Comment

“Causes of failure - prime cause Low Morale Indian Troops”

Indians had fought whole way down mainland and at end little to choose between their morale and A.I.F. in spite of fact that the latter only started fighting in Johore.

“Poor quality 18th Division”

(See Thomforce Report) Thomforce only troops at end showing cohesion and will to attack, though seriously handicapped by lack jungle training and unacclimatised.

Tactics.

“Beach defence systems provided long thin-line posts along beach without depth...

This is not so. On the regular beach defences the system was in depth and very sound, i.e., Changi, Siglap, &c. The North and West shores, as fully explained elsewhere, are not good examples, as improvised at last moment. In any case, strength of troops at end would not allow of deep defence round whole coast. principle is hold on beach with minimum and eject landing by immediate and over whelming counter-attack.

Defences constructed during campaign.

“It must have been anticipated retreat, which commenced the 7th December, would end on Singapore Island. When troops reached Island the 30th January they found no defences prepared except those prior to hostilities”

Why so pessimistic an outlook ? Commander certainly did not expect to have to fight south of Batu Pahat - Ayer Hitam. Shows misunderstanding of whole raison d´etre of Naval Base and policy. Admitted; as precaution Northern shore defences should have been put in hand. No labour. All would suffer if suggested at early stage that we should be driven on to Island thus early.

“No doubt Singapore Island should have been strongly fortified against attack from mainland. Strong perimeters, support and reserve positions could have been prepared.”

This (see above) shows a misunderstanding of the factors bearing on the defence of the Naval Base.

“Own and enemy casualties.

(A) Own. Difficult to secure because nature of country facilitated isolation of units ...... Missing personnel thus constantly reappeared ........ 11th February A.I.F. casualties were approximately 7,000 killed or missing, while approximately 2,000 in hospital. Impossible to estimate total casualties till enemy report numbers of prisoners.”

Admitted that assessments of casualties very difficult, but allowing for this, there is no doubt that casualties in killed and wounded on the mainland were not heavy. One estimate - as reliable as can be expected under the circumstances - put A.I.F. killed and wounded on the mainland at under 300.

“Conduct of Defence of Singapore.”

“Defences of Island divided into 3 sectors ... western A.I.F. and 44th Indian Brigade.

(2) Work immediately commenced preparing positions´ soon realised coastline could only be thinly held.”

It has been difficult to ascertain how much was actually done on the A.I.F. sector, though there is a general agreement that it was not well prepared. One officer speaks of seeing wire in coils being carried away from the position.

Paragraph (2) shows misunderstanding of general principles for defending any long perimeter, and Singapore Isalnd in particular. They are:

(1) Sufficient fire power at the water´s edge to make landing very hazardous.

(2) A counter-attack plan for immediate destruction of any enemy who gets ashore. Obviously, with fighting troops available and a total shore line of about 80 miles, the counter-attack was of importance.

“Night the 4th / 5th February patrol encountered large enemy concentrations mainland overlooking Straits Johore.”

There is a conflict on this point and it is a matter which had a marked bearing on the events of the next few days. A senior Staff Officer (G.S.) has stated that Fortress Command made unsuccessful efforts to persuade General Gordon Bennett to send patrol across the Johore Strait to ascertain whether or no the Japanese were massing on the opposite shore.

Finally, on night the 8th / 9th February an A.I.F. patrol did cross the Strait and discovered large numbers of Japanese concentrated on the opposite shore and rafts prepared for ferrying them.

It was then too late. The information reached Command Headquarters when the enemy was in process of landing.

(4) The 7th February enemy aircraft and artillery started bombardment. Concentrated attention on Headquarters and roads western sector ..... Defences destroyed. Information that night enemy had landed a large force. Two battalions holding position over-run.

It is difficult to ascertain what occurred at the time of the Japanese landing and for some hours previously. Description of the Japanese bombing varies between “very heavy” to “nothing much.” The beach lights were never exposed because the local infantry commander had given strict orders that this was not to be done without his permission.

As a state of defences of the troops in the immediate vicinity of Japanese landing is not accurately known, and further, as it is difficult to judge the weight of this bombardment, it is impossible to say whether or no the A.I.F. Battalions concerned shamefully abandoned their positions, and thus allowed the enemy to land almost unhindered. An officer of the Chinese guerillas co-operating with the A.I.F. Battalions in this sector has stated that they (the guerillas) were kept “in the air” and suffered very severe losses.”

“Reserves thrown into counter-attack but unable to stem enemy advance.”

This is the only evidence of any effort on the part of the A.I.F. to hold up the Japanese in this sector at this stage. On the other hand there are statements to the exact contrary - notably from Officers of the 11th Indian Division and Chinese guerillas.

“After conference with General Wavell, line to be pushed forward easy stages on the 11th and 12th February. This impossible.

Commander of Thomforce (formed from units of 18th Division) is of an exectly contrary opinion, and speaking with knowledge of conditions (he had come under Gordon Bennett´s command), states that he did not see how it could fail with the artillery support available.

General Gordon Bennett actually issued orders for this counter-attack, and on the 6th, 15th Indian Infantry Brigade on extreme left started and gained their objectives, but later retired as no other formations or units co-operated “owing to non-receipt of orders - or something.”

Explaination needed as to why, if counter-attack was not practicable, the Indian Brigade in Westforce was allowed to proceed on the original orders and why the A.I.F. did not participate.

Brigadier Paris has confirmed on morning 11th (see Thomforce narrative) that the counter-attack did not take place, and that since midday on the previous day (10th February) there had been no A.I.F. west of the Bukit Timah road in the direction of the Sunggi Kranji.

Beyond any doubt morale and discipline had at this time gone to pieces. The news of the landing and the failure of counter measures had been the final blow. The A.I.F. according to incontrovertible evidence, were affected more seriously at this crises than some of the other units. The commander Westforce, issued his orders for a counter-attack to be carried out on the morning of 11th february.

One formation, at least, carried out their part; the A.I.F. did not and in his report the Commander says that the counter-attack was impossible. There can only be one deduction.

“Part Ten,” Japanese forces on Singapore Island. In first attack on Island it seems enemy used one division against two battalions north-west sector island. Having created gap, he poured troops this division towards Buki Timah village.

The deciding factor is not the number eventually landed, but the number of the first tows to secure a footing.

“(1) Contrary reports that natives were unfriendly. Not one case of 5th Column activity was reported by A.I.F., Malaya, Chinese assisted as guides, provided food, boats, &c

This evidence applies only to Johore State. Unquestionably Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengannu, Fifth Columnists abunded.

Tamils, Malays, and Chinese were almost invariably ready to help our troops if the risk was not too great.

“During campaign in north desertions of Malay volunteers were reported. Men of a Malay regiment contacted by A.I.F. fought as well as Indian troops.”

Malays of the Volunteer Battalions proved valueless and were disbanded, while those of regular regiment were good on occasions, i.e., Pasir Panjang on 12th, 14th February.

“(1) As martial law was proclaimed, Singapore civil authorities could not be blamed for shortcomings.”

The Civil administration retained a large measure of control, even after the withdrawal of all force on to the Island, and the unamimous verdict of senior staff officers is that an important factor in our failure in Malaya was the difficulty of ensuring efficient co-operation. Many prominent civilians (professional and buinessmen) are unsparing in their condemnation of the Governor and administration.

“Part Fourteen, effectiveness demolitions. (1) Reports revealed that in beginning campaign destruction of property useful to enemy was not organised, viz., Penang.

The enemy break through in Kedah was so rapid and unexpected that Penang was completely surprised.