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OFFER OF CHINESE TROOPS FOR DEFENCE OF BURMA.
11. From Rangoon I flew to Chungking with General Brett of the United States Air Force to discuss the Japanese war with Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek. I wished to ensure that at least one of the A.V.G. Squadrons, which Colonel Chennault wished to remove to China, remained in Burma for the defence of Rangoon; also to obtain the temporary use of some of the Lease-Lend material for China, which was stacked in large quantities in the Rangoon docks and could not quickly be removed, to make good the most serious deficiencies in the Burma Army. To neither of these requests did I get a definite reply, though in the end one squadron of the A.V.G. always did remain for the defence of Rangoon, and some of the Lease-Lend equipment was placed at the disposal of the Burma Army. On the other hand, the Generalissimo offered to send to Burma the Fifth and Sixth Chinese Armies. Since it has been alleged that my refusal of this offer was a main contributing factor to the loss of Burma, I will state the facts of the matter from my point of view. I accepted at once the 93 Division, part of which was already approaching the Burmese border from Puerh, and the 49 Division as a reserve on the northern frontier of Burma at Wanting. These two Divisions constituted the Sixth Army, with a third Division, the 55th,, which General Dennys, head of 204 Mission in China, informed me was very scattered and would take some time to collect and was of poor quality. The Fifth Army, of good quality, was collecting round Kunming. I asked that it should not at present be moved into Burma, but should be held in reserve in the Kunming area. I considered that it would be well placed here either to move into Burma if required; or for the defence of Yunnan if the Japanese made an advance north from Indo-China against the Burmese road, a contingency which the Chinese had not long before represented as the enemy's most probable move; or for offensive operations into Indo-China in co-operation with an advance from Burma if all went well.
The Generalissimo made it perfectly clear that it was a condition of the acceptance of his offer that a separate line of communications should be available for his troops and that they should not in any way be mixed up with British troops. It was impossible at the time to provide a separate line of communication for the Fifth Army though it was possible to keep the communications of the 93 Division from Puerh separate from that of the British troops in Burma. I had at the time every reason to suppose that I should have ample British, Indian or African troops available to defend Burma, which did not seem immediately threatened: obviously it was desirable that a country of the British Empire should be defended by .Imperial troops rather than by foreign. The Chinese who had no administrative services of their own would have complicated the already difficult administrative problem in Burma. These were the reasons that were the motive of my qualified acceptance of the Generalissimo's offer. It should be noted that a Chinese " Army " was approximately the equivalent in numbers of a British division but with a much lower scale of equipment.
I am quite satisfied that my decision was justified by the military situation as it appeared to me at the time. Nor had I any reason to know that the Chinese .attached great political importance to the acceptance of the offer. The Generalissimo himself showed comparatively little interest in the matter and made no attempt to press me; three-quarters of the lengthy discussions I had with him were devoted to the question of the establishment of an Allied Council at Chungking and to consideration of an ambitious plan for defeat of the Japanese in 1942.
From subsequent experience of the slowness of Chinese troop moves, I think that even if I had accepted the whole of the Fifth and Sixth Armies at once they would actually have reached Burma very little, if any, sooner than they eventually did.
As things turned out, I admit that it would have saved much criticism in China and in the U.S.A. had I accepted the Generalissimo's generous offer whole-heartedly and at once. I do not, however, think that it would have made any difference in the end to the defence of Burma.
12. When I returned to India, I found that the troops I was counting on for Burma were being taken from my control for the reinforcement of Malaya. Already the War Cabinet had ordered one brigade group of the 18 British Division and two brigade groups of the 17 Indian Division to Malaya, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery. The remainder of the 18 Division was also put under orders for Malaya shortly afterwards. Thus of the two complete divisions on which I had reckoned one divisional headquarters and one brigade only remained. I still believed the African brigades available and expected the first to arrive in Burma by the middle of February. It was not until that date that I received a cable to say that the leading brigade was delayed. Actually it did not embark in East Africa till after Rangoon had fallen.
13. On 23rd December and 25th December the Japanese made two large scale air raids on Rangoon. They caused practically no military damage but civilian casualties in the first raid -were high, and the flight of the population from Rangoon began. From now to the final evacuation of the city, the working of the essential services, the provision of labour to unload ships and the cessation of all business became a major problem for the Government and a serious military embarrassment. The presence on all routes leading towards India of many thousands of refugees, which soon grew to hundreds of thousands, was another problem that occupied both civil and military to the end of the campaign.
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