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I.—OPERATIONS RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF RANGOON.
3. After this conference with the Commander-in-Chief I flew to Magwe, which I reached that evening. On the morning of the 5th March I flew to Rangoon, arriving at Army Headquarters at midday.
4.* Situation at the Time of my Arrival. On arrival at Army Headquarters I found that General Hutton was away at the front, and, in his absence, the situation was explained to me by the staff as follows: —
17 Indian Division were holding the area Pegu-Hlegu with—48 Infantry Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade in area Pegu; 16 Infantry Brigade—Hlegu.
Both these Infantry Brigades were very weak and disorganised as explained in General Hutton's Report.
63 Infantry Brigade, having just disembarked, was at Hlawga, sixteen miles north of Rangoon, but its transport was still on board ship.
1 Burma Division having handed over the defence of Southern Shan States to Chinese Sixth Army was located:—
13 Indian Infantry Brigade—Mawchi.
1 Burma Brigade—Pyu.
2 Burma Brigade—Nyaunglebin.
There was a gap of 40 miles between forward elements of i Burma Division and 17 Division. There were Japanese forces in Waw and the neighbouring villages north and north-east of Pegu, and in addition Japanese columns had been infiltrating across the Sittang River between Pegu and Nyaunglebin under cover of darkness for some days. These had entered the Pegu Yomas, the jungle country north and north-west of Pegu.
5.* Operations at Pegu. In view of this situation, which looked, to say the least, serious, I set off at once for the Headquarters of 17 Division at Hlegu where I met General Hutton and Major-General Cowan, commanding 17 Division. The situation was here explained to me again but in more detail and General Hutton told me of the orders for the evacuation of Rangoon which he wished to issue but had held up pending my arrival. I was not satisfied that Rangoon could not be held but it appeared to me that the only course of action which could save the situation was to effect a junction between 1 Burma Division and 17 Division with the object of preventing any further Japanese infiltration into the Yomas. I accordingly ordered 17 Division to carry out offensive operations against the Japanese at Waw and in the neighbouring villages with a view to relieving pressure on their immediate front, and at the same time I ordered 2 Infantry Brigade of 1 Burma Division to advance south from Nyaunglebin to join hands with 17 Division. The offensive carried out on 5th March by the 17 Division and part of the Armoured Brigade from Pegu was locally successful but during this operation the Japanese attacked from the wooded country bordering Pegu on the west and succeeded in capturing a part of the town. Considerable fighting took place there on 6th March but 17 Division were not successful in ejecting the Japanese. Meanwhile, the wider enemy encircling movement which had been in progress when I arrived had developed, and the road from Rangoon south-west of Pegu which had been under snipers' fire on 5th March was definitely cut on 6th March.
6. Decision to withdraw from Rangoon. Counter-attacks to open the road failed and I then ordered 63 Indian Infantry Brigade to be put at the disposal of the Commander 17 Division.
An attack on 6th March by this Infantry Brigade to open the road was not successful and the situation by noon on this day was as follows: —
The troops cut off in Pegu consisted of— 7 Hussars, 48 Indian Infantry Brigade, 1 W. Yorks, and 1 Cameronians.
** There was further confirmation that a force of 2,000 Japanese previously reported by Burma Frontier Force patrols had passed through Paunggyi about 30 miles north of Hlegu and was moving in a south-westerly direction.
** It was also confirmed about this time that a number of traitor Burmans with Japanese officers had landed at the mouth of the Rangoon River, threatening the Syriam refineries where there was only a small garrison.
In view of this situation I considered that the retention of Rangoon was quite impossible with the comparatively small forces at my disposal, dispersed as they were and with part of them already encircled.
I therefore decided that the right course of action was to order the destruction of the oil refineries at Syriam, the evacuation of Rangoon and the regrouping of my forces north of Rangoon in the Irrawaddy valley. The order to put the Denial Scheme into operation was issued at midnight on the 6th March.
7. Force cut off and breaks out at Taukkyan. On the morning of the 7th March, Army Headquarters, administrative units and troops not required to cover the demolitions in Rangoon area moved out of Rangoon on the Prome road. Near Taukkyan, twenty-one miles north of Rangoon at about 11.00 hours, the leading vehicles of Army Headquarters ran into an enemy road block and the column was held up. Attempts by the 1 Glosters, 2/13 F.F Rifles and some tanks of the 7 Hussars throughout the day failed to clear the block. It must be remembered here that the force in Pegu was still cut off, all the efforts on the 6th March of the 63 Infantry Brigade to relieve it having been unsuccessful.
On the 7th March, however, the force in Pegu was ordered to cut its way out and this it eventually succeeded in doing with the loss of some of its transport. Meanwhile, 63 Infantry Brigade had concentrated near Hlegu and it was decided to use this brigade to attack the road block north of Taukkyan early on the 8th March, strongly supported by tanks and artillery.
This attack of 63 Infantry Brigade was unsuccessful in effecting an immediate clearance of the road block. The situation was very serious but such troops of 16 Indian Infantry Brigade as were available were collected from Hlegu, together with some tanks, and another attack was carried out later in- the morning. This attack succeeded. The road block was found to be clear and, although there was a good deal of sniping which made it necessary to piquet the route with the 16 Infantry Brigade, the column moved north without further serious interference. That this was possible was partly due to the fact that the Japanese, in their eagerness to reach Rangoon, had passed further round our left flank and were actually entering the north-west outskirts of the town as our troops were moving north through the road block.
While the column, consisting of Army Headquarters, administrative units, ,etc., moved northwards from Taukkyan, the withdrawal of the remainder of 17 Division from Pegu and Hlegu continued. On the night of the 8th March, 17 Division (less a detachment of tanks and infantry which had been sent to keep open the road Taukkyan—Tharrawaddy) was concentrated in the Taukkyan area. It may be remarked here that intensive bombing attacks by the enemy could have done great damage, as the whole force was now concentrated in a comparatively small area.
That this did not take place was due to the temporary but complete ascendancy which had been established by the R.A.F. during recent Japanese attacks in which the enemy had sustained very severe losses. The few enemy bombers which did attempt to attack the Taukkyan area were kept at a great height by our light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery. The move northwards from Taukkyan was commenced on the morning of gth March.
My intention was to concentrate 17 Division in the area Thonze—Tharrawaddy—-Letpadan and to hold the line Henzada—Sanywe Ferry —Thonze—Thonze Chaung.
The withdrawal from Taukkyan was without enemy interference and concentration in the new area was completed toy evening of 11th March.
8. Effect of the Loss of Rangoon. The effect of the loss of Rangoon was very serious, since it ds the only point of entry to Burma through which personnel and supplies can be moved in large numbers.
9. Rangoon was the base port for Burma and after the fall of that city the army was fighting facing its former base and with no L. of C. behind it. In the absence of a road to India the army was virtually cut off from outside assistance and could be supplied only with the very limited numbers of personnel and small quantities of stores which could be brought in by air. Base and L. of C. installations and reserves of various commodities had already been moved north of Rangoon and this back loading had to continue throughout the withdrawal, which placed an enormous strain on the administrative machine and on the transportation agencies. Civil heavy repair installations in the Rangoon area which could not be moved were lost altogether and the maintenance of mechanical transport and equipment became a matter of great difficulty.
10. The destruction of the refineries, where the refining of all crude oil from the oil fields had been carried out, very much reduced the output of motor and aviation spirit and lubricating oils and rendered the Allied Forces in Burma dependent on such spirit as could be produced by improvised methods in the oil fields themselves, when reserve stocks had been consumed.
11. The loss of the Rangoon aerodromes with their efficient warning system had the most serious consequences for the R.A.F. and on the air situation in Burma. This will be touched on in more detail in a later paragraph.
12. Turning to the enemy side of the picture, the fall of Rangoon transferred to the Japanese nearly all the advantages in communications which had previously been held by the Imperial Forces. Instead of having to supply their army by difficult mountain roads the Japanese were now able, after effecting repairs to the port, to move very large forces by sea to Burma. In fact it is not too much to say that until such time as the road from Assam to Burma was completed the retention of Upper Burma by the allies was dependent on the amount of force which the Japanese decided to employ in that theatre. The task of the allies therefore was to impose the maximum delay on the enemy and make him expend resources which he might have employed elsewhere.
Note
* See General Hutton's Report, Section IX.
** See General Hutton's Report, paras. 104, 106 and 107.
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