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Part III-f
126. Morning (23/24th December) dispositions of West Infantry Brigade were—Brigade HQ Magazine Gap, HQ 2 Royal Scots and Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wanchai Gap, 2 Royal Scots still holding the West slopes of Mount Cameron and patrolling forward, Winnipeg Grenadiers holding down to Aberdeen Reservoir, Little Hong Kong area still holding out, 4 and 7 Companies HKVDC on the new line to which they had been moved (Mount Kellett to Mount Gough).
127.-—
(a) At about 0400 hours 24th December the Royal Rifles of Canada were back on a line across Stanley Peninsula from near pill box 27 on Tytam Bay, through St Stephens College buildings to West Bay, but the battalion required regrouping. A forward line had been formed through the Police Station manned by " B " and " D " companies 1 Middlesex Regiment, some H K.V.D.C., prison warders (enlisted as volunteers), and a few other personnel.
The 1 Middlesex crews from the pill boxes in the area of Repulse Bay had been ordered to withdraw and had joined the Stanley Forces with all their machine guns, equipment and most of the small arms ammunition—a timely reinforcement and an excellent achievement.
(b) Brigadier Wallis assured me that Stanley Force were in good heart and that he was confident that if the enemy attacked his three lines of defence they would suffer heavily. He confirmed that he had enough food, water and ammunition, and I ordered him to fight on and not to surrender as long as these conditions prevailed.
128. Information was received in the morning that the enemy held the central and southern portions of Mount Cameron, and that the Royal Scots were on the northern extremity.
At 0915 hours the enemy had reinforced the northern portion of Mount Cameron where he was about 300 strong. The small party of Royal Marines (q v. para 117) was now patrolling the spurs South of Mount Parish in touch with the 5/7 Rajput Regt. who had collected hospital discharges, etc , and formed a third platoon which had been positioned on the Mount Parish spur.
129 Noon.—
(a) One of the 6-in. Howitzers at Mount Austin was put out of action by bombing.
(b) Two enemy launches on the West side of the Kowloon Peninsula were set on fire by our artillery.
130. At 1400 hours 24th December about 200 enemy were seen working North West, and an attack developed at about 1500 hours on Leighton Hill after a severe artillery and mortar bombardment, in addition to dive bombing. Attacked from three sides, the garrison was being rapidly surrounded when at 1645 hours it was authorised to escape, if it could, through the streets leading North West to Canal Road. The two officers and 40 other ranks did so, losing 25 per cent, casualties. A most determined and valuable resistance had been put up on this position (and q v. para. 118). These troops withdrew into and assisted the defensive area between Lee Theatre and the Canal Road, already occupied by the reinforcements mentioned in para. 118.
131. This evening a convoy plus an armoured car was again formed to obtain ammunition and bombs from Little Hong Kong. Accompanying the convoy were two trucks with reinforcements from 2 Royal Scots and 1 Middlesex Regt., plus two machine guns. It succeeded, though shot at repeatedly.
132 1730 hours 24th December.—The patrol of the Royal Marines ascertained that no enemy was on the road North East of Wanchai Gap, and that 2 Royal Scots were at the Gap. Posts were to be established on the spur.
133 At 1800 hours Morrison Hill was heavily shelled. Holding this feature were detachments of 1 Middlesex Regt. with seven machine guns. All guns were reported knocked out but the majority of the crews escaped, having been withdrawn to nearby cover ready to repel an attack.
At 1900 hours a party of thirty clerks, spare signallers, military police, etc , was formed at Fortress H.Q. and went under Major R. E. Moody, D.A.A.G., to assist the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. This party, with a few others collected on the spot, held Morrison Hill until the afternoon of 25th December.
The enemy now had three guns in action on the water front near the Peninsular Hotel, Kowloon, and another battery at Tai Hang. At about 1900 hours a large fire broke out on the water front near the China Fleet Club, hindering certain forward movements.
134 At about 2200 hours reports from Aberdeen and Shouson Hill indicated a general move of the enemy from Mount Nicholson Mount Cameron area northwards towards the Race Course A possible intention, I considered, might be to turn West and join in the drive along the North face of the island, possibly with the left flank along the line of the '' gaps '' and the right flank just clear of Wanchai This X would strike a weak place where I had only the Royal Marines patrolling. In hand were less than a dozen men at H.Q of 2/14 Punjab Regt. unless I drew on the two companies in positions covering Government House, Command H.Q., R.N Yard, Military Hospital, i.e., our last stand.
135. Night 24/25th December—Between 2200 and 2300 hours the Central District of Victoria came under a 3-in. Mortar bombardment— including the R N. Yard, Victoria Barracks, and Fortress H.Q. Communications were not affected The direction of the enemy advance on Wanchai made it possible that the enemy might use the A R.P. tunnels for infiltration, and wardens were warned accordingly. The most important tunnels concerned were those under Mount Parish.
136 At 2300 hours all units were sent such seasonal greetings as were possible from H.E. The Governor and from Fortress H.Q.
137. Around midnight the enemy attacked in the area South of Wanchai Gap and effected a slight penetration.
138. At 0100 hours on Christmas Day Commander East Infantry Brigade reported a series of attacks on his positions at Stanley. The enemy had succeeded in getting behind some of the forward defended localities and were mopping up parties of H K.V.D.C. at Stanley Police Station. I again instructed him to hold out till the last.
139. The enemy continued pressure North of Aberdeen, reached the North slopes of Bennets Hill, and " dug in " there, at 0300 hours he was reported to be advancing again At this time only one of the two 4-5-in. Howitzers at the " Sanatorium " remained in action.
140. Wanchai —Before dawn 25th December a successful retaliation to the enemies- light infantry gun26 was carried out. A Bofors A.A. gun was taken to a position just South of Morrison Hill and vigorous short range fire silenced the enemy activity in the sports pavilions immediately South of Canal Road. Many calls had been made on the Bofors detachments during the last few days. Besides their continuous day role they had also performed night roles, e g., beach defence, replacing equipments disabled or knocked out, such as at Belchers Fort, in which area the infantry beach defences had been weakened by 95 per cent in order to find troops for counter-attack
By 0700 hours anti-tank mines had been laid in the main approaches to Wanchai from the East but enemy house to house infiltrations continued to be reported even as far West as fee China Fleet Oub. This report I discounted, but awkward fighting was developing, for I was unable to employ suitably the available artillery in this street fighting, apart from the desire to escape causing innumerable civilian casualties in such a congested area. The Japanese on the other hand, with their overwhelming superiority of artillery and noted carelessness for loss of life, had no hesitation in putting down in such areas heavy concentrations, with mortars super-imposed, lasting half an hour, and with a rate of fire comparable to those of the Great War.
At 0800 hours the enemy were on a front from the South end of Canal Road to the West arm of Causeway Bay, with snipers in houses further forward.
At 0830 hours, 25th December, the Royal Navy contributed a further small reinforcement which was placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding i Middlesex Regt. (Lieut -Colonel H. W. M. Stewart, O.B E., M C.) who thereupon put in hand the building up of a second line running North from the Mount Parish area —Wanchai Market, O'Brien Street—to the water front (" O'Brien Street Line "').
141. At daylight our troops were still holding the eastern slopes of Bennets Hill.
142. At 0900 hours Major C. M Manners (q.v. paras. 84 and 90) and Mr. A L. Shields came across from the Japanese lines under a white flag. They had been told that they could talk freely. They informed me of their march with civilians of both sexes from Repulse Bay Hotel via Wong Nei Chong Gap to North point, of the " incredible " number of guns and troops seen during the last half of their " trek " and (in their opinion, not put forward by the Japanese) the uselessness of continuing the struggle.
A special defence meeting was immediately called, where it was decided that there could be no talk of surrender The Japanese Commander sent one message —that their forces would not initiate active hostilities for three hours I conformed, including regretfully closing down on a promising counter-attack by Canadian troops on a large enemy " pocket " North-West of Bennets Hill. This impromptu " truce " was difficult to stage, for Japanese planes, operating from Canton, did not conform and bombed Stanley, Aberdeen and Mount Gough. Stanley was also shelled A constant service of launches was maintained over Kowloon Bay and Japanese artillery continued bombarding the Gaps.
143. At 1030 hours the Royal Marines patrol (q.v. para. 132) reported having established contact with 2 Royal Scots at Wanchai Gap. This patrol had meanwhile been increased by thirty all ranks of Fortress R.E. who were reserved for a minor operation that night, i.e., the mopping up of an enemy post on Stubbs Road. At mid-day Japanese artillery opened up punctually on a large scale, and later hand to hand fighting was reported by 5/7 Rajput Regt. on Mount Pariah, where a platoon was surrounded. Shortly afterwards Mount Parish fell into the enemy's hands, and an advance alone Kennedv Road was threatened. This put Fortress HQ area, which had a garrison of only one platoon of 2/14 Punjab Regt., in jeopardy. More road blocks and anti-tank mines were put out.
By 1300 hours, 25th December, the 2nd (" O'Brien Street ") line was established, held by some 60-70 men of 1 Middlesex Regt., including small parties of Royal Navy, Royal Engineers, and 5/7 Rajput Regt The enemy was now in the Wanchai A R.P. tunnels (q v para. 135) but about noon an 18 pounder gun had arrived there, which, mounted in the main street, covered several of the exits. A number of rounds were fired at these exits, more as a deterrent than anything else. No casualties were observed to have been caused, and no enemy emerged.
144. Communications were increasingly difficult to maintain: between noo and 1200 hours there were none to Stanley area, Wanchai Gap and Magazine Gap, nor to the 2 Royal Scots.
145. There were, at noon, only six guns of the mobile artillery left in action, with an average of 160 rounds per gun available.
146. At 1430 hours two officers and fifty other ranks of 2/14 Punjab Regt. reached the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt., who had given warnings several times that his men, though in good heart, were being slowly but surely overwhelmed. A further withdrawal was enforced from the Canal Road area, and the " O'Brien Street line " became the forward active line of defence HQ i Middlesex Regt withdrew to Murray Barracks.
147. Very heavy dive-bombing attacks were made in the Wanchai Gap area between 1400 and 1430 hours, and shortly afterwards this Gap was reported lost.
Magazine Gap was similarly attacked and incendiaries were dropped—most effectively, for the hillside was set on fire and field cables were burnt. A little later the Gap itself came under mortar and small arms fire, and Commander, West Infantry Brigade, reported that the area could not in his opinion be held for more than 24 hours at the most against a determined attack.
148 At 1450 hours the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that his forward positions were being shelled from both Kowloon and North Point and that Captain C M Man, the Officer Commanding " Z " Company, had telephoned " the line is breaking." Lt.-Colonel Stewart said 'he would try to form yet another line East of the R.N. Yard if necessary, i e , just below, and to the North of, Fortress HQ The " O'Brien Street line," if seriously attacked, could not hold out long—perhaps half an hour.
149 I had no communications with East Infantry Brigade HQ at Stanley and consequently had no information.
As far as it was known, the force surrounded in Little Hong Kong Magazine area, was still holding out.
Bennets Hill had been heavily attacked, had been completely surrounded and by 1500 hours had been forced to surrender. The Canadian line north of Bennets Hill had been forced to give ground.
150. This advance by the enemy along the line of Gaps, the possession of these Gaps by him, thus giving him an open line of advance to the Central District, the fall of Bennets Hill, the isolation of the forces in Stanley, the deployment by the enemy of such superior forces and armament, the exhaustion after sixteen days of continuous battle with no reliefs for any individuals, our vulnerability to unlimited air attack, the impossibility of obtaining more ammunition for the few mobile guns I had remaining, the serious water famine immediately impending—these were the factors which led to the inevitable conclusion, namely, that further fighting meant the useless slaughter of the remainder of the garrison, risked severe retaliation on the large civilian population and could not affect the final outcome. The enemy drive along the North shore was decisive.
I asked Lt.-Colonel Stewart, the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. how much longer in his considered opinion the men could hold the line now occupied He replied " one hour."
The Commodore agreed with my conclusion.
At 1515 hours I advised H.E. The Governor and C.-in-C. that no further useful military resistance was possible and I then ordered all Commanding Officers to break off the fighting and to capitulate to the nearest Japanese Commander, as and when the enemy advanced and opportunity offered.
Notes
2 Running North East from Tsun Wan Wai to Pineapple Pass
3 Killing both the Company Commanders concerned.
4 Except that the Vehicular Ferry gave priority to all military vehicles and guns.
5 At noon in Prince Edward Road an ammunition convoy of 2 Royal Scots was attacked; fifth columnists were in dark grey uniform and armed with rifles.
6 Owing to shortness of time communications in the Devils Peak area were incomplete, but excellent work by Royal Signals provided efficient field cable circuits in time
7 Fifth columnists attacked the A A searchlight position at Sail Ki Wan this night
8 The Peak Observation Post was forced to move three times, for each location quickly came under heavy and accurate artillery fire in spite of every precaution for concealment. Treachery was certain but the source could not be ascertained.
9 Near the Police Station, Braemar.
10 It was subsequently ascertained that the Saiwan A A. position was heavily shelled at 2145 hours and Japanese troops rushed it at 2200 hours.
11 Lieut Carruthers was the sole survivor (HKVDC)
12 No evidence has been obtained as to what happened to this company It is believed to have reached Wong Nei Chong Gap at first light and to have been ambushed by superior Japanese forces, all remaining personnel being captured.
13 After the capitulation a Japanese Staff Officer informed me that the Japanese had suffered very heayy "casualties in this area.
14 Lt. Gen. Kitajama three weeks after the capitulation informed my Commander, Royal Artillery, of this fact Our defences in the Mount Cameron area also noticed that at one period the enemy artillery fire seemed far more efficient, every round going off, and no " blinds " as customary. A map of artillery dispositions was also shown to the Commander, Royal Artillery, with three regimental artillery areas marked, indicating the employment of the artillery of three divisions.
15 The " University Company " less a proportion of pillbox crews, total 45.
16 Kennedy Road—China Fleet Club Company
17 It was afterwards ascertained that these orders did not reach Colonel Kidd and the two companies which at this time were still operating in the area East of Tai Hang The spur was captured and occupied for some time but no trace of " D " Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. could be found.
18 This was the company referred to in para 63 (s) It was confirmed later that this company had earlier in the morning reached its objective successfully.
19 One company had lost one platoon in a counter attack.
20 These R.N. personnel had been manning the mine control station at Chung Am Kok.
21 The following message was issued to all units— " There are indications that Chinese forces are advancing towards the frontier to our aid All ranks must therefore hold their positions at all costs and look forward to only a few more days of strain."
22 Nevertheless later in the evening this company of Royal Scots moved forward from the northern end of Mount Nicholson and occupied a position on the right of " B " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt.—q.v. paras 71 and 76
23 Blacks Link—the track leading from Wong Nei Chong Gap to Wanchai Gap.
24 A demolition scheme had been fully prepared, but the area was over-run too quickly on the morning of 11th December Luckily this Depot was only half full
25 It was not practicable The women and children fell into the hands of the Japanese when the troops evacuated at midnight on 23/24th December.
26 It was not till some time later that this statement re withdrawal was found to be untrue.
26 This was mounted on balloon type tyres, was about 3" calibre, was very boldly handled, and produced most effective results, both material and moral. Each battalion had two.
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