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SUMMARY OF BURMA CAMPAIGN.
25. The loss of Burma has been from a strategical point of view our most serious reverse of the Japanese war. It has deprived our Chinese allies of a flow of munitions to continue their long resistance; it has made the establishment of air bases within effective range of Japan a matter of extreme difficulty; it has exposed India to a serious threat of invasion; and it has had a disastrous effect on British prestige in the East. The reasons for this reverse merit some examination.
26. The unpreparedness of Burma for war and its causes have already been mentioned; and I have recorded my conviction that to place the control of operations in Burma under a Far Eastern Command instead of under India was an error from the military point of viewwhich it would require strong political reasons to justify.
27. From a geographical point of view the defence of Burma against an attack from Thailand was an awkward commitment. The fact that there was practically speaking only one means of entry into the country, by the port of Rangoon, was a source of weakness; and this port lay within a comparatively short range of enemy airfields in Thailand. The long narrow strip of Tenasserim, over 400 miles long and nowhere much more than 40 miles broad, was not easily defensible, while in the enemy's possession it was a threat both by air (there were several excellent aerodromes) and by sea.
If Moulmein in Upper Tenasserim fell, and here again the ground gave little scope for defence in depth, Rangoon was very closely threatened; while a force defending Rangoon against an enemy advancing from the line of the Salween River had the disadvantage of fighting on a front parallel to its communications and with its base close behind, almost outside, its right flank.
If ever there was a country where attack was the best form of defence it was Burma. Unfortunately the means were not available.
28. Such plans and preparations as had been made for the defence of Burma suffered from three misconceptions:
(a) that the main attack would be directed against Kengtung in the Southern Shan States, the only place to which there were good communications in Thailand—a motor road from a railhead at Lampang. Actually the Japanese made no attempt to use this obvious route.
(b) that our air force would be able to prevent the enemy using the limited approaches to the frontier. The whole experience of this war is that air forces cannot prevent the use of a road or railway; and anyway there were no bombers in Burma.
(c) that the natural difficulties of the country on the frontier, few and indifferent tracks, hills and thick jungle and the formidable natural obstacle of the Salween River, would restrict the numbers the enemy could employ and dictate the direction in which he used them. Actually, we found ourselves up against a new feature in warfare— an enemy fully armed, disciplined, and trained on the continental model using the mobility, independence of communications and unorthodox tactics of the savage in thick jungle. It was perhaps little wonder that our troops were out-manoeuvred and became bewildered.
29. British military authorities have seldom realised that an Intelligence system cannot be improvised and requires to be built up over a period of years. The study of Intelligence in peace is not encouraged and officers who specialise in it are apt to be regarded with suspicion The operations in Burma are a striking example of the penalty we pay in war for this neglect.
30. There was never sufficient naval force to give any effective naval support during the Burma Campaign; and its absence made the G.O.C. always anxious about a landing near Rangoon. Actually the Japanese made no attempt at sea-borne invasion nor were any ships from convoys to Rangoon ever lost from enemy action.
Commodore Graham, R.N., with small forces did some good work in the protection of Akyab and the coast to the south in the later stages of the campaign.
The situation as regards air support has been sufficiently indicated in the narratives of General Hutton and General Alexander. I constantly endeavoured to obtain air reinforcements for Burma but they were not available.
The operations are a striking example of the importance of an adequate warning system, which conditions in Burma made it extremely difficult to organise.
The Japanese air force did not show itself particularly efficient or formidable in Burma, either in bombing or fighting. Our small air forces, skilfully and boldly handled, were more than a match for the enemy as long as good airfields and warnings were available.
Casualties and material damage from air attack were small but the moral effects were considerable. This should not be so with well trained and disciplined troops.
I should like to express my grateful thanks to Colonel (now Brigadier General) G. Chennault and to all the officers and men of the A.V.G. who did such skilful and gallant work in the defence of Rangoon.
I should also like to record the good services of Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, who commanded the air forces in Burma from January, 1942, onwards, and of his predecessor Group-Captain Manning.
32. The troops who fought in the Burma campaign were subjected to a very severe strain. They were opposed by a well-trained, vigourous and determined enemy, usually superior in numbers; they had to fight in a type of country and under conditions quite unfamiliar to the majority; they had no relief and very little rest during more than five months, in the later stages they were almost entirely deprived of air support. After the fall of Rangoon they felt themselves cut off from outside help and from all amenities. Every effort was made to send mails and asupply of stores to Burma, but the limitations of air transport made it impossible to meet thefull needs. Rations, however, thanks to the efforts of the administrative staff, were not short.
The importance of the Fifth Column in Burma has been exaggerated; the number of actual rebels who took arms against us or assisted the enemy was probably small. But the moral effect on the soldier of the knowledge that a proportion of the population was potentially hostile and treacherous was considerable. The defection of large numbers of the men of the units of the Burma Army also had a depressing effect.
In the circumstances the troops put up a remarkable performance and showed a fine fighting spirit.
Particular mention should be made of' the 7 Armoured Brigade under Brigadier J. H. Anstice (7 Hussars, 2 Royal Tank Regiment, 414 Battery (Essex Yeomanry) R.H.A., A Battery 95 Anti-Tank Regiment), who, from their arrival in Burma in the third week of February till the end of the campaign, formed the mainstay of the Burma Army and kept up a very high standard of morale and efficiency. Owing to the fact that no tanks had been available in India, the infantry in Burma had had no practice in co-operation with armoured forces, which was in consequence elementary.
The 1 Indian Field Artillery Regiment, which went straight into action on landing at Rangoon and was continually engaged to the end of the campaign, greatly distinguished itself.
33. Lieut.-General Hutton did most valuable work in placing Burma on a war footing so far as could be done in the very limited time available. To reorganise the whole military system and to endeavour to create an administrative lay-out practically from nothing, while at the same time controlling difficult operations in the field, threw a very heavy strain on him. As C.G.S. to General Alexander he continued to give most valuable service till the arrival of Major-General Winterton.
I should like also here to pay a tribute to the work previously done by him a C.G.S. in India during the expansion of the Indian Army, which owes much to his organizing ability.
34. General Alexander took over an extremely difficult situation and a somewhat shaken and disorganised army. By his cool and inspiring leadership he did everything possible during the remainder of the campaign to check the Japanese advance and to keep the army together. He also succeeded in establishing and maintaining good relations with the Chinese, though, as he says, a real combined command, owing to the difference in outlook and methods, was not possible.
35. Generally speaking, the standard of leadership of the Army in Burma was high. Lieut.-General Slim, Commanding the Burma Corps, Major-General Cowan, Commanding the 17 Indian Division, Major-General Bruce-Scott, Commanding the 1 Burma Division, were all good and resolute commanders; and it was largely due to their efforts that the enemy's superior numbers were kept at bay for so long and the final withdrawal so skilfully conducted. The majority of the brigade and battalion commanders also showed themselves competent and determined leaders.
36. Of the staff officers Major-General Goddard in charge of administration under both General Hutton and General Alexander, did outstanding work and was quite untiring. On the General Staff side Brigadier Davies, first with General Hutton and later under General Slim in the Burma Corps, did work of a high order.
The work of Major-General Wakely in charge of the lines of communication also deserves special mention.
37. The bearing and endurance of the Chinese troops who fought in Burma created a favourable impression. General J. Stilwell of the United States Army, who was placed by the Generalissimo in command of the Chinese troops m Burma, and General Lo Cho-Ying, who commanded the Fifth and Sixth Armies, were always ready to co-operate, although Chinese methods usually resulted in considerable delay in the execution of orders to put into effect the plans that had been concerted.
I should like to record the great impression that the Generalissimo, Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek, made on all commanders who met him; and to express my gratitude for the wholehearted assistance he gave in the attempt to hold Burma.
38. The Civil Administration in Burma was faced suddenly by a series of most difficult problems due to the rapid Japanese advance, the bombing of Rangoon and the flight of a large part of the population. As might have been expected, parts of the -administration stood the test well 'and parts collapsed. The Governor, H. E. Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, was always whole-hearted in his co-operation with the military, and his Counsellor, The Honourable Mr. John Wise, was also extremely helpful. But some of the executive branches, such as the Police, tended to break down under the strain.
Denial of essential materials to the enemy was on the whole effectively carried out. The oil refinery at Syriam, just outside Rangoon, and the oilfields at Yenangyaung were very thoroughly destroyed.
39. As will have been seen, much depended in the later stages on how quickly the process of driving a road from India to Burma could be accomplished. The project of a road between Assam and Upper Burma had been the subject of discussion for some years previous to the war, but no action had been taken. As a military necessity, it began to take shape in the late autumn of 1941; the actual orders to begin work at all speed were issued in the middle of December. India was to widen the metalled road already existing from Dimapur to Imphal in Manipur State (135 miles) and to make a road from Imphal to Tamu (65 miles) where only a bridle track existed. Burma Government was to make an all weather road from Tamu to Kalewa and thence to Ye-U (approximately 190 miles) between which places only a fair-weather cart track existed.
Up to February work inside India proceeded somewhat slowly, (but thenceforward was pushed on with all possible speed. A motor road, not metalled, reached Tamu just in time for the withdrawal of the Burma Army. Maintenance by this road during the wet season would, however, have been impossible. Great credit is due to Major-General Wood who was specially placed in charge of the project in March, 1942, for the energy with which he furthered the completion of the road, and to Brigadier Gilpin, R.E , and the engineers under him for a fine piece of work in difficult conditions.
Owing to various difficulties, little work was ever done by the Burma Government on the Tamu-Ye-U sector and eventually India had to undertake to complete it. The withdrawal took place before work on an all-weather road could be begun; but some very good work was done in a very short time to facilitate the withdrawal by improvement of the existing cart track.
Report by Lieut.-General T. J Hutton, C.B.,
M.C., on Operations in Burma -from- 27th
December, 1941, to 5th March, 1942.
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