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V. NAVAL CO-OPERATION.
Close co-operation with such naval forces as were available, the control and escort of shipping, and the appreciation of naval problems, was obtained through the medium of Captain J. I. Hallet, R.N., and subsequently of Commodore C. M. Graham, R.N.
35. The Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The B.R.N.V.R., then in its infancy, consisted of a few armed launches. Its officers were British and Burman and the ratings were almost wholly Burman. It maintained an examination service at the mouth of the Rangoon river, carried out minesweeping and furnished a Mergui Archipelago patrol. During the operations on the Tenasserim Coast every possible assistance was given by these craft both in reconnaissance and in the withdrawal of our forces from Mergui, Tavoy, and Moulmein which is referred to elsewhere. In spite of their inadequate numbers they undoubtedly proved a considerable deterrent to coastal operations of the type employed by the enemy with so much success off the coast of Malaya. Eventually, owing to desertions, and other causes, the Burma Navy, like the " Burma Army " largely disappeared but not before it had done most valuable work.
36. Naval Assistance. Except for one visit by a sloop of the R.I.N. sent by Commander -in-Chief East Indies in response for an urgent request for naval assistance, and the despatch of a most welcome reinforcement of 100 Marines, naval operations proper were almost entirely confined to the escort of convoys. Towards the close of the period, however, another sloop of the R.I.N. was successful in intercepting and capturing off the mouth of the Rangoon River a party of some 35 of the Free Burma Army under the leadership of a Japanese officer.
37. Evacuation. The successful evacuation by sea of the whole of the rear parties and protection troops left to carry out the demolitions in Rangoon, carried out under the very nose of the enemy, was highly creditable to all concerned, including the R.A.F., who afforded air cover during the passage of the dangerouswaters south-west of Rangoon.
38. Enemy Action. The fact that not a single transport was ever attacked by either surface craft, aircraft or submarine during the whole of the operations is a proof of the success achieved in timing the arrival and departure of convoys and the provision of air cover and seaward reconnaissance. This was not of course achieved without detriment to air operations elsewhere, and imposed a severe strain on the small air forces available.
That co-operation was so successfully achieved was largely due to the practice of holding daily, or twice daily, meetings of the three commanders and to the effort to ensure that as far as possible all communications with higher authority on major policy were sent either as from the combined commanders or else were the subject of inter-service agreement before despatch.
39. Higher Command. Finally it is necessary to point out that the fact that Burma was included in the sphere of the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet and subsequently transferred to that of Commander-m-Chief East Indies rendered it especially difficult to obtain naval support or guidance as to naval policy. For a considerable period the exact definition of responsibility was very vague.
40. Inshore Operations. A further matter that deserves future consideration was the absence of any organisation, or of suitable craft, for inshore operations on the coast line from India to Malaya. The possibilities of such action, in close co-operation with troops or marines especially trained in boat work, was very considerable, and it is suggested that it should in future be recognised as a special branch of naval activities. Attempts were made to develop an organisation of this kind based on the detachment of 100 marines referred to above. Before they had completed their training, however, the evacuation of Rangoon rendered it necessary to withdraw them up the River Irrawaddy where they have since done most valuable work.
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