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II.—REGROUPING OF FORCES CONSEQUENT ON THE FALL OF RANGOON.
13. A period of comparative quiet followed the withdrawal from Rangoon. Apparently, at this time the enemy was resting and refitting in the Rangoon area whilst his propaganda machine exploited to the full the fall of the city. This period of quiet was most welcome as my forces were badly in need of rest and reorganisation.
14. Having failed an my primary task of holding Rangoon, I now had to consider my secondary task which was the retention of Upper Burma. In order to achieve this it was necessary to regroup the forces.
15. The Situation on the Irrawaddy Front At this stage the 17 Division was reforming in the area Thonze—Tharrawaddy—Letpadan and carrying out reconnaissances with a view to the selection of the most suitable ground on which to fight the enemy in the Irrawaddy valley. In view of the situation on the Toungoo front, a position around Prome and south of that town was finally chosen as offering the best ground for future operations.
16. The Situation on the Toungoo Front, Arrival of the Chinese Fifth Army. To divert attention from the Irrawaddy front, 1 Burma Division made on 11th March an attack to clear the villages of Shwegyin and Madouk. This operation, which was carried out by the 1 Burma Rifles and the 5/1 Punjab Regiment, was successful, and on its completion 1 Burma Division, less 13 Infantry Brigade, was withdrawn to the area north of Kanyutkwin.
17. In reorganising my forces it was necessary to have more strength in the Irrawaddy valley. I therefore arranged for the Chinese Fifth Army to relieve the i Burma Division on the Toungoo front so that this Division could be brought across into the Irrawaddy valley, and concentrated there with the 17 Division. The date on which this could take place was dependent on the moves of the Chinese Fifth Army and it was not until the third week of March that the relief of the 1 Burma Division could be effected. Up to that time the 1 Burma Division, which had been covering the concentration of the Chinese, fought a delaying action back on Toungoo. It would have been possible, had the Chinese agreed, to have handed over to them a large area south of Toungoo They were not however willing to go south of that place and it became necessary to give up this area or to abandon the concentration of the Imperial Forces in the Irrawaddy valley. This I could not afford to do.
18. During the same period, the 17 Division, in order to conform with the gradual withdrawal of the 1 Burma Division, commenced to move back towards the Prome area. To keep touch with events on 'the Toungoo front, columns from Frontier Force units were stationed in the Pegu Yomas to give warning and to prevent any Japanese infiltration through this area. Other light forces were also stationed west of the Irrawaddy to intercept enemy penetration on this bank of the River. Advanced detachments consisting of tanks and lorry-borne infantry were ordered to operate southwards along the Prome road towards Rangoon to delay and harass any Japanese forces moving north. The only engagement of any note which took place was an attack by the 1 Glosters supported by tanks against forces of Japanese and traitor Burmans at Letpadan on the 19ih March. This attack was successful in capturing the town and inflicting losses on the enemy.
19. Formation of a Corps Headquarters. The concentration of the Imperial Forces now necessitated the formation of a Corps, especially as at this stage I was nominally in command of all Chinese forces operating in Burma. I therefore requested G.H.Q. India to supply me with a Corps Commander and a skeleton Corps Headquarters The Corps Commander, in the person of Lieut.-General W. J. Slim, M C , arrived on the 19th March and took over Command of the Corps (1 Burcorps) but, owing to the limitations of air transport, a skeleton Corps Headquarters could not be provided from India and the staff and signals had to be found from Burma Army resources.
20 Arrival of General Stilwell. On the 12th March I went to Maymyo, now the centre of the Civil Government, which had been selected as, the only suitable location for my headquarters. On the 14th March General Stilwell of the American Army arrived and informed me that he had come to take over command of the Fifth and Sixth Chinese Armies. General Stilwell had only a small staff and no signal communications of his own, so that this arrangement did not appear very satisfactory. It was, however, the Generalissimo's order and I could not interfere, but I informed G H.Q. India by telegram of this new development.
21. My Visit to Chungking. At this time I decided to go to Chungking for the purpose of paying my respects to the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, to explain to him the military situation in Burma, and to ensure that he was satisfied with the administrative arrangements which had been made for his troops. Accordingly I left Maymyo by air on the 24th March. I was warmly -received by the Chinese and had several very satisfactory talks with the Generalissimo, at the last of which he expressed the wish for unity of command of the Imperial and Chinese Forces in Burma, and asked me to accept the command of all his .troops in that country. On my return to Maymyo I informed General Stilwell of the Generalissimo's wishes and he readily agreed to serve under me as Supreme Commander in Burma. I should like to take this opportunity to add that General Stilwell and his American staff could not have been more loyal or more co-operative throughout the campaign. General Stilwell had my complete confidence. He was obviously liked and trusted by the Chinese, and he understood them and spoke their language.
22. System of Command of the Chinese Armies. Nevertheless, I must state here that the system of command of the Chinese forces in Burma was far from satisfactory. Nominally, I commanded all the Allied Forces. General Stilwell commanded the Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies but he had to issue all his orders through a Chinese commander, General Lo Cho-Ying. There was, however, a system of liaison officers working tinder the Generalissimo and it appeared that no orders of a major nature issued by myself, by General Stilwell or by General Lo could be carried out unless they had the sanction of the Generalissimo, which had to be obtained through the latter's Liaison Mission, whose head was General Lin Wei at Lashio, and who in turn had a forward liaison officer in General Hou at Maymyo. Such an arrangement was obviously quite unsuitable for modern war since quick decisions for the employment of the Chinese forces were impossible to obtain and this, together with the almost total lack of knowledge of staff duties which existed in the Chinese forces, caused considerable delay in the execution of vital movements.
23. Concentration of 1 Burcorps. The move of i Burma Division, on relief by the 200 Chinese Division, to the Irrawaddy front commenced on the night of 21st-22nd March. Owing to the difficulties of communication between the Toungoo and Irrawaddy valleys, the bulk of the 1 Burma Division was despatched by rail and road via Pyinmana and Taungdwingyi The 5 Burma Rifles proceeded by march route from Toungoo to Prome over the Yomas On the 25th March the newly formed 1 Burcorps issued orders for the concentration of the Corps in the area Allanmyo-Prome with 1 Burma Division in the area Dayindabo - Kyankpadaung - Allanmyo -Thayetmyo, 17 Division in area Wettigan-Prome-Shwedaung-Sinde, 7 Armoured Brigade in the area of Tamagauk 'in Corps reserve. The defence of the area was based on the two brigade groups in Allanmyo and Prome, the remainder of the force being mobile and prepared to act offensively. On the Irrawaddy the detachment of the Royal Marines, whichhad covered the demolitions at Syriam, found the crews for a river patrol.
24. Operations resulting in the Loss of Toungoo. On the Toungoo front the concentration of the, Chinese Fifth Army was seriously delayed by the movement of the rear echelons of the Chinese Sixth Army and also by the disintegration of the railway system which was beginning to set in as a result of enemy .bombing On the 24th March, the situation on this front was as follows:—(For Chinese Order of Battle see Appendix " A ").
All Imperial units had been withdrawn north of Toungoo en route to the Irrawaddy front. The 200 Division was entrenched in and around Toungoo with the divisional cavalry unit holding the river line to the south. The Fifth Army Troops were in Pyawbwe with certain units forward under command of the 200 Division. The other divisions of the Fifth Army were: —
22 Division with leading regiment arriving at Pyinmana, rear formation at Lashio.
96 Division approaching the frontier.
On the 24th March, the Japanese made a surprise attack on the aerodrome north of Toungoo thus cutting off the 200 Division. The rear echelon of the i Burma Division, including the 23 Mountain Battery and Frontier Force Columns 1 and 4, were involved in the fighting for the aerodrome and put up a stout resistance. By the evening of the 26th March the whole of the Chinese 22 Division had been concentrated in the area Pyinmana-Yedashe and the leading troops of the 96 Division were approaching Pyinmana. On 28th March the 22 Division attacked south from Yedashe with the object of relieving the 200 Division at Toungoo but made little headway, and on the 1st April the 200 Division cut its way out from Toungoo, where it had been besieged for over a week, and passed through into reserve at Yezin, north of Pyinmana.
25. The Japanese establish Air Superiority. The air situation was, as has been previously mentioned, adversely affected by the loss of the Rangoon aerodrome. At this time there were in Burma only the following aerodromes fit for operational use: —
Magwe, Akyab, Lashio, and Loiwing (in China).
There were also the following landing grounds •suitable only as A.L.Gs. or for fighters: —
Namsan, Heho, Mandalay, Meiktila, Piawbwe and Shwebo.
Toungoo aerodrome had by this time been rendered untenable by enemy bombing raids.
None of the above, with the exception of Loiwing, had an efficient warning system. This was partly due to lack of essential equipment and W/T personnel and partly to hills which acted as a screen to the approach of hostile aircraft.
So far as the air was concerned, the operational advantages were now with the enemy and this was soon demonstrated in the severe reverse which was sustained by the R.A.F. at Magwe on the 21st and 22nd March when a large number of aircraft, both, fighters and .bombers, were destroyed on the ground. This reverse forced the R.A.F. and the A.V.G. to withdraw from Magwe to Loiwing, 400 miles further north, and this reduced very much the effectiveness of the air force.
The supply of aircraft now became the ruling factor in the air situation in Burma. In view of the limited amount of aircraft available at this time, that is to say the end of March and the beginning of April, for the defence of India and Ceylon, it was decided that all R.A.F. units should be withdrawn from Burma, where it was uneconomical to retain aircraft in operational conditions which rendered high losses inevitable. However, an R.A.F. organisation known as " Burwing " was retained at Lashio and Loiwing and aircraft were flown over from India from time to time; but very little could be achieved in the circumstances prevailing.
That the decision to withdraw the R.A.F. to India was right there can be no doubt, but this decision left the Japanese with almost undisputed command of the air and this had a serious effect on the civil population and the working of the utility services and a somewhat lesser effect on the morale of the troops.
26. Effect of Bombing on Public Utility Services. At the end of March and the beginning of April, the Japanese commenced to make heavy bombing raids on centres of communication in Central and Upper Burma, raids being made on such places as Prome, Meiktila, Mandalay, Thazi, Pyinmana, Maymyo, Lashio and Taunggyi.
Except for the damage to house property, the material effect of these raids was not very great but the moral effect amongst the civil population was enormous. After a heavy raid on a town, the life of that community came practically to a standstill, the population moving into the jungle. From the military aspect, the effect on the working of the public utility services was most serious. Many railway employees and I.W.T. workers in the employment of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company left their jobs. The Police force disintegrated, the power supply broke down and the Post and Telegraph service, to whom a tribute should be paid for the manner in which a large number of personnel stuck to their jobs, was affected to a lesser degree.
The effect of bombing on public utility workers was accentuated by the presence of their families, many of whom had not at this time been evacuated and it is a point for consideration in the future, that all workers in services on which military operations depend do better, when they know that their families have been removed to a place of safety.
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