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TRANSFER OF BURMA TO A.B.D.A. COMMAND.
14. On 30th December, 1941, I received a telegram appointing me to the newly constituted South-West Pacific Command (afterwards known as A.B.D A.). Burma was included in this Command. I at once recommended that the defence of Burma should remain the responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, India, for the same reasons for which I had previously urged its transfer to India from the Far East Command (see paragraph 3). I was, however, overruled on the grounds that Marshal Chiang-Kai-Shek must feel himself connected with the new South West Pacific Command. I think that this decision was a serious error from the military point of view. From my headquarters in Java, 2,000 miles distant from Rangoon, and concerned as I was with an immense area and many international problems, it was impossible for me to give as close attention to the defence of Burma as was desirable; nor had I any reinforcements at my disposal to aid Burma. They must come almost entirely from India. Moreover, administration of the forces in Burma had necessarily to be conducted from India; and it is always wrong to separate operational and administrative responsibility.
General Sir Alan Hartley who succeeded me as Commander-in-Chief, India, did everything possible to meet Burma's requirements. What was lacking was the close personal touch of the responsible commander. During the five weeks that Burma remained under A.B.D.A. Command, I was only able to pay two hurried visits; and owing to faulty signal communications, messages and reports from Burma sometimes took several days to reach me in Java. It was during these five weeks that the fate of Burma was decided.
15. I took over control of South West Pacific Command on 15th January, and established A.B.D.A. Command Headquarters in Java, near Bandoeng, a few days late. During the first half of January there had been little sign of enemy activity against Burma. The maximum scale of Japanese attack was still estimated as one division against Moulmein and one division against Kentung with possibly brigade groups against Toungoo and Mongpan. I admit that I did not at this time consider the threat to Burma serious; I over-estimated the natural difficulties of the wooded hills on the Burmese frontier. Nor did I realise the unreliable quality of the Burma units nor the lack of training of the British and Indian troops. I was certainly guilty of an error of judgement in minimising the danger to Burma, but it is doubtful whether, even if I had appreciated it thoroughly, I could have done much more to help Burma. India had been sucked dry of trained troops by the requirements of Middle East, Iraq and Iran; and those most nearly approaching completion of their training had been sent to reinforce Singapore. Such as could be extracted from frontier garrisons and internal security duties were -being sent to Burma as rapidly as possible. The same applies to administrative units. India was deficient of equipment for her own needs and could not meet those of Burma as well. Finally, and most important of all, India had no modern air force with which to support the Burma Army.
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