|
Part III-e
100. 1430 hours.
(a) Two companies of enemy occupied the whole length of Mount Nicholson, and brought up a small gun.
(b) A. report was received from "A" Company Royal Rifles of Canada that the whole company had moved. One platoon had reached the " Ridge " and another platoon was on Middle Spur though the enemy were still firing from it. The situation at Repulse Bay being so unsatisfactory, I ordered a senior officer to be sent to take local command there. Major C. R. Templar, R.A. was selected. On arrival he collected two trucks, filled them with Canadian troops and went up towards Wong Nei Chong Gap.
101. At 1600 hours 21st December a telegram was received from the Military Attache, Chungking, that the main Chinese attack could not start before 1st January but " it was hoped that " twenty bombers would operate at once against Japanese aerodromes.
102 The question of the women and children at Repulse Bay Hotel now arose. It was difficult to give a satisfactory answer but I decided that the safest course would be to leave them there for the night The situation was extremely " fluid," both in this area and the Little Hong Kong area.
103. After dark enemy landing craft operating near the R.N. Yard were fired on from pill boxes and passed West down the harbour, but no actual landing was attempted. Strong Police patrols were sent out in the Central and Western Districts for special reconnaissance to confirm this.
104.
(a) During the day 2ist December The Royal Rifles of Canada had been trying to force their way north-eastwards as planned— one company and carriers, with No 1 Company Volunteer Machine Gunners in support, up the Tytam Road; a second Company directed across country on to Bridge Hill. These companies made a great effort, in spite of handicaps, but by the late afternoon could get no further forward than Red Hill-Bridge Hill, owing to considerable resistance by the enemy. Volunteer machine-gunners (Nos 1 and 2 Companies) rendered valuable forward support on this occasion.
(b) At 2030 hours 21st December Major C. R. Templar reported an unsuccessful attack on Wong Nei Chong Gap and that there were still about one hundred R.A.S.C. and R.A.O C. on " The Ridge," with fifty Canadians in Altamira House. Further, that sixty to seventy Canadians were in Repulse Bay Hotel, round which sniping was continuing.
105. At about midnight a cable was received from the War Office emphasising the need to destroy all oil installations This was carried out by artillery fire on the next day (22nd) The Texaco tanks at Tsun Wan Wai, the Shell tanks at Tai Kok Tsui (next to Cosmopolitan Dock), and the R.N tanks a mile to the South thereof, were all set well alight, but the Socony tanks24 at Laichikok could not be shelled as they were close to the hospital establishment in the women's prison.
106.
(a) In the evening (2ist December) the decision was taken to evacuate " The Ridge," and at about 2230 hours 8 officers and 120 other ranks left, trying at the same time to clear the catchwater in a southerly direction This, however, failed under enemy machine gun fire. They sheltered for the night in " Overbays ", a private house on the edge of Deepwater Bay.
(b) During the evening some Japanese managed to penetrate into the Repulse Bay Hotel but were evicted by prompt action initiated by Major Templar.
107. Night 21/22nd December. Enemy launches kept the North shore defences on the alert, but there were no attempted landings. Sniping occurred from houses round the Race Course and also in Victoria. The civil population observed the curfew well.
108 In the morning the enemy opened heavy fire from Middle Spur and resumed operations on the high ground North of the Repulse Bay Hotel, and at 1000 hours he was reported in possession of two large houses overlooking Deepwater Bay. At 1030 hours 22nd December I placed Stanley Garrison under the direct orders of Brigadier Wallis By now the intention of linking up East Infantry Brigade with West Infantry Brigade by moving westwards had perforce to be abandoned.
It may be noted that at this time the 3 7-in Howitzers at Stanley had only 45 rounds left in all. This was supplemented later when the provisioning of Stanley garrison was carried out by motor torpedo boats from Aberdeen.
In the meantime the enemy had cut off the water supply in Stanley by the capture of the Tytam Reservoir area machinery. For the forces in the Repulse area there was now only two days' supply of food and water. The evacuation of the civilians was still quite impracticable either 'by road or by water though I went into the question most carefully
109
(a) 1030 hours 22nd December —Commander West Infantry Brigade reported that the Canadian troops tin the Mount Cameron area were being heavily dive-bombed and mortared. They had no tools with which to dig in (although the rocky ground made this in any case almost impossible), no 3-in: mortars or bombs, there was no shelter, and there was nothing to do except stick it out with small arms fire from behind the rocks. These conditions applied in general to the subsequent fighting on the important high ground there.
Morale now had been seriously affected by the feeling that it was futile to continue resistance with insufficient equipment, with insufficient mobile artillery support, and without both air support and air observation.
(b) At this time, too, 2 Royal Scots were being heavily mortared from the ground near Jardines Lookout. The enemy seemed to have no difficulty in keeping up his ammunition supply across country from North Shore: and evidence was afterwards forthcoming that local Chinese were forcibly impressed as carriers. Much of the Japanese mortar ammunition, too, was of a much lighter nature than the British: one variety was 95 per cent. H.E., thus causing great moral effect, particularly valuable on un-seasoned troops in the opening phases of battle. The Japanese handling of mortars was extremely good. They were very quick into action; were quickly ranged, and accurate concentrations were put down at short notice at ranges of 1,500 yards.
(c) By the early afternoon 22nd December the enemy was consolidating his positions on the northern lower slopes of Mount Nicholson within one hundred yards of the 2 Royal Scots forward defended localities.
(d) The Japanese air force at this time was extremely accurate.
110. 1400 hours. The enemy gradually advanced in the Repulse Bay area. An 8 pounder here, over open sights, knocked out some enemy mortars on Violet Hill In addition the enemy was infiltrating southwards from the high ground " The Twins " and Netting Hill. The Royal Rifles of Canada's positions on Sugar Loaf and Stanley Mound were precarious.
Commander East Infantry Brigade telephoned that he was hoping to arrange the evacuation of the civilians from the Hotel this night.25
111.
(a) During the morning I suggested to the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. that he could not long hope to exercise control from so forward a position as Leighton Hill.
At 1600 hours very heavy mortar fire developed on this area. HQ I Middlesex Regt. accordingly withdrew and established itself in Hennessey Road, Wanchai—the densely populated area West of Mount Parish.
(b) The enemy launch traffic to North Shore, which had been going on all day, increased during the afternoon.
112. In the afternoon 22nd December, Commander West Infantry Brigade considered from the information available that the enemy was concentrating between Little Hong Kong and Mount Cameron with a view to attacking North-West on Wanchai Gap. Counter measures were accordingly ordered by him.
113. Meanwhile I had agreed to an adjustment of the line in the area of the Filter Beds. A gap existed between the right flank of the company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. and the left of 2 Royal Scots, thus giving the enemy a line of attack towards the Race Course, in which area he was already active with fifth columnists. Such an attack would envelop the whole Leighton Hill area, turn the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots and cut straight in to Wanchai, and I had insufficient troops in hand to meet such a contingency. This adjustment was carried out without incident and the company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. (only thirty-five strong) thus freed moved to the area South-East end of the Race Course, thus linking up with the 2 Royal Scots West of Mount Nicholson Camp. The Company Commander on arrival had, however, only eight men with two Light Automatics at his disposal, owing to casualties and dispersal of his men from enemy shelling in the darkness. The enemy attacked the company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. which remained in the area South-East end of the Race Course. Although this company was of a composite nature only —two platoons formed from the remains of " B " and " D " Companies—it held its ground successfully.
114. During the day 22nd December Stanley Mound and Stanley Prison had been shelled and mortared, and at midnight I received news of the enemy capture of the Stanley Mound feature.
115. The isolated troops at "Overbays" (see para. 106) had been in close contact with the enemy throughout the day and at about 1930 hours the place was evacuated in an endeavour to join up at Repulse Bay Hotel. The majority succeeded in getting past the Japanese. A Warrant Officer of the R.A.O.C., however, telephoned to Fortress HQ at 2000 hours to say that he and four wounded were alone in the house. He was instructed to surrender. There was in point of fact (though this was unknown at the time) a party of thirty others upstairs. This party attempted to surrender at 0800 hours the following day (23rd December) but were hand-grenaded in their rooms and a number were bayoneted. Corporal Jeffery and six men escaped, leaving twenty-eight dead, including four Japanese, in the room. The Warrant Officer and the wounded on the ground floor were not seen alive after 2300 hours on the 22nd, and they were not amongst the eventual Prisoners of War. It can only be assumed that they were burned to death when the Japanese later fired the house.
116. A serious report concerning the water supply came from the Director of Public Works at 0100 hours. No water was coming from Tytam Reservoir, the Aberdeen supply was out of action for at least two days, and only a trickle was coming from Pokfulam. " The town (of Victoria) was now helpless." The fighting troops were also feeling the shortage of water.
117. At about 0130 hours Commander West Infantry Brigade reported the loss of Mount Cameron, that troops were coming back in disorder, and that an effort was being made to rally them at Magazine Gap and Mount Gough. Wanchai Gap was still held.
At 0345 hours 23rd December the Royal Engineers reported their rear party still in position on Mount Kellett and that the Winnipeg Grenadiers were being re-organised in the Gough Hill Police Station area.
At 0430 hours the Royal Engineers and 4 and 7 Companies H.K.V.D.C. were still in position, the Volunteers holding their original line in the area Magazine Gap which they had taken up three days previously.
A new R A. (West) H.Q. was being established at Victoria Gap. At this critical time the Royal Navy offered valuable help—1 officer and 40 men of the Royal Marines—who were ordered to Magazine Gap to report to the senior officer there (Lt.-Colonel F. D. Field, R.A.) for the purpose of clearing up the situation at Wanchai Gap, now out of touch.
At about 0600 hours it was reported that three platoons of the Royal Navy from Aberdeen had already moved forward to Bennets Hill to reinforce the machine gunners of 1 Middlesex Regt. already in position there.
By 0800 hours 23rd December Lt.-Colonel F. D. Field reported that he had got into touch with 2 Royal Scots at Wanchad Gap and he was instructed to send a fighting patrol to Mount Cameron to ascertain the situation there. It was learnt from him that " A " Company 2 Royal Scots was still in position near St. Albert's Convent, which had been occupied by us as a military hospital.
From now onwards until 1100 hours many conflicting reports were received concerning Mount Cameron, but it was apparent that the crest of this commanding and important feature remained in enemy hands. Information indicated that the enemy's local HQ and organising centre was at Wong Nei Chong Gap, but owing to the configuration of the ground it was not possible to shell this over the top of Mount Nicholson, for the remaining sections of mobile artillery were in positions in the area Victoria Peak-Mount Gough-Mount Kellett. However I am confident that heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy on the stretch of Blacks Link between Wong Nei Chong Gap and Middle .Gap, for a 9.2-in. gun from Stanley had been engaging enemy in this area for the last two days with immediate observation from Shoushon Hill nearby. In addition Major H. Marsh had expended some 20,000 rounds from his medium machine guns on very good targets at ideal ranges. It was now learnt that two small ammunition convoys had got through to Little Hong Kong during the previous night and had returned successfully with much needed supplies. At this time Stanley was being supplied with ammunition by motor torpedo boat.
118. Meanwhile the situation to the North was causing me considerable anxiety. The composite company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. much reduced in numbers and short of ammunition and food, had been forced to withdraw at about 0800 hours, exposing the right flank of the Middlesex Leighton Hill position held by Captain C. M. Man's " Z " Company. At 0922 hours he was holding on, though the enemy was infiltrating into the houses and streets around him. He had only forty men, with six machine guns. At 1000 hours the enemy attacked him strongly, and heavily shelled the Bowrington area.
At 1100 hours the bombardment again intensified and the positions of one machine gun platoon were completely destroyed. The guns, however, moved into the Lee Theatre to hold the North flank. At Fortress H.Q. fifty Royal Artillery and 2 Royal Scots personnel were collected and sent to reinforce 1 Middlesex Regt.
119. At 1000 hours 23rd December Commander East Infantry Brigade reported that a counter-attack on Stanley Mound had failed. The Royal Rifles of Canada had had heavy losses, the enemy were infiltrating and the Commanding Officer felt he must fall back. The Infantry Brigade was in the process of reconnoitering and organising three defensive positions in depth which were to be held to the last, the most northerly being well forward of Stanley Village. The Canadians felt that they could put up a better resistance on flatter ground, and on a narrower front, where communications would be simpler. The loss of the tactically important high ground was fully realised and very regrettable.
120. At 1000 hours the enemy were attacking Bennets Hill and bombing Aberdeen Dockyard, also A.A. positions in Victoria City.
121. At 1130 hours HQ 1 Middlesex Regt. was forced to withdraw to a prepared position. At noon the line ran: —South-east corner Race Course to (exclusive) Leighton Hill (sixty men of 5/7 Rajput Regt.)—Leighton Hill and northwards (by 1 Middlesex Regt) to pill box 55.
At about 1500 hours the enemy attacked, but was beaten off.
122. At 1330 hours 23rd December communication was re-established with HQ West Infantry Brigade at Magazine Gap and it was learnt that about 250 enemy were round St. Albert's Convent, that our troops on the Northern slopes of Mount Cameron were withdrawing26 and that Magazine Gap and Wanchai Gap were being heavily bombed. The positions at every " gap " were unenviable, for the nature of the country was such that local defence was bound to be restricted and confined to the gap itself, thus providing an excellent target for the enemy air force, which did not fail to take due advantage of the opportunity. These positions were originally prepared for limiting any enemy exploitation after a South shore landing.
At 1430 hours our line ran from Bennets Hill to Wanchai Gap, and a patrol of 2 Royal Scots was going out to Mount Cameron.
123. At 1645 hours 23rd December the last Army W/T set was knocked out by shell fire, and communications with the United Kingdom and Singapore ceased except that military messages could be and were transmitted by Royal Navy W/T.
124. At 1730 hours communication was reopened at HQ 2 Royal Scots at Wanchai Gap, who reported that they were holding the western slopes of Mount Cameron.
125. With difficulty eight ammunition lorries had been collected and organised, and during the night six of these managed, with the help of an armoured car of the HKVDC, to get to the Ordnance- Depot at Little Hong Kong and obtain some badly wanted gun and mortar ammunition. There were unfortunately no hand grenades there (they were in the other Reserve Depot at The Ridge), for these were now urgently needed in the street fighting which was developing in the area North of the Race Course.
|
