VIII. OPERATION IN THE SOUTHERN SHAN STATES AND IN TENASSERIM

62. Dispositions. The dispositions when I arrived in Burma were as follows: —

Mergui, 2 Burma Rifles and two companies 3 Burma Rifles with a Frontier Force Detachment and an aerodrome guard.

Tavoy, 6 Burma Rifles, Tavoy Company of the Tenasserim Battalion B.A.F. and aerodrome guards.

Moulmem, 1/7 Gurkha Rifles, 8 Burma Rifles and the remainder of the Tenasserim Battalion B.A.F. also one Indian Mountain Battery.

Near Kawkareik, 4 Burma Rifles watching the Thai frontier. All the above were under the command of Commander 2 Burma Brigade in Moulmein.

Rangoon, the 1 Glosters and 3 Burma Rifles (less two companies) were under the Brigadier commanding Rangoon Area.

Southern Shan States, the 1 Burma Division consisting of an Indian Mountain Regiment, one 18-pounder Battery B A.F (4 guns), 13 Indian Infantry Brigade and 1 Burma Brigade consisting of the 2 K.O.Y.L I. and 1 and 5 Burma Rifles. There were also some Frontier Force Detachments.

Mandalay Area (in reserve), 16 Indian Infantry Brigade (less one Battalion) and 7  Burma Rifles.

63. Minor Operations in the Southern Shan States. There were no serious operations undertaken in the Southern Shan States during my period of command. A raid into Thailand up the River Kemapyu obtained useful information and there were several encounters between our Frontier Force columns or guerrilla detachments and the enemy on the frontier in the neighbourhood of the Kengtung-Chiengrai road. The Chinese 93 Division also undertook some raids across the Mekong River which inflicted considerable, casualties and obtained valuable information.

Although the enemy was no very active during this period, there were Known to be considerable numbers of Japanese as well as Thai troops in Northerly Thailand and there were persistent reports indicating early invasion on this front. The distance from our junction with the Chinese on the Indo-China border to the mouth of the Salween was some 300 miles and to guard this we had only one division consisting of two infantry brigades and a few of the Frontier Force Detachments already referred to. The road from the River Salween through the valuable Mawchd mines to Toungoo was practically unguarded. The situation was therefore one which caused me considerable anxiety, especially when it became necessary to withdraw troops from the Southern Shan States to deal with the more threatening situation in Tenasserim.

64. Tavoy and Mergui. A few days after my arrival on 27th December, I visited Moulmem and Kawkareik and shortly afterwards Mergui and Tavoy.

The forces at these latter places were primarily for the defence of the aerodromes and though Mergui was to some extent defensible against land or sea attack Tavoy certainly was not—with the forces available. Mergui was, however, 300 miles from Moulmein and communications consisted of the road Ye-Tavoy-Mergui which crossed many ferries and was for the most part through thick jungle. There were a considerable number of known tracks from the Thai border, only a few miles away, by which the road could be intercepted. From Ye to Moulmein there was a railway and no road. Withdrawal from either of these places would obviously be difficult, especially as the total naval forces available consisted of two small motor launches, and other suitable craft were manned by native crews- who were not. likely to face any operations in the presence of the enemy. In any case there were not enough of such craft to enable the Mergui garrison to be evacuated in one lift. In view of these circumstances and the certainty that sooner or later the Japanese would begin to work up the coast or across the border from Thailand, it was decided that in event of a serious threat the Mergui garrison would be evacuated to Tavoy which would then be capable of defence. Furthermore, provided a stop could be put across one track leading in from Thailand it should be possible for the Tavoy force, if necessary, to withdraw by land towards Moulmein.

65. Kawkareik. One battalion of the Burma Rifles north-east of Kawkareik was watching the Thai border at Myawaddy and holding the pass over the Dawna Range which was covered throughout its length with thick jungle. In face of any serious attack its position was obviously very isolated. Although only 45 miles from Moulmein as the crow flies the only road available was 90 miles in length. It traversed two wide rivers by ferries and ran for 30 miles parallel to the Thai frontier and toward the Three Pagodas Pass into Thailand—a very likely avenue for any enemy invasion. The supply route was by launch up to Kyondo on the Gyaing River.

In view of these circumstances I decided to move H.Q. 16 Indian Brigade and one battalion then in reserve, down to Tanasserim as early as possible both to strengthen the Kawkareik position, watch the Three Pagodas Pass, and garrison Moulmein. With this accession of force it became possible to push a detachment down to the Ye-Tavoy road with a view to keeping open communication with Tavoy.

66. Lack of Intelligence. Information at this time, as ever, was practically nil. The thick jungle prevented any considerable information being obtained from air reconnaissance for which resources were very limited, and for political reasons no attempt had been made before the war to organise any source of intelligence in Thailand. There was therefore every prospect of an attack without warning coming at any time. Any offensive action beyond that of patrols or attacks upon isolated posts, was with the forces available, quite out of the question.

67. Formation of H.Q. 17 Indian Division. On the 5th January the senior staff officers of the 17 Indian Division having arrived an advanced headquarters was established at Moulmein and Brigadier Bourke assumed the command.

The Commander of the 17 Indian Division arrived on loth January and then assumed command although the remainder of his headquarters did not arrive until serious operations were already in progress. Although he had little .time to study the problems involved he entirely agreed with the plans and dispositions proposed.

68. Enemy Activities. During the early days of January many reports were received indicating that the Japanese were concentrating in some strength between Raheng and the frontier at Myawaddy, and on the 11th January the total was given as 5,000 in this area.

On the 3rd some interesting information was received from some police agents who had been arrested in Thailand and subsequently released They stated that while in captivity they had overheard some Japanese officer discussing future plans which included plans for an advance on Tavoy which was to take place in three weeks time. The information which these men brought back proved to be substantially correct.

69. Troop Movements. In consequence of a decision to move the whole of the 16 Indian Infantry Brigade to the Moulmein area, the troops in this area were disposed on the 14th January as follows: —

The Commander 16 Indian Infantry Brigade took over responsibility for the defences about Kawkareik, where 1/7 G.R. and 4 Burma Rifles (which was very weak) were now joined by 1/9 R. Jats and a mountain battery. One company of 1/7 G.R. was posted about Kyungyaung to watch the Three Pagodas Pass into Thailand.

The 4/12 F.F. Regiment of this Brigade was left in Moulmem under the 2 Burma Infantry Brigade with the role of keeping open the road from Ye to Tavoy as far south as the road and track junction at Migyaunglaung.

The 7 Burma Rifles was at this time also ordered to Moulmein.

70. Operations at Tavoy. On the 16th January two companies of the 6 Burma Rifles came in contact with a Japanese force, estimated at about 100, at Myitta on the track leading from the north of Tavoy to the frontier. The companies apparently withdrew for the night with the intention of attacking the next day. Reports had been received that further enemy forces were coming down the river and there is little doubt that they were correct. The following day the two companies supported by a company of the 3 Burma Rifles (the two companys of this Battalion having been transferred from Rangoon) advanced again to the attack. It is hard to get a clear picture but the attack failed and meanwhile the Japanese had worked round the flanks and ambushed the transport. For the time being the force was broken up into small parties, most of whom eventually made their way back to Moulmein through the jungle.

It should be mentioned here that the 6 Burma Rifles was a newly raised Battalion which had had no opportunity for carrying out higher training in any form, and in the absence of any definitely appointed commander the action of these three companies was probably not too well planned or directed.

During the next two days a good deal of useful information was forwarded to Tavoy regarding the movements of Japanese troops by men of the Tenasserim Battalion and by mine managers and so on. In some cases these reports were passed through by telephone after the Japanese had passed by.

However, early on the morning of the 19th the enemy appeared near the Tavoy aerodrome and commenced to attack it. At first the detachment of the Kokine Battalion The Burma Frontier Force put up a spirited defence but were eventually forced to withdraw and the aerodrome was lost.

The remainder of the troops in Tavoy now completely disintegrated. The enemy had established himself astride the road leading to Ye and most of the troops eventually found their way back to Moulmein moving in small parties through the jungle.

In these operations round Tavoy, parties of the Tenasserim Battalion B.A.F. did excellent work under their officers in blowing up bridges and roads and many of them remained behind for long periods after the other troops had left, eventually getting back through the jungle or by boat and bringing with them much useful information.

71. Southern Tenasserim. Before recording the main operations which started at Myawaddy and ended at the River Sittang it is convenient to dispose of the remaining event in Southern Tenasserim.

The Japanese were in occupation of Victoria Point and it was known that patrols were working up towards Mergui. With the possibility of Tavoy falling into the hands of the enemy Mergui would be in a very precarious position. Consequently on the 18th January, it was decided, during my absence in Kengtung, to evacuate Mergui while there was yet time and to .transfer the troops to Tavoy and to make every endeavour to hold the aerodrome at that place. I confirmed these orders on my return.

Before this move could be completed Tavoy had fallen, so the garrison and civil officials, etc., were evacuated direct by sea to, Rangoon where the last parties arrived on the 24th January.

72. Effect of Operations. The results of the action at Tavoy were unfortunate. It had caused the withdrawal from Mergui and it is possible that in the light of after events that it might have been wiser to hold on to Mergui even if the eventual withdrawal of the garrison or part of it were thereby prejudiced. Its re-tention would have enabled our air forces, small as they were, to have carried out effective bombing attacks along the L of C supplying the enemy's forces in Malaya. It should be remembered, however, that at the time the plans were made our air forces available for this purpose were practically nil and that if the plan actually made had succeeded it might have ensured the retention of Tavoy for a considerable period.

Another and perhaps more serious effect of the operation at Tavoy was that the units of the Burma Rifles involved suffered a serious loss of morale from which they did not entirely recover. The enemy received a corresponding encouragement to undertake similar enterprises in future.

73. Operations in Northern Tenasserim. Before dealing with the operations in Northern Tenasserim it is desirable to draw attention to the fact that nearly all the fighting took place in dense jungle for which form of warfare the Japanese were especially trained while our troops were not. Communications were very limited and in the jungle runners had to be almost entirely relied upon.

The mobility of the Japanese brought home the fact that our troops had far too much baggage and reserves of all sorts with them which often in the end were either lost or had to be destroyed.

Throughout the operations leading up to the Battle of the Sittang I had constantly in mind the necessity for fighting as far forward as possible so as to have room in which to deploy the expected reinforcements. I therefore took every unit I could from elsewhere, including i Burma Division, to strengthen our forces on this front. This involved taking considerable risks in the Southern Shan States, on the Karenni front and in Rangoon. There was also an internal security problem that might become critical at any time.

74. First Japanese Attack. Active operations on a larger scale commenced on the 20th January when 1,000 Japanese troops, reported to be Thais but probably Japanese, attacked the post of the 1/7 G.R. at milestone 48 on the Myawaddy road. Other positions were heavily bombed and machine gunned at intervals throughout the day. There was every indication that a large scale attack was about to take place.

The following morning the attack developed as expected and most of the forward troops were forced out of their positions.

By midday the enemy were severely pressing the main position of the 16 Indian Infantry Brigade about Kawkareik. As they appeared to be in considerable strength (it was later estimated from the information that became available that there were about 2,500 enemy troops in the initial attack) and no reinforcements or reserves were available, it was possible that if 16 Indian Infantry Brigade tried to fight it out on this position it might be overwhelmed. Orders were therefore issued that this Brigade was not to get so involved as to render withdrawal impossible. The Divisional Commander was told at the same time not to give up more ground than necessary and that an intermediate position should be occupied.

It appeared afterwards that the attack was not, in fact, nearly so heavy as had been originally reported and there seems little doubt that more seasoned troops could have maintained their position for the time being.

75. Withdrawal commenced. On the 22nd January the withdrawal commenced and unfortunately there was a certain amount of confusion.

The Brigade, however, managed to disengage and during the succeeding day withdrew without further molestation from the Japanese to Moulmem not, however without losing most of its animal transport, its signal equipment, many of its weapons and all its M.T.

Part of the losses in transport etc. was due to the ferry boat being sunk which rendered impracticable a withdrawal by road and necessitated a move across country by a track impassable to vehicles. The operation, as the small number of casualties showed, was not a very happy start to the operations for the defence of Burma. The company of 1/7 G.R. that the enemy attacked in the first instance did especially good work and the 4 Burma Rifles showed up very well.

On the 23rd January in view of the: disorganised state of the troops at his disposal and the fact that the enemy were believed to be in considerable strength the Commander of the 17 Indian Division represented the view that he considered it desirable to move his Division right back to the area Bilin—Kyaikto—River Sittang where he could concentrate his troops in a strong position and establish a secure base from which to deliver a counter stroke.

76. Decision to hold Moulmein. In my opinion a withdrawal on this scale was quite unjustified and I decided that at any rate Moulmein should be held and if time permitted I proposed to move up the 2 K O.Y L.I. from 1 Burma Division to reinforce it. I did not, however, intend to have a brigade closely invested in that place. Arrangements for a withdrawal were therefore to be planned. The first requirement was to regain touch with the enemy, which had been entirely lost as a result of the withdrawal and was not really regained until the enemy attacked Moulmeiin on 30th January.

By the 25th, H.Q. 16 Indian Infantry Brigade was established at Martaban with 1/7 G.R. less two companies, one of which was still missing from the Kawkareik position, two companies of the 4 Burma Rifles and the 1/9 R. Jats. The 46 Indian Brigade was ordered up to the area about Bilin. This Brigade which consisted of 7/10 Baluch, 5/17 Dogras, 3/7 Gurkhas had arrived in Burma on the i6th but without its transport which did not arrive till 30th. It was, as already explained in Part I, by no means fully trained.

On the following day 100 men of the 1/7 G.R. turned up having marched across country to the Salween.

The enemy did not press forward his advance with any great speed and it was evident that he was bringing forward more troops and probably deploying on a wider front. Reports were received to the effect that they were in some strength just east of Paan and this was confirmed the following day.

77. Attack on Moulmein. Early on the morning of the 30th January the Japanese started an attack on the aerodrome situated about four miles beyond Moulmein and held by the detachment of the Kokine Battalion The Burma Frontier Force. This detachment fought well and continued to hold on to the aerodrome until ordered to withdraw at midnight.

Moulmein itself was held by the four Battalions of the 2 Burm's Brigade, 3 Burma Rifles, 4 Burma Rifles, 7 Burma Rifles and 8 Burma Rifles, with the 12 Mountain Battery R.A.; extended along a seven mile perimeter. 4/12 F.F.R. less one company was in reserve. At noon Brigadier Ekin took over the commandand at that time found the situation to be in hand, but having visited the units and seen something of the position he came to the conclusion that in the face of a heavy enemy attack it would be very doubtful whether this extended line could be held. Orders were therefore issued by the Brigadier for the line to be withdrawn towards Moulmein in order to form a " Box " which it was hoped would be proof against penetration.

During this operation a battalion of the Burma Rifles failed to take up their allotted position with the result that there was a gap between the 8 Burma Rifles and the 4/12 F.F.R. and this latter unit was soon at close grips with the enemy and had a difficult time.

At 1900 hours the situation . was certainly serious and as no reinforcements were yet available for sending into Moulmein it looked as though it would be necessary to withdraw from the town. As he estimated that there were probably not more than a thousand Japanese attacking, the Brigadier thought that there was still a possibility of holding the town and told the Divisional Commander on the telephone that he would make a final decision later.

The Brigade, Commander, however, made preparations for withdrawing if necessary and sent Major Ward, R.E., commanding the 1 Field Company Burma Sappers and Miners, to collect all available launches alongside the jetties. He managed to collect fifteen and to keep them there until they were required These boats were manned by local crews and in charge of serangs and they worked extremely well under very trying conditions.

78 Decision to Withdraw. During the night it became increasingly obvious that a withdrawal would be necessary and on this being reported to the Divisional Commander he agreed and considered that it should be carried out as soon as possible

At about 0730 hours on the 31st January the embarkation began and by 1000 hours eleven ships had left with troops. Throughout this time the Japanese were closing in round the jetties and considerable fighting was in progress.However, the bulk of the troops got away although the ships in their passage over to Martaban were subject to machine gun fire and shelling.

The month of January therefore ended with our troops west of the River Salween with the exception of small parties of men who did not get away with the ships or who had got separated from their units. Many of these turned up later having managed to cross the river in native boats or ori rafts, etc.

79. Reasons for Withdrawal. The question may well be asked as to whether it was necessary to evacuate Moulmein. While the initial attack was probably carried out by only one enemy regiment there was every reason to suppose that the remainder of a division was moving up and this afterwards proved to be correct. With the enemy established to the north and south of the town and probably on the island of Chaungzon to the west, no communication with the town would have been possible and in the absence of any naval or military boat crews, etc., operations for relief, even if troops had been available, would probably have been impossible. The area had not in any way been prepared for defence and required at least two infantry brigades to hold a secure perimeter. Furthermore the water supply came from outside the only line which it was possible to hold. In view of these considerations it is quite clear that a decision to hold Moulmein any longer would almost certainly have involved the loss of the garrison and possibly have hastened the fall of Rangoon.

At one time I hoped that the arrival of reinforcements would enable me to establish a strong force across the River Salween at Paan. This would have covered the northern flank of Moulmein and secured its communications across the River Salween. It would also have secured the most promising jumping off place for a counter-offensive.

80. Request for Naval Assistance. About this time a signal was despatched to G.H.Q. South West Pacific Command (A.B.D.A. Command) pointing out that Moulmein would probably fall and requesting that warships should be sent to protect the coast as otherwise the enemy would be able to move up the coast from Malaya at will.

81. Casualties. The casualties suffered by our troops up to and including the evacuation of Moulmein amounted to 617 all ranks, a considerable proportion being " missing." It should be noted, however, that in jungle fighting involving a withdrawal, practically all dead and wounded are likely to be counted as missing in addition to prisoners and those who, getting separated from their units, may turn up later as stragglers. There is no doubt that the enemy suffered considerable casualties at Moulmein though probably very few at Kawkareik.

Although the Divisional Commander was still anxious to withdraw to the Bilin River and to give up Martaban, I issued orders that the Division was to fight hard to hold the line of the River Salween and to give no ground. As far as possible, however, the Division was to be dispersed in depth so as to be able to deal with enemy infiltration.

The general plan was now to hold Martaban securely and the line of the River Salween to the north of Paan, with the remainder of the 17 Indian Division distributed back in depth along the road to Kyaikto.

Two companies of the 3/7 Gurkha Rifles held Martaban while the 1/7 G.R. were about Paan. The 4 Burma Rifles watched the river between these two places and the 5/17 Dogras were ordered to Duyinzaik and to carry out active patrolling.

82. Reorganisation. A good deal of reorganisation was 'now necessary within the Division and it was decided to reconstitute the Brigades so as to include a battalion of the Burma Rifles in each Brigade as it was felt that these battalions would be of greater value when brigaded with other troops.

83. Reinforcements. On the 3rd February the 48 Indian Infantry Brigade which had arrived in Rangoon on 31st January without its transport and had been held in Army Reserve, was ordered forward to (Bilin to join the 17 Indian Division. The Divisional Commander was instructed to keep this Brigade concentrated and not to use it until there was a real necessity to do so.

84. Enemy Action. Martaban was now subjected to a good deal of shelling and bombing and small parties of the enemy succeeded in crossing the Salween at different points. In view of the enclosed country and long distances involved it was very difficult to locate them, especially as no information was forthcoming from the local inhabitants. Apart from this there was a lull on the front which gave our troops a much needed breathing space for reorganisation. The 1/7 G.R., however, showed a greater activity in the Paan area. They maintained a post and patrols on the far side of the river and had several very successful encounters with the enemy. Eventually, however, his increasing strength in this area forced their withdrawal across the river.

On the 5th February 7/10 Baluch relieved the 1/7 G.R. opposite Paan who then moved to Bilin. The 2 K.O.Y.L.I, which had been transferred from the I Burma Division in the Southern Shan States moved to Thaton while the 8 Burma Rifles and 1/9 R. Jats moved into reserve at Bilin.

85. Martaban Road cut. On the 9th a Japanese party which had no doubt infiltrated through the jungle led by local guides cut the road at milestone 8 a few miles south of Paung and established a strong road block there. Two carriers of the 5 Dogras failed to force a passage and two armoured cars of the Rangoon Battalion B.A.F. which came on the scene a little later were put out of action. In spite of further attacks the enemy was not dislodged from his position here. The 3/7 G.R. later succeeded in opening a way through Thebyugon and thence across country to Thaton.

86. Martaban. On the following day (l0th) Martaban was again subjected to a considerable amount of shelling and a good deal of enemy activity was observed, all of which indicated that the enemy were likely to make a renewed effort in the near future. It was also known that some parties of the enemy were on our side of the river. In view of the situation the Divisional Commander represented his desire to evacuate Martabah and to withdraw his line in order to get on to a less extended front. For the reasons given already I did not wish to give no more ground than was necessary and moreover as soon as the enemy got possession of Martaban it would have been easy for him to pass over troops and stores from Moulmein. I therefore issued orders that Martaban must continue to be held.

87. Loss of Martaban. The reports received on the nth disclosed a somewhat confused situation but did indicate that the enemy had started the next phase of his plan.

About six hundred Japanese were now in the area about Martaban and a further 2,000 were reported to have landed on the swamps and mud flats further up the coast and would no doubt be working their way in towards the road.

The 3/7 G.R. were forced to withdraw from Martaban but were still covering the exits of that place; they inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy and at one time charged them with the bayonet which caused them to run for cover throwing away their arms as they did so.

On this day also, about a battalion of the Japanese crossed the Salween near Paan and were believed to have surrounded the 7/10 Baluch. To restore the situation in this area the 5/17 Dogras were ordered to counterattack from the direction of Duyinzaik.

By the evening of the 13th the situation was a little clearer. The 5/17 Dogras, only one hundred strong and much disorganised arrived back from Duyinzaik where they had been heavily engaged for the past two days, (but there was still no news of the Baluch, who it was believed must have been surrounded.

88. Condition of Troops. The Divisional Commander now reported that, while he still had the 48 Indian Infantry Brigade intact and in hand, in the 16 and 46 Indian Brigades there was only one battalion, the K.O.Y.L.I., in a fit state to fight.

In view of the extent of his front and the condition of his troops he wished to withdraw to a better defensive position with a less extended front. While again pointing out the necessity for fighting as far forward as possible I gave him permission to withdraw if and when he considered such a course essential.

On 13th February I sent an appreciation to General Hartley, Commander-in-Chief, India, . which emphasised that the situation for the next month, until more troops became available, was likely to be critical and envisaged the possibility that we might be forced back to the line of the River Sittang. The difficulties likely to be encountered in an event of a forced withdrawal across this river were especially stressed. It also pointed out that the loss of Pegu would be likely to seal the fate of Rangoon and referred to the policy of stocking bases in Central Burma with a view to continuing the campaign and covering the road to India in the event of Rangoon being lost. It ended with an appeal for more troops, especially British, as early as possible.

89. 7/10 Baluch. On the 14th February, the news was received that some survivors of the 7/10 Baluch after 48 hours of heavy fighting had managed to fight their way out and were withdrawing to Duyinzaik. The following day this Battalion was visited by the Divisional Commander who found that its strength was about six officers and 250 men. There is no doubt that this Battalion fought most gallantly whilst completely surrounded by superior numbers and that it was only after all ammunition was exhausted that a small remnant was forced to surrender. The survivors consisted for the most part of a company that was detached from the Battalion and men who were away with the transport.

90. Withdrawal to Bilin. At midday on the 15th February, the Divisional Commander reported that, in view of the pressure on his front, he proposed to withdraw to the River Bilin which he felt confident he could hold. Accordingly as a first step the 46 Indian Infantry Brigade commenced to withdraw behind the Bilin.

On the 16th, H.Q. 2 Burma Infantry Brigade was ordered to move to Nyaunglebin together with the 7 Burma Rifles as soon as transport could be made available. A reconnaissance party started off at once. The object of this move was to ensure that the line of the River Sittang to the north should be at any rate patrolled, and also, if possible, prepared for defence. Most units of the Burma Rifles were no longer fit for further fighting without rest and re-organisation, and certain Indian battalions were in a similar condition. It was hoped, therefore, as reinforcements became available, to withdraw these battalions into reserve across the River Sittang.

About the same time the 1 Burma Rifles which had reached the front from Mergui via Rangoon and which had not been engaged, were sent up to Papun to cover the left flank. This Battalion carried out its task very well and after several weeks in the jungle eventually joined i Burma Division near Toungoo. Two detachments of about a company each were also placed to watch likely crossings over the River Salween between Papun and Paan and a Burma F.F. column was detailed to protect the left flank of the 17 Indian Division.

At 12.05 hours a report was received to the effect that a party of Japanese estimated at being from 300 to 1,000 strong, had crossed the Salween at Yinbaing and were advancing on Mepli. A company of the 8 Burma Rifles were sent to investigate and contacted the Japanese at Kuseik.

In the evening Thaton was evacuated and the bridge at Yinnein was demolished, and on this date the 1/4 G.R. of 48 Indian Brigade were put into the line and carried out a counterattack to restore the situation on the left flank.

Heavy fighting took place on most parts of the front on the 17th February and it was evident that the enemy were trying to work around the left flank of the Division. The remainder of the 48 Brigade was now brought up into line on the right of 16 Indian Brigade, where both 5/17 Dogra and 8 Burma Rifles were found to have vacated their positions. To protect the right flank an organisation of watchers backed up by Burma Military Police was put in operation along the coast.

The 2 K.O.Y.L.I, now became heavily engaged with the enemy about Danyigon and were out of touch for some considerable time.

91. Pegu Force. The possibility of the Japanese crossing the estuary of the River Sittang by -boat and cutting off our communications with Pegu or of going further afield and landing near the Rangoon River had been considered for Lome time past, but beyond small detachments of the Burma Frontier Force and Burma Military Police, there had been no troops spare for this task. The arrival of reinforcements now made it possible, however, for more effective steps to be taken, and on the 18th February, the Pegu Force was formed. This Force consisted of the 1 W. Yorks, F.F.6 and detachments of the Burma Military Police, and was given the role of protecting Pegu from the south east linking up with the 17 Division at the Sittang Bridge. An armoured train was provided to operate in the Delta area. A similar organisation consisting of a company of the 1st Glosters, F.F.7 and some Military Police were responsible for the approaches to Syriam from the sea.

92. 7 Armoured Brigade. In anticipation of the arrival of the 7 Armoured Brigade every effort had been been made, to strengthen bridges, and to convert railway bridges for the passage of tanks in order to give them as large an area in which to operate as possible.

All possible steps were also taken to ensure that the disembarkation of .the Brigade could be carried out as quickly as possible after its arrival, and that there would be no delay in moving the units to their concentration areas. It was obviously doubtful whether the Brigade would be in time to assist in the defence of the area east of the River Sittang, but the Brigade arrived in Rangoon on the 21st and thanks to the excellent work of all concerned, it was got forward in time to impose considerable delay on the enemy west of the River Sittang and to relieve the pressure on the tired troops in the Pegu area.

93 Bilin Position. It is now necessary to turn back to the operations on the Front of the 17 Indian Division which was occupying the Bilin position.

During the 18th the enemy definitely increased his pressure against our troops and succeeded in crossing the river to the south of the village of Bilin.

In this area a counter attack was delivered by the 48 Indian Infantry Brigade which, while succeeding in holding up the enemy advance, did not succeed in pushing him back over the river. Further to the north the enemy were working round the flank of the 16 Indian Infantry Brigade. The 2 K.O.Y.L.I, which had put in a gallant counter attack, had suffered heavy casualties, but was holding it’s own. It should also be mentioned (that on this date some very effective bombing was carried out by the R.A.F. on enemy troops south of the Bflin River. The night passed with our troops in close contact with the enemy along the north bank of the River.

On the 18th a wide turning movement was initiated by 4/12 F.F.R. with the object of attacking the enemy's right flank. The operation achieved considerable success and heavy fighting ensued. It left the Division, however, without any reserves and weak along the coast. The troops were becoming very weak and exhausted. The enemy also established himself in the rear of the right flank—presumably by landing from the sea. In view of the situation, I ordered up the 2 D.W.R., the only unit I had in hand, to protect the rear of the Division.

94. Question of Withdrawal. During the morning of the igth I visited the Division. A counter attack by 2/5 R.G.R. had not altogether succeeded in driving the enemy out of Thattkyon in rear of the right flank. The enemy was well established in the centre of the position and there was every indication that he was 7 bringing up strong forces against the left flank. The situation was, therefore, such that there appeared to be grave risk of not being able to disengage the troops unless a further withdrawal was ordered.

In view of the strong position on the River Sittang in rear, the anticipated arrival of  reinforcements and especially tanks, a decision " to fight it out " on the River Bilin had little to recommend it. In view of subsequent events there is little doubt that had the withdrawal been further deferred the Division would have been practically destroyed and Rangoon left open to the enemy.

I, therefore, told the Divisional Commander to make all necessary preparation for withdrawal and to judge for himself when the necessity for doing so had arrived. Subsequent orders were issued to the effect that all transport should be got across the River Sittang at an early stage of the withdrawal, and that the 2 D.W.R. should be sent back to guard the bridgehead as early as possible. I myself had personally ordered the retention of one company at that place, in view of the weakness of the garrison.

On 18th February, I sent to A.B.D.A. Command and the War Office an appreciation which after referring to the severe check that had been inflicted on the enemy on the Bilin River indicated that if, as appeared probable, he was able to renew his attack with fresh troops, it might not be possible to continue to hold the position. It also pointed out that if the battle went badly, the enemy might succeed in crossing the River Sittang without much difficulty which would render the evacuation of Rangoon an imminent possibility. After reviewing the meagre resources of troops available, and future reinforcements, it is stated that probably the best that could be hoped for was that it would be possible to hold up the enemy on the line of the River Sittang. This would, however, involve an immediate threat to the main road and railway from Rangoon to Mandalay which was the main route of supply of China and for the evacuation of civilians, stores and base installations from Rangoon. After referring to the difficult problem of whether to start evacuation of non-essential personnel at once, with its obviously bad effect on morale, or risk congestion and confusion at a later stage, it concluded by stating that five divisions in all were essential to the defence of Burma of which two would be required for the defence of the River Sittang. It expressed doubts, however, as to whether sufficient troops could arrive in time to save Rangoon and said that unless they could do so more quickly than was at the time visualised, the risk of losing Rangoon within the next few weeks was considerable. The accuracy of this was very fully borne out by events. On the 20th February, after the decision to withdraw to the River Sittang, a further telegram was sent which, after describing the condition of the troops, dealt in some detail with the necessity for taking preliminary measures for the evacuation of Rangoon. It stated that after consultation with the Governor and Combined Commanders, it had been decided to commence certain measures under the evacuation scheme which would not, however be detrimental to the actual defence of Rangoon. These included the diversion of certain ships carrying administrative units which would be very difficult to unload in the existing conditions and whose presence would seriously complicate the evacuation problem. It made it clear that fighting troops should be continued to be sent as reinforcements and that every effort would be made to hold Rangoon. It also dealt with the evacuation of women and children and the denial of the oil refineries. It concluded with emphasizing once again the need for a Corps Commander and also for a Senior General Officer to undertake liaison duties with the Chinese Armies.

There can be no doubt now that the timely adoption of these measures was amply justified, without them there would have been chaos.

95. Withdrawal begins. On the 20th February after three days of almost hand to hand fighting, the forward troops managed to disengage from the enemy and the first stage of withdrawal commenced. The withdrawal was co-ordinated by the Commanders of the 48 and 16 Brigades. The only unit that had any difficulty in getting away was the 1/9 R. Jats, which was partially surrounded and owing to a delay in receipt of orders to withdraw was caught by a pre-arranged bombing attack intended for the enemy. This delayed the withdrawal of 48 Brigade till 1500 hours and it was eventually ferried to Kyaikto by M.T., reaching that place at about 2030 hours.

The intention now was for the 17 Indian Division to form a strong line on the west bank of the River Sittang, and it was hoped that, if any enemy managed to cross in any strength, the 7 Armoured Brigade would be able to deal with them. It may be mentioned here that while the paddy land looked most suitable for the employment of tanks, it was found that the small bunds between the fields necessitated the tanks slowing down to take them, and thus making them vulnerable and slow.

96. Plan of Withdrawal. The 17 Indian Division's plan for the withdrawal was for 48 Brigade to move back first, going into divisional reserve. It was to pass through 46 Brigade which was already in the Kyaikto area, 46 Brigade was to act as rearguard to the 17 Division. On 21st February the leading battalion of 48 Brigade was only to go as far as the quarries, two miles east of Mokpalin. The remaining battalions were to halt on positions some four or seven miles further back along the main road. To strengthen the bridgehead defence consisting of the 3 Burma Rifles and one company a D.W.R., the Divisional Commander subsequently ordered the 4/12 F.F.R. to the Sittang bridge area.

The 2 D.W.R. less one company remained with 46 Indian Infantry Brigade and it was also decided that units should retain their transport.

97. Communications. The withdrawal across the river was bound to be a difficult operation as only the one bridge existed, but a power ferry, for M.T. with three boats had been placed in position as an alternative means, and was provided with landing stages of elaborate construction.

It should be noted here that in this area communications were extremely difficult, apart from the railway there was a road only as far as Waw some 10 t miles west of the Sittan Bridge, on the east 'side there was no road until reaching Kyaikto 16 miles beyond the River. Every effort had been made to complete the road, and to deck over the railway bridge. By excellent work on the part of Mr. Stewart of the Burma Railways, the latter and the power ferry were completed, but the " road " was still a very dusty and rough track through the jungle. It may be added, that the River Sittang at this place was nearly 500 yards wide and very swift. The rapidity of the current, the enormous rise and fall of the tide (40 feet) and the existence of a bore, were considered to render it unsafe for navigation, and nobody but a very strong swimmer could hope to cross it by that means.

98. Visit to Lashio. As the withdrawal of 17 Indian Division on 20th had been successfully begun, I felt able on 21st to fly up to Lashio to meet the Generalissimo on his way back to China. It was obviously most desirable that I should do so in order to hasten as far as possible, the arrival of the Chinese troops in Burma. Unfortunately he decided at the last moment not to land, and flew straight on to Chungking. I returned to Rangoon by air on 22nd to find a very serious situation had arisen on the River Sittang. It is necessary first however, to describe what had taken place on 21st during my absence.

99. Events of list. By 12.00 hours on the 21st both 48 and 16 Indian Infantry Brigades had passed through 46 Brigade at Kyaikto. During the afternoon 46 Brigade commenced its withdrawal and although bombed from the air it was not followed up. The order of march was 48 Brigade leading, followed by 16 Brigade M.T., 46 Brigade M.T. and then 16 Brigade followed by 46 Brigade. One battalion of 46 Brigade moved by the railway line, all the remainder by the road and track.

Between 12.00 and 15.00 hours the troops between Kyaikto and Mokpalin were very heavily bombed and machine gunned by aircraft which were considered by many people to be our own. Whether this was the fact and whether the fault lay with the Army or the R.A.F. was not satisfactorily cleared up at the time.

By 18.30 hours on 21st H.Q. 48 Brigade and 1/4 G.R. were established in Mokpalin with the remaining battalions of the Brigade supporting them and seven miles further south as laid down by Divisional H.Q. The 16 and 46 Brigades spent the night 21/22nd on the road between Kyaikto and Mokpalin and the time of start for the 22nd was fixed between the Brigadiers concerned. It was agreed that 16 and 46 Brigades M.T. should start at about 03 oo hours, in that order, followed by 16 Brigade and 46 Brigade. By 06.00 hours the whole of the troops in the rear of the column were on the move.

100. Situation about the Sittang Bridge. We must now return to the head of the column. The movement from the Quarries started at 04.00 hours on 22nd February with the 1/4 G.R. leading, followed by Divisional H.Q. and H.Q. 48 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The 1/4 G.R. were given the task of protecting the west bank of the bridge against parachute attack and the bridgehead was still therefore dangerously weak. The passage of M.T. across the river was completely held up for three hours by a 3-ton lorry which got off the roadway. Movement did not therefore start again till 06.30 hours.

At 08.30 hours, as the 7/10 Baluch was marching through the railway cutting immediately east of the bridge, the enemy put in a heavy attack from the north-east of the bridgehead. One and a half companies of the 3 Burma Rifles holding that sector were forced back and the attack went through almost to the end of the bridge itself. An Advance Dressing Station north of the bridge was overcome. The A.D.M.S., D.A.D.M.S. and all medical personnel were taken prisoner. Two companies of the 4/12 F.F.R. at once counter attacked and re-took the original position on the north and north-east of the perimeter. The Battalion was supported by the 7/10 Baluch. The bridgehead was again lost and re-taken later. D Company 2 D.lW.R. then on the west bank was ordered across the River and took up a position on the south-east of the bridgehead perimeter. The ferries immediately above the bridge were destroyed in view of the situation and there was no communication with the remaining battalions or brigades which were still a considerable distance on the far side of the river.

At about 14.00 hours the bridgehead was shelled. About this time two platoons of 1/3 G.R. reached the bridgehead. It transpired later that the 2/5 R.G.R. and 1/3 G.R. had staged an attack on the enemy between them and the bridgehead. These platoons, whilst taking part in the attack, had lost direction in the dense jungle. They were subsequently employed in the defence of the bridgehead. During the remainder of 22nd and during the night heavy pressure continued on the bridgehead. The original garrison had had considerable casualties and 1/4 G.R. less one company were brought up to reinforce it. In spite of heavy fire stragglers started to come in via the river bank from the south—all telling the same story of troops ambushed, cut up and scattered. It seemed as if no unit of the Division remained intact, and as the enemy pressure gradually increased the Commander 48 Brigade after consulting the Divisional Commander by telephone and obtaining his consent, decided to blow the bridge before daylight on the 23rd.

At 05.30 hours on the morning of the 23rd, after very heavy fighting, the bridge was blown.

The destruction of the bridge left the other two Brigades and two battalions of 48 Brigade on the far side of the River in a very precarious position and it is necessary now to return to the story of their action on 22nd.

At about 08.45 hours on 22nd heavy fire was opened on 3/7 G.R., the leading battalion of 46 Brigade, an immediate counter attack failed to dislodge the enemy and further attacks developed on both flanks. 5/17 Dogras and one company 2 D.W.R. endeavoured to deal with these attacks but while doing so a further attack was made on the rearguard—2 D.W.R. Severe casualties were sustained on both sides.

101. Bridgehead recaptured. About 10.00 hours Brigadier Ekin, Commander 46 Brigade, organised a sweeping movement through the jungle which enabled the troops on the road to move forward and join 16 Brigade, three miles further on. This Brigade was also by this time heavily attacked. This action continued till dark on 22nd and the column under the Brigadier 46 Brigade encountered about 20.00 hours a large enemy force moving up the railway line on Mokpalin. By now the forces involved were much split up and various elements eventually made their way through the jungle and crossed the river higher up. Meanwhile Brigadier Jones, 16 Indian Infantry Brigade had been fighting hard and a number of gallant counter attacks had been carried out by battalions of that Brigade and the Gurkha battalions of 48 Brigade which were cut off from the bridge. By 09.00 hours on the morning of 23rd he had cleared the enemy from the bridgehead and organised its defence with his own Brigade, two battalions of 48 Brigade and portions of all three battalions of 46 Brigade. He also had the Divisional Artillery and most of the M.T. with him. By this time, however, the .bridge had been blown and there were no boats.

Very determined attacks supported by artillery and air bombing were still being made by the enemy from .the south and east and there was no hope of organised withdrawal. Brigadier Ekin now succeeded in joining 16 Indian Infantry Brigade and after discussion it was decided that the only course possible was to start withdrawal by every means possible before disorganisation became complete.

Great credit is due to those officers and men who held their positions to the last to cover the withdrawal of the others and the evacuation, so far as it was possible, of the wounded. Many men swam the River, a most formidable undertaking involving nearly an hour in the water. A large number who attempted it were unfortunately drowned in the attempt. Others crossed, under fire all the time, on improvised rafts on which they carried such of the wounded as they could collect. Others with, the aid of ropes collected in Mokpalin crossed the gap between the remains of the bridge, also under fire. A number of others who could not swim, forced their way through the jungle and crossed some miles higher up, where the River is narrower, in boats or rafts. Quite a number did not get back to our lines for many days, or in a few cases weeks, afterwards.

It has only been possible to obtain the names of a few of those who performed outstanding acts of gallantry on this day. Many swam the River again and again under fire bringing over parties of wounded and the whole episode, disastrous as it was, is a magnificent example of heroism on the part of all ranks of the forces engaged. The fact that a large proportion of men eventually rejoined their units shows that at no time was there any disposition to surrender to the enemy. Brigadier Ekin swam the River about 15.00 hours and Brigadier Jones about an hour later. Although many of the troops were able to make good their escape few were able to bring back their arms and practically all transport and equipment had to be abandoned. Many of the transport mules which had been turned loose swam the River on their own and joined up with other units which had mules.

102. Condition of Troops. From this date onwards none of the Infantry Brigades concerned could be regarded as more than remnants, ready to defend themselves doggedly but otherwise unfit for any of the normal operations of  war. If they could have been pulled out for a few weeks to rest and refit, and if it had been possible to provide their deficiencies in personnel, equipment and transport, no doubt they would have recovered. In existing conditions this was of course impossible and after only a short pause they were again engaged in the severe fighting at Pegu which eventually culminated in the loss of Rangoon.

It was afterwards ascertained that the enemy had brought up for this action part at any rate of another Division—the 33rd. This Division moved via Paan and jungle tracks north east of the Thaton-Bilin-Kyaikto road and was no doubt intended to annihilate our forces east of the River Sittang. Our timely withdrawal, however, prevented his carrying out his plan in full. By forced marches he was able to launch an attack on the bridgehead at the Sittang and thus bring about its premature destruction. He was also able to ambush our columns on the march and inflict heavy casualties. The success of the latter operation was no doubt partly due to the disorganisation caused by the bombing already referred to. It is interesting to note that it was reported by stragglers that the tracks used by the enemy were most carefully marked with paper arrows and that the enemy undoubtedly had the assistance of local guides.

There is no doubt that the battle of the River Sittang was nothing less than a disaster. Except for about two battalions which both suffered heavy casualties the Division had lost practically all its equipment, transport, guns and ammunition. The men that were eventually collected had in some cases retained their rifles but many had lost them in crossing the River Sittang and others had had in addition to discard some of their uniform including even their boots. Their morale was naturally low and many were utterly exhausted. Steps were of course immediately taken to distribute such transport, arms, clothing and equipment as could be made available, though this amounted to little. A large number of men who were unarmed had to be put on trains and evacuated to reinforcement camps up country where they could be rested, re-armed and equipped. Owing to transportation difficulties many of them did not rejoin their units until after the loss of Prome. The 46 Indian Infantry Brigade had to be broken up and many units were amalgamated or re-distributed, among these were 5/17 Dogras, 7/10 Baluch, 1/7 Gurkhas, 3/7 Gurkhas, 1/3 Gurkhas. The following table shows the state of battalions of 17 Indian Division on the evening of 24th February.

STATE OF INFANTRY OF 17 INDIAN DIVISION (EVENING 24™ FEBRUARY)

* Note the small number of rifles available

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