was made to remedy this deficiency which had not been foreseen in pre-war plans.
The composition of brigades and divisions has constantly been changed which is not conducive to the maintenance of an esprit de corps. Great stress is laid in India on this factor during training, and it is regrettable that owing to unavoidable causes, the shortage of troops and of reinforcements, and heavy casualties, brigades and even units had to be broken up.
49. Disembarkation. One of the best administrative achievements during the period has been the disembarkation arrangements, especially during the period subsequent to the 21st February. Lack of civilian dock labour, frequent changes of orders, a virtual breakdown of transportation all tested the embarkation staff to the full. Lieut.-Colonel Hallett, the chief embarkation staff officer, is to be congratulated on a very fine achievement in that disembarkation was so quickly and successfully carried out under most difficult conditions.
50. Medical. Medical staff had to be created and although medical conscription had been accepted it had not been enforced to any considerable extent by a committee appointed by the Burma Government. Many potential medical officers were thus lost.
The Indian Hospital Corps (I.H.C.) have been satisfactory. The Burma Hospital Corps (B.H.C.) poor originally in quality and quantity, has failed badly in the time of stress owing to mass desertions. The B.H.C. was eventually in danger of disintegrating altogether.
Sweepers, cooks, water carriers and washermen were difficult to find after the bombing of Rangoon.
Lack of transport has been a serious handicap. Two Motor Ambulance Sections arrived with no cars. One improvised Motor Ambulance Section has never had more than 15 cars. All were Fords and all broke their backshafts. Field ambulances arrived without transport.
Every medical unit must have transport of some kind included in its War Equipment Table (W.E.T.). Field medical units must be self mobile. It is impossible to get transport from any pooled sources in a crisis, and so valuable equipment is lost.
All existing medical services were badly handicapped by the cheeseparing policy adopted when they were raised. Burma Army units were raised on a reduced scale totally inadequate for their work.
Two improvised Ambulance Trains were provided initially. They were not good, being non-corridor, but they have been of great value and have saved the situation many times. Number 3 Train was made up just before the crisis and was fortunately kept where it was intended, on the Prome line. This has time and again proved its value. Without these trains medical evacuation would have collapsed.
The initiative and resources of some members of all classes of the medical services, especially British, Indian and Karen, have been excellent on many occasions, and have frequently surmounted considerable difficulties and kept the service going.
Partly owing to the above mentioned difficulties and partly owing to the conditions of the campaign, there (is no doubt that the wounded have suffered very considerable hardship. The D.M.S., Colonel Treffrey Thomson, and his staff, have made every effort to improve matters but would be the first to agree that there has been much in the medical situation to cause them very serious concern.
Apart from the difficulties met in dealing with our own casualties the virtual breakdown of the civil medical services has imposed considerable additional strain on the military organisation. Furthermore, the arrival of Chinese troops with practically no medical
organisation at all has rendered it necessary to provide not only stores and equipment that could ill be spared but also medical units, staff and beds in our own hospitals.
51. Amenities. A great deal has been done in the face of much difficulty by Lieut.-Colonel A. Campbell, Chief Amenities Officer, to provide some small amount of amenities to the troops.
52. Canteens. No canteen organisation existed 'before the war, and although a Defence Services (Burma) Canteen was set up in 'January or February with the assistance of India, it never really got started.
As will easily be realised the canteen situation was a potent contributory factor in lowering the morale of both officers and men.
53. Transportation. The Director of Transportation arrived in the country on 20th January. There were no military transportation units whatsoever, except a Docks Operating Company which did very good work.
The railway administration was not to be convinced of the necessity of raising somemilitary units, operating under military control, to run the railways in the operational area. India was unable to provide them and it was not found possible to raise them locally. Experience elsewhere suggests that if this had been done, the railways would have stood up to the strain better than they did. The same remarks in general apply to the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, but the personality of the Manager, Mr. Morton, 'assisted by some British officers enabled the organisation to do some excellent work in the later stages after it had been taken over by the military. The lesson is that transportation must be organised for war.
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