V.—THE JAPANESE BREAK-THROUGH IN THE SHAN STATES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ALLIED FORCES NORTH OF MANDALAY.

49. Decision to withdraw North of Mandalay. The situation in the Shan States which had (become serious on the 20th April rapidly deteriorated. On the 21st April it was reported that the whole of the Chinese 55 Division had been scattered by the Japanese attack, and on the 22nd that the Japanese had captured Hopong and were advancing north towards Hsipaw and Lashio with armoured forces and motorised infantry. It was never possible to discover the exact strength of the Japanese thrust but of the weakness of the Chinese forces between them and Lashio there could be no doubt. A good deal of damage was done by panic in the rear areas, especially at Lashio, and I sent Brigadier Martin, my chief liaison officer with the Chinese forces, to attempt to restore order and confidence there, which he succeeded in doing. Under the orders of General Stilwell, 28 Chinese Division (less one regiment) was moved during this period from Mandalay to Hsipaw, but the disorganisation of the railways made this movement very slow. I therefore took steps to protect my rear by sending a detachment from the British Infantry Depot at Maymyo to hold the Gokteik Gorge on the Lashio Road. On 23rd and 24th April the Chinese 200 Division captured Taunggyi and advanced towards Hopong. On the 24th April I asked General Stilwell to come and see me at Maymyo. The situation, however, did not permit of his leaving his Headquarters and therefore on the -morning of the 25th April, in company with my M.G., G.S., I went to General Stilwell's Headquarters at Kyaukse and I arranged to meet there General Slim, Commander 1 Burcorps. Here I learned that the enemy were putting heavy pressure on the Chinese 96 Division which was holding the front, that this Division was breaking up and that the Japanese were advancing fromPyinmana on Pyawbwe. One regiment in the Thazi Area had been moved to the Shan States. In consequence, Meiktila was now devoid of infantry. General Stilwell was not sanguine about the operations in the Shan States and I formed the impression that Chinese resistance on the Pyawbwe front was likely to collapse altogether very soon. I therefore issued orders for the plan of withdrawal north of Mandalay to be put into operation commencing on the night of the 25th/26th April. I also ordered 1 Burcorps to take over rear guard from the Chinese on the axis Meiktila—Mandalay and to cover the withdrawal of the Chinese 22 and 96 Divisions north of Meiktila. My decision was telephoned to Army Headquarters at 1300 hours and evacuation of units and installations remaining in Maymyo was begun.

50. Decision to dispose Imperial Forces for Defence of India. I now considered that the situation had clarified sufficiently for me to decide on the future role of the Imperial Forces I was of the opinion that the capture of Lashio by the Japanese was only a question of time and that there would be nothing to stop them moving on Bhamo, thus turning my communications with Myitkyina. Subsequent events proved this opinion to be correct, but it was impossible for me to disengage any forces to send to Bhamo. I also thought that the condition of the Chinese ,armies precluded the possibility of being able to hold Mandalay and the Irrawaddy line for very long. In these circumstances, I decided that my main object was the defence of India, out I had two subsidiary objects: —

(a) to maintain touch with the Chinese, and

(b) to get as much as possible of the Imperial Force back to India so that it could be reorganised.

51. I issued to General Slim, Commander 1 Burcorps, on the 26th April, a D.O. letter embodying my plan which was to be implemented after the Mandalay—Irrawaddy line was given up. This was as follows: —

(a) for the defence of India two infantry brigades astride the Chindwin to delay the enemy as far south as possible, and

(b) a strong detachment in the Myittha Valley.

The above to be maintained eventually from Kalewa, as well as the detachment in (c) below.

(c) the remainder of the force to move via Ye-U on Kalewa leaving a detachment to cover this route.

(d) I determined to keep contact with the Chinese. I hoped to be able to keep the 38 Division which was fighting so well under the command of 1 Burcorps.

This plan was subsequently modified as will appear later.

52. The execution of the amended plan of withdrawal to the Mandalay—Irrawaddy line was most expeditiously put into effect by 1 Burcorps, the 17 Division, with the 7 Armoured Brigade under command taking over rear guard on the axis Meiktila—Mandalay. On the 26th April the 7 Armoured Brigade attacked and dispersed an enemy column eight miles south of Meiktila and the withdrawal of the rear parties of the 63 Infantry Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade from this area was delayed until midnight 26th/27th April his order to cover the 22 and 96 Chinese Divisions and the Fifth Army Troops, which had been ordered back from the Kalaw area.

On the 26th April I moved my Headquarters to Shwebo and preparations were put in hand for making the Ye-U—Kalewa road fit for M.T. as far as possible and for stocking the road with supplies and water. Major-General Wakely, Commander L. of C. Area, was placed in charge of all work on the road.

53. On the 27th April reliable information was received that a large Japanese force was in the Nagape area (west of Magwe) date uncertain, but probably between the 15th and 20th April, and that this force was moving north via Myittha VaHey with the intention of cutting the Assam road at Kalemyo. In view of this information I visited Headquarters i Burcorps on 28th April and made there the following alterations to the plan for a further withdrawal when the Mandalay-Irrawaddy position had to be,abandoned: —

The force moving up the Myittha Valley had already been increased to include the whole of the 2 Burma Brigade, which was on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. I confirmed this and in addition arranged for one infantry brigade of the 1 Burma Division to be sent by river to Kalewa and thence to Kalemyo. As a result of these alterations, :the force astride the Chindwin would consist of one infantry brigade of the 1 Burma Division and one brigade of the 17 Division, leaving only the 17 Division, less one infantry brigade, 7 Armoured Brigade and Corps and Army Troops to withdraw via Ye-U on Kalewa.

The amended plan was confirmed in Operation Instruction No. 47 issued the following day.

54. Events leading up to the Abandonment of the Mandalay—Irrawaddy Line. At this time I was in close touch with General Stilwell and all plans were agreed with him. At a meeting at Shwebo, on the morning of the 29th April, General Stilwell informed me that the Chinese Fifth Army would, when Mandalay was given up, move to the north of Katha and that it would probably move thence to Bhamo. He was, however, uncertain on this point and was awaiting the Generalissimo's instructions. The capture of Lashio by the Japanese appeared imminent and this might force the withdrawal of the Chinese Fifth Army to India. General Stilwell also stated that exhaustion made it impossible for. the Chinese 96 Division to take part in any fighting south of Mandalay and he therefore proposed to move this Division by train to Myitkyina as soon as possible. This left only the 22. Division to hold the crossings over the Myitnge River and therefore only a delaying action could be fought on this line. The 22 Division would have to continue its withdrawal up the left bank of the Irrawaddy eventually crossing by ferry at Singu. The weakness of the Chinese forces and the wide .extent of the front made it clear to me that the Mandalay-Irrawaddy position could not be held for very long. General Stilwell asked that the 38 Division should revert to his command to cover the withdrawal to the north of the Fifth Army. I felt obliged to agree to this request.

55. India had already been, asked to move supplies to Kalewa and, on the 29th April, Lieut.-Colonel Reynolds of the Q.M.G. Staff arrived by air at Shwebo. Lieut-Colonel Reynolds was given, details of the latest plan and strengths and these he telegraphed to Delhi. It was known that the condition of the road Tamu-Kalewa would not permit of traffic once the rains began, and the movement of stores south of Tamu would have to be via the Rivers Yu and Chindwin. The maintenance capacity of this route was not known in any detail at Burma Army Headquarters and therefore it was not known what force could be maintained south of Tamu.

Lieut.-Colonel Reynolds left Shwebo by air on the 1st May. On the 3rd May I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in India to the effect 'that, while supplies had been sent to Kalewa, it was not possible- to maintain south of Tamu and that therefore I was to clear my force north of Tamu as rapidly as the tactical situation permitted.

56. At this time, it was estimated that the stocking of the road from Ye-U to Kalewa would take seven days and therefore I was anxious to hold on to the Mandalay-Irrawaddy position for this period. I felt, however, that the possibilities of doing so were slight and I urged my Administrative Staff to accelerate their arrangements as much as possible. The shortage of,-transport at the disposal of the army made it necessary to withdraw lorries from all - possible sources including the. 7 Armoured Brigade and 1 Burcorps. During the next few days drastic steps were taken in this respect, units being made to dump kit and stores which did not affect their immediate fighting value.

57. Meanwhile, the withdrawal to the Irrawaddy proceeded according to plan. The Japanese 55 Division followed up rapidly the rear guard in the axis Meiktila-Mandalay. On the evening of the 28th April, tanks with the rear party made contact with enemy motorised infantry south of Kyaukse. On the 29th April, 48 Infantry Brigade supported by tanks and artillery fought a most successful action all day in the Kyaukse area, inflicting about 500 casualties on the enemy with small loss to themselves. The enemy pressed strongly, ferrying up infantry in M.T. They failed, however, to make any progress.

58. By the evening of 28th April, 1 Burma Division had completed its crossing of the Irrawaddy at the Sameikkon Ferry between Myingyan and Myinmu, and by the evening of the 30th April the whole of the Imperial Force had withdrawn north of the Irrawaddy. The 17 Division, which had crossed the river at the Ava Bridge, was moving as rapidly as possible to its positions west of the River Mu. The 38 Chinese Division, which had crossed by ferry, had taken up its positions east of the River Mu.1 Burma Division was moving to Monywa with the intention of embarking the 13 Infantry Brigade for Kalewa and the 1 Burma Brigade for the defence of the right bank of the Chindwin. The demolition of two bays of the Ava Bridge was, with the full agreement of the Chinese, successfully carried out at 23.50 hours on the 30th April.

59. Earlier on this day, a report had been received that the Japanese had occupied Lashio. This constituted a direct threat to Bhamo and Myitkyina as had been foreseen. A number of casualties and evacuees were on their way by river to Katha for evacuation by train to Myitkyina and thence by air to India. It was impossible for me to spare any forces and indeed, in view of the chaotic conditions of the railways, to move any forces to Northern Burma. I therefore issued by telegram to Colonel Upton, the Cdmmander of the Northern Burma Sub-Area, instructions as to the policy to be adopted for the defence of and evacuation from Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha.

60. Reports were also received on the 30th April that Japanese columns were at Hsipaw and Maymyo and I had to consider the, possibility of a small enemy force moving through Mogok to the Irrawaddy at Thabeikkyin and Male. On the evening of the 3oth April, therefore, I established observation posts on the east bank of the Irrawaddy and moved one squadron of tanks and one company of motorised infantry to the north of Shwebo.

61. The Battle of Monywa. At about 19.00 hours on the 30th April, a Japanese force attacked from the right bank of the Chindwin, subsequently crossing the river and occupying the town. There was in Monywa at this time only a detachment of about 150 men of 1 Glosters, finding guards, and at Alon, northwest of Monywa, there was the Headquarters of 1 Burcorps with a protective detachment and a Frontier Force column. The troops at Monywa, who were taken by surprise, put up a stout resistance, and the Commander 1 Burcorps put in an immediate counter-attack with the few troops at his disposal. Information of the attack on Monywa was received at Army Headquarters at 22.00 hours and orders were immediately issued for one squadron of tanks to move via Ondaw on Monywa, and during the night of 1st/2nd May the squadron of tanks which I had moved north of Shwetbo for the protection of the left flank was also ordered to move on Monywa via Ye-U.

62. The situation created by the Japanese occupation of Monywa was serious since it cut off all the Imperial Forces west of the River Mu from the direct approach to Ye-U through Monywa and also prevented the move of any forces up or across the Chindwin. Further, there was no regular formation of Imperial Forces in position to oppose an enemy advance direct on Ye-U. The Commander 1 Burcorps at once ordered the 16 Infantry Brigade to move with all speed via Shwebo to cover the approaches to Ye-U from the south. The situation in Monywa, however, improved due to the prompt action of 'Commander 1 Burcorps and the courage and tenacity of the troops and by the morning of the ist May the town was again temporarily in our hands.

63. Meanwhile, at 2045 hours on 30th April, orders were issued by 1 Burcorps for 1 Burma Division to advance on Monywa as quickly as possible. 63 Infantry Brigade was due to arrive by train at Chaungu early on 1st May and this Brigade and 48 Infantry Brigade at Myinmu were placed under command 1 Burma Division. Later, however, 48 Infantry Brigade was ordered to move via Shwebo on Ye-U.

Orders were also issued, in pursuance of the original plan, for 13 Infantry Brigade to cross to the west bank of the River Chindwin but this move did not prove possible and had to be abandoned.

64. Early on 1st May the enemy crossed the River Chindwin south of Monywa and, assisted by local guides, attacked H.Q. 1 Burma Division, capturing a wireless set. This somewhat disorganised, the chain of command. The enemy also re-occupied Monywa. During the day 1 Burma Division, with 63 Infantry Brigade and one squadron 2 R. Tanks under command, advanced to the south-east outskirts of Monywa with a view to attacking on the morning of 2nd May One squadron 7 Hussars moved via Ye-U to the north of Alon.

65. My Headquarters, Headquarters 1 Burcorps and Headquarters 17 Division moved to Ye-U on 1st May. Before leaving Shwebo I had arranged for General Stilwell to meet me at Ye-U at 1800 hours that evening in order to co-ordinate plans for the withdrawal from the Mandalay-Irrawaddy position. At this meeting, at which Commander 1 Burcorps was present, General Stilwell agreed that a withdrawal could no longer be delayed and the code words to put this into effect were issued at 1845 hours. General Stilwell also agreed that the situation at iMonywa demanded the withdrawal of 7 Armoured Brigade from its position in support of 38 Chinese Division east of the River Mu and orders were therefore issued for 7 Armoured Brigade to move forthwith on the axis Ye-U—.Monywa. General Stilwell informed me that he intended to withdraw the Chinese Fifth Army to the Katha area but was uncertain of his further plans. Preparations were, however, in hand for a possible withdrawal to India.

I did not see General Stilwell again until his arrival at Din] an at the end of May and, owing to the failure of his wireless, did not have any further communication with him.

66. On 2nd May, 7 Armoured Brigade, which had arrived south of Ye-U during the night of 1st/2nd May, attacked Monywa from the north assisted by improvised forces of infantry from 1 Glosters and F.F. Columns, 1 Burma Division attacking from the south-east cleared the outskirts of Monywa, but the attack was not pressed home since i Burma Division succeeded in moving round Monywa via Ettaw and in reaching the Ye-U road south of Budahn.

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