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JAPANESE ATTACK ON BURMA
16. The Japanese advance on Burma began with engagements in the neighbourhood of Tavoy which was occupied by the enemy on 19th January. Meanwhile the garrison at Mergui further south was withdrawn without being attacked. On 20th January, fighting began in Northern Tenasserim with an attack problem on the 16 Indian Brigade near Kawkareik. These engagements are described in General Hutton's report. It is quite clear that the enemy were allowed to gain cheap initial successes through bad handling by local Commanders, lack of training and in some instances lack of righting spirit on the part of our troops. It was an unfortunate beginning to the campaign and had serious results in raising the morale of the enemy and depressing that of our own troops. It became clear that the battalions of Burma Rifles, which formed so large a proportion of the army in Burma, were undependable.
From my point of view I received in Java telegrams indicating that the threat to Rangoon was considered to be imminent and that without additional and earlier reinforcement the G.O.C. did not think that Rangoon could be held. I knew that General Hutton was prepared for the loss of Mergui and Tavoy, but I had not received any information indicating the probable appearance of a Japanese force large enough to imperil Rangoon.
I flew from Java to Burma during the night 24th-25th January, spent the 25th at Rangoon and returned during the night 25th-26th January. I found the situation better than I had expected and, after discussing the situation with the G.O.C. I reported to the Chiefs of Staff that I did not consider the situation immediately serious, provided that the reinforcement of Burma with land and air forces proceeded without delay, and that some naval force was provided to prevent a landing near Rangoon from the Tenasserim coast. I had already on 19th January authorised General Hutton to accept any Chinese troops available. It may be remarked that those I had originally accepted on 22nd December, the 93 and 49 Divisions, had not by this date yet reached Burma.
17. On the night of 4th-5th February, I again flew to Rangoon and spent two days there. My purpose was partly to meet the Generalissimo who, I had been informed, was passing through Rangoon on his way to India. He went, however, straight from Lashio to Calcutta, and I did not see him. General Hutton had a very cordial and satisfactory interview with him.
I visited the troops, who were then holding a front west of the Salween River opposite Moulmein, and all commanders expressed themselves to me as confident of their ability to deal with the Japanese advance. I was impressed with the suitability of the dry paddy fields for armoured troops and decided to divert to Burma the 7 Armoured Brigade which was on its way from the Middle East to Malaya. By this time the troops in Malaya had been driven into Singapore Island and the Armoured Brigade was obviously of no use there, while Java also offered little scope for armoured troops, I therefore ordered the Brigade to be diverted to Rangoon. It played a very prominent part in all the fighting in Burma after its arrival in Rangoon on 21st February. The air situation over Rangoon was satisfactory, Hurricanes had begun to arrive and these, with the A.V.G. P.405, had established and were maintaining air superiority over the enemy.
18. The battle at the Sittang River bridgehead on 22nd and 23rd February, which is described in General Hutton's report, really sealed the fate of Rangoon and Lower Burma. In the withdrawal from the Bilin River to the Sittang and the action east of .that River almost the whole of two brigades were lost.
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