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BURMA RETURNED TO INDIA COMMAND.
19. By the time the Sittang River battle took place, two changes of importance in the control of the operations in Burma had been decided. I had ceased temporarily to be responsible for Burma, and the War Cabinet, in view of the proposed expansion of the forces in Burma, decided to place Lieut.-General Alexander in command of the troops in Burma. Lieut.-General Hutton remained as Chief of the General Staff to General Alexander.
The Chiefs of Staff had telegraphed me on 18th February asking my views on the desirability, in view of the loss of Singapore and Sumatra, of Burma reverting to the control of Commander-in-Chief, India. I replied that I had never varied in my recommendation that Burma should be under Commander-in-Chief, India, for defence. On 2ist February I received orders that Burma was to come again under the command of Commander-in-Chief, India.
20. Soon after the middle of February I realised that it was most unlikely that Java could be held against the impending Japanese attack and that in view of the enemy command of the air it would be impossible to land the Australian Corps, which was on its way from the Middle East, in Java. I considered it absolutely essential that Rangoon and Burma should be held and recommended that the Australian Corps, or at least the leading Division of it, should be sent to Burma. My recommendation was supported by the Prime Minister but was not accepted by the Australian Government.1 When this convoy changed course for Australia, the last hope of holding Rangoon practically vanished.
21. On 23rd February I was ordered to close down A.OB.D.A. Command Headquarters and to reassume my appointment as Commander-in-chief, India. I thus against became responsible for the defence of Burma within a few days of having handed it over. I left Java on the night, of 25th-26th February. Realising that the situation in Lower Burma must be critical I wished to fly direct from Java to Rangoon. In view of the prevailing weather conditions, however, it was doubtful whether even a Liberator could make the distance direct, and the aerodromes in Southern Sumatra were in enemy hands. I had therefore to fly to Ceylon. I arrived at Colombo on the morning of 26th February, intending to take a flying boat on to Rangoon. I found, however, a cable from General Hartley advising that I should first go to Delhi. I arrived in Delhi on the evening of 27th February and was informed that there was a proposal in Burma, if no instructions were received to the contrary, to evacuate Rangoon. Since from the information available this proposal appeared to me premature, I cabled that action should be suspended till I could reach Burma, I also ordered that the convoys containing reinforcements which had been turned back from Rangoon should again be diverted towards that port.
I arrived at Magwe in Upper Burma on the morning,of 1st March and held a conference with the Governor, General Hutton and Air-Vice Marshal Stevenson. There seemed to me no reason why Rangoon should not continue to be held at least long enough to enable the reinforcements on the way, 63 Indian Infantry Brigade and a field regiment, to be landed.
There was no evidence of any great enemy strength west of the Sittang, the 7 Armoured Brigade was still intact, and Chinese troops were moving down towards Toungoo. I therefore gave instructions that any orders that might have been issued with a view to the evacuation of Rangoon should be cancelled and directed that all ships with troops or stores for Burma should proceed.
I flew during the afternoon with General Hutton to Rangoon. On arrival there we found a telegram from- the G.O.C. 17 Division recommending the immediate evacuation of Pegu. I motored with General Hutton to Divisional Headquarters at Hlegu and found that the report on which the Divisional Commander's recommendation was based had proved a false one. The Divisional Commander was obviously a sick man, and I replaced him by Brigadier Cowan, who commanded the 17 Division with success for the remainder of the campaign.
On 2nd March I visited the troops of the 17 Division and 7 Armoured Brigade on the Pegu front and then flew to Lashio, since I had heard that Marshal Chiang-Kai-Shek would be there. I had two satisfactory interviews with him that evening and next day returned to India. At Calcutta I met General Alexander, who was on his way to take over command of the Burma Army, and instructed him to hold on to Rangoon for as long as possible.
While my intervention on this occasion postponed the evacuation of Rangoon for a week and enabled reinforcements .of an Infantry Brigade and a field regiment to be landed, it eventually placed General Alexander in a difficult position and led to his forces being nearly cut off, as described in his report. On balance I am satisfied that we gained by the delay.
Notes
1 War Office footnote —The Commonwealth Government at that time considered that diversion of their Force would have exposed Australia to great risk at a time when the Japanese were advancing Southwards rapidly and when the invasion of Java was imminent
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