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OPERATIONS AFTER FALL OF RANGOON.
22. Once Rangoon had fallen, there was comparatively little that G.H.Q. in India could do to influence the operations in Burma. Until the road from Assam was completed, reinforcements of personnel and stores could only be sent in by air, and the number of transport aircraft was extremely limited.
The chief requirement of the forces in Burma at this time, British and Chinese, was air support, which India was unable to provide in the necessary strength. At first it was hoped to maintain the ascendancy which our air forces in Burma had so far held over the Japanese in spite of great numerical inferiority. The loss of the port of Rangoon, however, stopped the flow of R.A.F. personnel and equipment planned by the Air Ministry, .and the loss of the airfield organisation in Southern Burma greatly affected air operations. Once Rangoon had gone, the maximum force that could be maintained in Upper Burma from the resources available was one Bomber Squadron, one Fighter Squadron and one Army Co-operation Flight, in addition to one A.V.G. Fighter Squadron. It was decided to form also a mixed Wing of one Fighter, one Bomber and one G'.R. Squadron at Akyab. Shortage of aircraft, however, prevented this Wing being fully formed and with the exception of a few obsolescent fighters, all the serviceable operational aircraft—fighters and bombers—were absorbed by the formation of the Wing in Upper Burma. This Wing was based at Magwe, the only airfield left in Burma with any degree of warning. On the 21st and 22nd March, over a period of some 24 hours, it was attacked by the enemy in force. The available Hurricanes and Blenheims had been engaged in the early morning of the 21st against an enemy concentration of aircraft at Mingaladon on which they had inflicted severe losses. When the enemy retaliated only 12 of our fighters were serviceable and able to take off to engage the first raid. Although four of the enemy were shot down and two were damaged, the weight of attack got home. In his attacks the enemy made Magwe temporarily untenable for first-line aircraft and destroyed or rendered unserviceable 17 bombers and fighters on the ground. The cause of this reverse was our weakness in fighters, the failure of the warning system and an almost complete absence of aircraft pens and dispersal arrangements. The loss of these aircraft, which constituted practically the only air force available at the time, and the withdrawal of the R.A.F. to Lashio on the northern frontier of Burma and Loiwmg in China, several hundred miles further north, made the support of the Burma Army an extremely difficult problem. Aircraft were only reaching India in small numbers, and it was essential to organise the defence of Calcutta and of Ceylon. I had reluctantly to decide that I must use the air forces reaching India to build up a defence in that country, and that I could not afford the heavy losses that Japanese numerical superiority, the lack of training of our air squadrons, the absence of a warning system and the difficult flying conditions in Upper Burma were bound to cause in an attempt to give air support to the forces in Burma. The Japanese air arm had therefore almost a free hand in the later stages of the Burma campaign, and it was fortunate for us that they failed to take full advantage of their opportunity.
23. I had little confidence in being able to prevent the Japanese from reaching the Burma oilfields at Yenangyaung or from occupying Mandalay if they made a determined attack on these objectives. We could not relieve or reinforce our troops of whom the majority had been fighting continuously for some months in difficult conditions, while the enemy had practically unlimited powers of reinforcing his land and air effort. During March and April he increased his forces in Burma by three divisions and gradually drove back the Chinese and ourselves.
I hoped that we might still manage to retain a hold on Upper Burma north of Mandalay and a common front with the Chinese. I discussed with General Alexander during a visit which I paid to Burma at the end of March his dispositions in the event of a withdrawal north of Mandalay being necessary, and we decided that a part of the Imperial Forces might withdraw with the Chinese on Lashio and possibly even into China.
In the end the sudden break through of the enemy into the Shan States and quick capture of Lashio, together with the enemy threat up the Chindwin against the road into Assam, led to the whole of the Imperial Forces withdrawing by Kalewa and Tamu into India. This was agreed with the Chinese who decided to withdraw the Fifth Army up the Irrawaddy valley on Bhamo and Myitkyina.
24. The defence of the Andaman Islands was included in the defence of Burma during most of this period. Its military importance lay in its seaplane base, in the possibility of establishing an aerodrome there, and in its potential value to the enemy as a submarine base. The original garrison was one British company. For security against a Japanese raid a battalion of Gurkhas was added early in January. When it became obvious that Rangoon could not be held, it was decided to withdraw the whole garrison, which was successfully carried out on 12th March. On 23rd March the Japanese occupied Port Blair.
Akyab was held till early in May when Japanese infiltration by land and sea and attack by air made it obvious that it would require an effort disproportionate to its military value to hold it any longer, since it could no longer be used as an air base. The garrison and naval patrol were therefore withdrawn.
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