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BURMA PLACED UNDER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, INDIA.
5 On 12th December, five days after the entry of Japan into the war, I received a telegram from the Prime Minister placing Burma under the Commander-in-Chief, in India for defence. In this telegram I was allotted the 18 British Division, then on passage to Mideast, for the defence of India and Burma; I was from the commitment to send 17 Indian Division to Iraq; and I was promised a special allotment of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. I was also told that four squadrons of fighter aeroplanes would be diverted from Mideast to India. In a later telegram I was informed that Mideast had been instructed to prepare plans to send six squadrons of Blenheim IVs to India for Burma.
I at once prepared to despatch to Burma the leading brigade group of 17 Indian Division which was about to embark for Iraq. I had asked the C.I.G.S. at the end of November to consider sending me some African troops for Ceylon or Burma, now that Gondar had fallen and the campaign against Italian East Africa was over; he replied on 16th December that two Brigades could be made, available, the first of which could be ready to embark at the end of January. Thus when I visited Rangoon on 21st December I had, as I thought, ample forces in sight for the defence of Burma.
6. In Burma itself there were at this time two British infantry battalions, two Indian infantry brigades, and eight battalions of Burma Rifles (four of which had been raised since the beginning of the war). The Burma Rifles who composed practically half the available force were of doubtful fighting quality (see para. 4 of General Hutton's report). The artillery in Burma comprised only four mountain batteries and one four-gun 18 pr. battery. The Administrative services were so inadequate that they might almost have been termed non-existent. There was also the Burma Frontier Force, the equivalent of approximately six battalions, divided into a number of detachments. They were composed not of Burmans but of Indians enlisted from the same classes as the Indian Army This should have been almost valuable force but in actual practice proved disappointing and had little fighting value. It was normally under the control of the Civil Power and only came under army control for operations shortly after the outbreak of war with Japan, whilst remaining for other purposes subject to their own Inspector-General.
It should be realised that the Burma Army had had a very short existence and only dated from the separation of Burma from India in April, 1937. The inhabitants of Burma have shown themselves brave and tough fighters in defence of their country but as irregulars in guerilla warfare. Regular soldiering and discipline make no appeal to them.
7. The air forces nominally available in Burma at the outbreak of war were one fighter squadron equipped with Brewster Buffaloes and one bomber squadron of Blenheims. Actually the aircraft of the bomber squadron were in Malaya for armament training and were taken by Far East Command for Malayan operations. None ever returned to Burma. It may be noted that this Blenheim squadron was one of two borrowed from India by Far East Command (the only modern aircraft India possessed). There was thus only one squadron in Burma, armed with a type of fighter which proved unable to compete with the Japanese fighters.
The War Cabinet's proposals for air reinforcements were an immediate programme of four Fighter Squadrons, six Bomber Squadrons, two Army Co-operation Squadrons and one G.R. Squadron. On the 1st January Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson arrived to command in Burma. The forward elements of three Hurricane Squadrons —aircraft and personnel— began to arrive on 21st January. It was not, however, until 26th January that a Squadron built up from these elements became operational. The total reinforcement of bombers arriving in the country before the decision to evacuate Rangoon was reached comprised the aircraft and personnel of 113 Bomber Squadron and the aircraft and crews of 45 Bomber Squadron.
India, after parting with her Blenheims to Far East, had no modern aircraft of any kind and could contribute only a flight of 4 Wapiti and 2 Audax aircraft (both completely obsolete types) to form a Coast Defence Flight. This was later replaced by a flight of Blenheim I aircraft. Later India sent the I Indian Squadron and No. 28 Squadron R.A.F. with Lysander biplanes. These squadrons, in spite of their out-of-date equipment, did much valuable work, and I Indian Squadron acquitted itself gallantly in the first service in this war of an Indian air squadron. No. 31 Bomber Transport Squadron equipped with Valencia and Douglas aircraft was also placed by India at the disposal of Burma.
The air defences of Burma, especially of the vital port of Rangoon, would have been overwhelmed at once but for the presence in Burma of the American Volunteer Group (A.V.G.), an air force manned by American pilots for the defence of China. It was equipped with P-40 fighters and led by Colonel G. Chennault. One of its two squadrons was alternately made available by the Generalissimo for the defence of Rangoon, and the pilots together with the R.A.F. Buffalo Fighter Squadrons saved the situation by their dash and skill.
8 In an appreciation about the middle of December, General Macleod estimated the maximum scale of Japanese attack at one or two divisions against Southern Shan States and one division in the south against Tenasserim. He stated that two infantry brigades, one field regiment and one field battery were the additional land reinforcements necessary to deal with the situation. He considered three bomber squadrons and two fighter squadrons were required.
Both Far East Command and War Office informed me that an attack in force against Burma was unlikely until the Japanese had completed their campaigns in Malaya and the Philippines.
9. After discussing Burma's defence problems with the Governor and G.O.C. I cabled from Rangoon on 22nd December to the C.I.G.S. an appreciation in which I emphasised the weakness of Burma's defences, the lack of an Intelligence system, and the need for air forces. I said that the immediate requirements of Burma were two bomber and two modern fighter squadrons, a divisional headquarters and two brigade groups, apparatus for a warning system and anti-aircraft artillery.
10 In view of the extensive re-organisation of the whole defence system of Burma, which was essential, I decided that it would be necessary to replace Lieut.-General Macleod, who had done his best with the very little available to him, by a commander with more experience of the organisation and administration of troops on a large scale. The Governor of Burma was anxious, for political reasons, to have an officer of the British Service if possible, and I decided to appoint my Chief of the General Staff in India, Lieut.-General Hutton, to the command in Burma. His powers of effective organisation had been amply proved in India. He assumed command on 27th December, 1941.
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