Part I
buttons1_left buttons1_right
side_buttons_top
side_buttons_b1_over
side_buttons_b1_over
side_buttons_b1_over
side_buttons_b1_over
side_buttons_bottom

Part I.

PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS

 

2. The British ship DORIC STAR had reported 'being attacked by a pocket battleship in position 19 degrees 15' south, 5 degrees 5' east during the afternoon of 2nd December, 1939, and a similar report had been sent by an unknown vessel 170 miles south-west of that position at 0500 G.M.T. on 3rd December.

From this data I estimated that at a cruising speed of 15 knots the raider could reach the Rio de Janeiro focal area a.m. 12th December, the River Plate focal area p.m. 12th December or a.m. 13th December and the Falkland Islands area 14th December.

3. I decided that the Plate, with its larger number of ships and its very valuable grain and meat trade, was the vital area to be defended. I therefore arranged to concentrate there my available forces in advance of the time at which, it was anticipated the raider might start operations in that area.

4. In order to bring this about, I made the following signal to the South American Division timed 1315 of 3rd December, 1939: —

    " In view of report pocket battleship, amend previous dispositions. CUMBERLAND self-refit at Falkland Islands as previously arranged but keep at short notice on two shafts. ACHILLES leave Rio de Janeiro area so as to arrive and fuel Montevideo 0600 (Zone plus 2) 8th December, EXETER leave Falkland Islands, for Plate a.m. 9th December, covering S.S. LAFONIA with returning volunteers. AJAX, ACHILLES concentrate in position 35 degrees south, 50 degrees west at 1600 (Zone plus 2) loth December. EXETER to pass through position 090 degrees Medanos Light ^50 miles at 0700 12th December. If concentration with AJAX and ACHILLES is not effected by that time further instructions will be issued to EXETER. Oiler OLYNTHUS is to remain at sea rendezvous until situation clears instead of proceeding to Falkland Islands."

5. Strict W/T silence was kept after passing this signal.

6. Concentration of all three ships was effected by 0700 Tuesday, 12th December, and I then proceeded towards position 32 degrees south, 47 degrees west. This position was chosen from my Shipping Plot as being at that time the most congested part of the diverted shipping routes, i.e., the point where I estimated that a raider could do most damage to British shipping.

7. On concentrating I made the following signal timed 1200/12th December to my Force: —

    " My policy with three cruisers in company versus one pocket battleship. Attack at once by day or night. By day act as two units, 1st Division (AJAX and ACHILLES) and EXETER diverged to permit flank marking. First Division will concentrate gunfire. By night ships will normally remain in company in open order. Be prepared for the signal ZMM* which is to have the same meaning as MM* except that for Division read Single Ship."

8. I amplified this later in my signal 1813/12th December as follows: —

    " My object in the signal ZMM is to avoid torpedoes and take the enemy by surprise and cross his stern. Without further orders ships are to clear the line of fire by hauling astern of the new leading ship. The new leading ship is to lead the line without further orders so as to maintain decisive gun range."

I exercised this manoeuvre during the evening of 12th December.

 

Notes:-

* The signification of these signals was :

    ZMM—ships are to turn to course . . . . starting with the rear ship.

    MM—Commanders of Divisions are to turn their Division to course . . . . starting with the rear Division.

 

Next Part

 


 

FEPOW Family

Keeping The Candle Burning

In Memory of FEPOW Family Loved Ones

Who Suffered in the Far East

Thanks for all the support

 

[FEPOW Family] [Ronnies Blog]

 

Designed by Ronnie Taylor

anbird1

Ronnie.Taylor@fepow.family

 

© Copyright FEPOW Family