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VI.—THE WITHDRAWAL TO INDIA.
67. The Race for Kalewa.—The operations had now developed into a race with the enemy for the possession of Kalewa. A warning was sent to General Wakely at Kalewa to establish local protection and to block the river approaches As a result of this, a boom was constructed across the Chindwin to the south of Shwegyin and the detachment of Royal Marines, which had done such good work on the Irrawaddy, was despatched with Breda guns to cover this obstruction. G.H.Q. India were also requested to order air attacks on enemy craft moving up the Chindwin. I learned later that such attacks were made on the 3rd or 4th May and I have no doubt that they imposed considerable delay on the enemy's advance up the river. There was also the possibility that the enemy might land at some point short of Kalewa and cut in on the Ye-U—Kalewa road. The most likely point for this to happen was at Maukkadaw from which place a chaung gave easy access to the road at Pyingyaing. A detachment of the Bush Warfare School, reinforced by British infantry from the depot at Maymyo, was therefore sent to Maukkadaw. This detachment was later reinforced by two companies of Gurkhas. At this time I assumed that the 1 Indian Infantry Brigade was moving from Palel to Kalewa and I requested G.H.Q. India to hasten this movement, as I still had reason to believe that a Japanese force was advancing on Kalemyo via the Myittha Valley. I learned on 5th May that 1 Indian Infantry Brigade would not move into Burma, as it was not considered possible to maintain it in Kalewa, in addition to the troops from Burma that would also be in that area.
68. Co-ordination with the Chinese Rear Guard.—On the morning of the 3rd May, I received a visit at my Headquarters at Kaduma from General Li Jen Sun, commanding 38 Chinese Division. This Division was ordered to act as rear guard to the Chinese Fifth Army. General Sun felt that his task was difficult and he was anxious that the movements of his Division should be closely co-ordinated with those of 1 Burcorps. I had already issued orders about this but as a result of General Sun's visit I again impressed on the Commander 1 Burcorps that he must not withdraw from the Ye-U area until the Chinese 38 Division had passed to the north of Shwebo. In view of the excellent manner in which General Sun had always co-operated with the forces under my command I should have liked to take his Division with me to India but in the circumstances this was impossible.
69. Description of Route.—The problem now facing my force cannot be appreciated without some knowledge of the road conditions between Ye-U and Kalewa. -This road was nothing more than a sandy track running from Ye-U via Kaduma, Pyingyaing and Thetkegyin to Shwegyin, eight miles south of Kalewa. It had been the intention to continue the road from Thetkegyin to a point opposite Kalewa but, owing to the difficulties of the last part of this route, which required a lot of rock blasting, this had not been possible and it was the lack of this last twelve miles of road, over which there was nothing more than a footpath, which caused the abandonment of the major portion of the M.T. and all tanks. The track from Ye-U passed through innumerable chaungs or nullahs, some of which were dry and sandy and some of which were wet. Between Pyingyaing and Thetkegyin there was a difficult hill section with many rickety bridges constructed only of brushwood or bamboo. Anyone seeing this track for the first time would find it difficult to imagine how a fully mechanised force could possibly move over it. The casualties to M.T. were heavy and the difficulties were much accentuated by the need to return empty lorries from Shwegyin in order to ferry back more troops and wounded. As the operations, progressed, the road was organised into sections for two-way and one-way traffic and the work of the Field Engineering units very much improved conditions in the later stages of the withdrawal to Shwegyin.
70. From Shwegyin all troops, motor vehicles and guns had to be transported to Kalewa by steamer. There were six steamers, the capacity of each being 600 to 700 men but only two lorries and two Jeeps. A special flat had to be constructed for taking vehicles, but owing to difficulties of embarkation from the beach at Shwegyin, full use could not be made of this method of transport. As a result of the low vehicle capacity of the ships, the transport problem, when units reached Kalewa, was acute. There was barely enough transport to carry essential unit equipment and ammunition and to evacuate the wounded. Fortunately the establishment of a system of staging camps stocked with supplies eliminated the necessity for units to carry rations. The track to a point opposite Kalewa was quite passable for infantry and pack animals and, in the early stages of the withdrawal, all refugees moved by this route, crossing the Chindwin to Kalewa in country boats.
71. As will have been seen from previous paragraphs, the withdrawal to Kalewa was forced on me before the stocking of the Ye-U road was finished. Nevertheless, the heroic efforts of the Administrative Staff and the drastic action which was taken to make transport available, enabled the distribution of stocks to be completed after - the withdrawal had commenced. Supplies were back-loaded to the fullest possible extent and, although the force was placed on half rations on the 4th May, there was never any real shortage of supplies.
72. The road northwards from Kalemyo to Tamu was no more than a dirt track through the jungle and once the rains set in, which might take place at any time about the 15th May, this track would become impassable to M.T. - I felt, therefore, that my operations were now as much a race with the weather as with the Japanese and as much a fight against nature as against the enemy.
Nevertheless, I had other problems to consider. There was a large number of refugees on the road west of Ye-U and I was not prepared to abandon them either to the enemy or to possible molestation by the local population. There was also the problem of clearing from Shwegyin a large number of Army Troops and followers before the fighting formations, and I therefore ordered the Commander 1 Burcorps to delay at this stage the withdrawal of his rear guard Fortunately, the enemy did not follow up closely on the road from Ye-U and, following a brush between the 7 Armoured Brigade and some enemy tanks north of Budalin on the 5th May, there was no further contact for some days.
73. On the 4th May, Commander 1 Burcorps proposed to withdraw one infantry brigade by the route Pyingyaing-Indaw-Pantha for the protection of his left flank.
As this would reduce the shipping problem at Shwegyin I agreed to the proposal, and arranged for necessary supplies to be moved by steamer to Pantha.
A few days later, Commander 1 Burcorps also arranged that when the 48 Infantry-Brigade, forming the rear guard,- reached Shwegyin it would proceed thence by steamer to Sittaung. This plan eased the transport problem on the road from Kalewa to Tamu.
74. The Fight at Shwegyin. The threat of enemy air attack on river craft reduced the capacity of the steamer service between Shwegyin and Kalewa during the hours of daylight. The crews were nervous and guards were placed on all ships to prevent any attempt at voluntary evacuation. Fortunately, however, the steamer service was singularly free from air attack. Except for bombing raids on the boom on the 5th May, and at Shwegyin on the evening of 7th May, no air attacks of any importance took place
On the morning of the loth May an enemy force of approximately one battalion with mortars, attacked the covering force at Shwegyin. It subsequently transpired that this force had moved upstream in landing craft as soon as the detachment at Maukkadaw had withdrawn and had landed at Kywe just south of Shwegyin. There was fighting all day but, in spite of this, embarkation continued. During the late afternoon, the rear guard, the 48 Infantry Brigade, counter attacked, driving off the Japanese. Contact was then lost. Commander i Burcorps now decided that ferrying by steamer from Shwegyin was no longer practicable.
There remained in Shwegyin at this time: —
Advance Headquarters 17 Division, 48 Infantry Brigade, 1/9 R. Jats, majority of the 7 Armoured Brigade, animal transport of 1 Burma and 17 Divisions.
Commander I Burcorps ordered all remaining guns, tanks and motor vehicles to be destroyed and personnel to move by the track to the ferry opposite Kalewa. The 48 Infantry Brigade, with under command 1/9 Jats and 2 D.W.R., finding guards on the ships, were embarked in steamers and proceeded upstream for Sittaung. The Headquarters 17 Division, 7 Armoured Brigade, the embarkation and administrative staff from Shwegyin and the animal transport were ferried across to Kalewa, which was at this time held by the 63 Infantry Brigade.
75. The Transport Problem. By the 9th May, staging camps on the route to Tamu had been established at Kalewa, Imbaung, Yezagyo, Khampat and Witok and the Army and Corps Troops were steadily marching from camp to camp as were the thousands of refugees which were now across the Chindwin.
Transport was the great problem. Fortunately the- Commander 4 Corps who was now in command in Assam was able to place at my disposal a G.P.T. company which proved of inestimable value. I must also mention here the excellent work done by the 7 Armoured Brigade, whose high morale and great fighting capacity I have frequently stressed. During the withdrawal it was necessary to take from the 7 Armoured Brigade nearly all their vehicles for use in the general pool both east and west of the Chindwin, and after their tanks and remaining vehicles had been abandoned at Shwegyin, this Brigade continued to find drivers not only for the vehicles brought across the Chindwin but also to supplement the drivers of G.P.T. companies working north and south of Tamu. Six to seven hundred men were employed in this way. No praise is too high for the work done by this formation.
76. Final Stages of the Withdrawal. While the withdrawal of the main body had been in progress the 2 Burma Brigade was still moving up the Myittha Valley and on the 4th May orders had been issued by wireless for it to reach Kalemyo by the 14th May. The G.P.T. company -placed at my disposal by the Commander of 4 Corps enabled this move to be accelerated and the Brigade was moved north by M.T. from Manipur River, crossing on the 13th May.
77. The withdrawal now continued without incident. Tactically, the principal anxiety of the Commander 1 Burcorps was that the enemy, moving up the Chindwin, which was parallel to the road Kalemyo-Tamu, might cut in and get astride his line of withdrawal. Even a small enemy force could have imposed a serious delay at this stage. Fortunately this threat did"1 not develop.
78. On the 11th May, Lieut.-General N. M. S. Irwin, Commanding 4 Corps came to see me at my Headquarters near Tamu. I had already been informed that my army would withdraw through his covering force on the Lokchao River north of Tamu. I discussed with General Irwin his plans for the movement of my force to the Imphal area, which had received the approval of the Commander-in-Chief in India.
79: On the 14th May, Headquarters I Burcorps moved to Tamu and the next day I moved my Headquarters out of Burma to Kangpokpi, thirty miles north of Imphal. All troops of the Burma Army arriving in India now came under command of 4 Corps,
The withdrawal of 1 Burcorps, which was skilfully conducted, proceeded according to plan and by the 17th May all formations were successfully concentrated in the Tamu area.
At 1800 hours on the 20th May I placed the rear guard of 1 Burcorps under command of 4 Corps and my task came to an end.
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