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I.—FORMATION OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST
1. This despatch, covers the period from the date of my appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Far East, the iyth October, 1940, to the date on which I handed over to Lieutenant- General Sir Henry Pownall, the 27th December, 1941.
My original staff consisted of seven, exclusive of my personal assistant. Of these seven, the Chief .of Staff, Major-General Dewing, the Senior Royal Adr Force Staff Officer, Group-Captain Darvall, as well as any personal assistant, travelled out with me.
The Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Back, met me on my arrival at Singapore, and the Army G..S.O.I, Colonel Fawcett, met me in Burma.
Before leaving England I saw the Chief of the Imperial General .Staff, Chief of the Air Staff and Major-General Ismay individually, but did not meet the Chiefs of Staff collectively at one of their meetings.
2. I left London on Sunday, the 27th October, and started 'by air from Plymouth on the 28th October. I spent two clear days in Cairo, three in Delhi and three in Rangoon, arriving at Singapore on Thursday, the 14th November. General Headquarters, Far East, started to operate on .Monday, ; the 18th November, 1940.
During the journey I was able to see the working of the Headquarters of both the Army and Air Force in Cairo, and to consult with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Wavell, on the methods of operating has headquarters, and especially why he found such a big expansion from his original staff necessary.
At Delhi I stayed with the Viceroy, and established contact with the Commander-in-Chief, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and their respective staffs, and with certain civil officials.
At Rangoon I stayed with the Governor, Sir Archibald Cochrane, and reached agreement over the constitutional problems raised by the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Far East. I met the General Officer Commanding, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir K. McLeod, visited various establishments, including the oil refinery at Syriam, and established contact with many of the civil officials
Instructions and General Policy.
3. My Directive is given in Appendix A.
On my arrival in Singapore it was agreed that, should I become a casualty, the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, should take my place until my successor was appointed.
With reference to paragraph 2 of my Directive, the meaning of the term " operational control " was explained as being higher direction and control as distinct from detailed operational control.
In addition to this Directive, I had two main guides for action: first, that if was the policy of 'His Majesty's Government to avoid war with Japan, and, secondly, that, until a fleet was available; our policy 'in the Far East should be to rely primarily on .airpower in conjunction with such naval forces "as could be made available. The first was confirmed during 1941 in many telegrams, e.g., in March, " Avoidance of war with Japan is basis of Far East policy and provocation must be rigidly avoided," and again in September, " Our policy in the Far East is still to avoid war with Japan." The second was. laid down by the Chiefs of Staff in August, 1940.
4. It was pointed out to me that the requirements of Home Defence, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Middle East, must take precedence over those of the Far East; at a later date Russia also took precedence, and, at one time, Iraq and Iran. Realising this, it was obviously our duty to be content with the essential minimum, to consider what we could do without rather than what we would like to have, and to make the fullest use of local resources. But we always regarded the strength of 336 aeroplanes as an irreducible minimum. (See para. 79 below.) In January, 1941, we were cautioned against over-estimate of the Japanese forces.
I was also informed that the defence organisation in Malaya was apparently not working smoothly or efficiently, and that this would necessitate early investigation and action.
5. To carry out the directions outlined above, it was evident that the following steps were necessary: —
(a) To avoid any action that might be deemed provocative by Japan, but at the same time to try and convince her that our strength was too great to be challenged successfully;
(b) To strengthen our defences in the Far East, and especially to build up our air forces, not only by obtaining new aircraft but also by making all preparations to ensure mutual reinforcement in the Far East area;
(c) To ensure effective co-operation in Malaya, not only between the Royal Navy, the Army and the Air Force but also between them and the civil services;
(d) To stiffen the Chinese so that they could contain the maximum Japanese effort (see paras. 70 and 71 below); and
(e) To establish as close co-operation as possible with the Dutch and Americans, as well as with Australia and New Zealand, the main object being to ensure that, should an attack be made on any part of the Far East area, all the nations concerned would simultaneously enter the war against Japan, thus avoiding the risk of defeat in detail, as had happened in Europe.
6. A very brief study of the area comprised in the Far East Command shows that the defence of the whole area is essentially one single problem. Burma, Siain, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand, all inter-connect and operations or preparations in any one of these areas affect all the others. In view of the above, I regarded it as one of my principal duties to make personal contacts in these places. During 1941 I visited Australia, twice, in February and October, Manila three times and the Netherlands East Indies five times. I also visited Hong Kong in December, 1940, and April, 1941; and Burma in June and September, 1941.
Another point that stands out is that the problem is (fundamentally a naval one, and that, although the Army and Air Force in combination may defend areas of land and repel an enemy, his definite defeat cannot be brought about unless control of sea communications is obtained. This control will necessitate air superiority.
The Far East is usually examined on a small scale map, so people are rather apt to get a false idea of distances. From Singapore to Alor Star at the North End of Malaya is a good deal further than from London to Aberdeen. Rangoon to Singapore direct by air is about 1,100 miles; Singapore to Hong Kong, via
Manila, is 2,000 miles, about the distance from Gibraltar to Alexandria; and from Singapore to Melbourne about 4,100, which is only slightly less than the distance from London to Aden, via Malta and Cairo.
Size of General Headquarters Staff.
7. Although it was obvious that Singapore was a key position, and -therefore that the defence of Malaya was of the greatest importance, it was evident that, apart from my Directive, the size of -my Staff rendered it quite impossible to exercise any form of direct operational control, except in the widest sense. I therefore decided that, although the fact of my headquarters happening to be situated at Singapore would naturally involve my dealing with more details in Malaya than elsewhere, the Commands of Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma must be regarded as of equal status. Each General Officer Commanding would have to control the operations in his own area, and the initiative of the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, must not be cramped; the operational control of my headquarters would be limited mainly to the movement. of reinforcements, principally air, within my command and to the issue of directives.
The staff of General Headquarters, Far East, was very small for the work it had to carryout, and immediately on its formation in Singapore it was found necessary to add three duty officers of junior rank in order to ensure keeping a twenty-four-hour watch in the office. Requests for an increase in staff at General Headquarters were made on more than one occasion, and finally it was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff, in August, 1941, that the total establishment should be raised to the following:—
Commander-in-Chief: 1.
Chief of Staff: 1.
Staff Officer, 1st Grade: Navy 1; Army 2; R.A.F. 2.
Staff Officer, 2nd Grade: Navy 1; Army 3; R.A.F. 3.
Staff Officer, 3rd Grade: Navy 1.
Total, 15.
In addition to this, there were:—
Personal Assistant: 1.
Cipher Officers: 2.
Signal Officer: 1.
Chief Clerk: 1.
Making a total in all of 20. This establishment was not completed by the time war broke out.
The result of the smallness of the Staff was that individuals were overworked, and this, in conjunction with the Malayan climate, led to sickness. The most serious case was that, of my Chief of Staff, Major-General Dewing, who went into hospital on the 8th April, and remained there until he started for England in May. General Playfair arrived to take his place on the 21st June, but for a period of some ten and a half weeks I was without a. Chief of Staff.
This sickness was largely attributed by the medical authorities to the effects of overwork. In addition, Wing-Commander Yarde had to be sent away sick, other officers were in hospital for shorter periods, and when war with Japan broke out Colonel Scott, who had taken Colonel Fawcett's place as the Army G.S.O.I, was in- India on sick leave, having been sent there from hospital.
Intelligence.
8. For intelligence I relied almost entirely on the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, known for short as F.E.C.B. This consisted of branches of Naval, Army and Air Force intelligence, and was under the administrative control of the Admiralty, the officer in charge of the Naval Section acting as head of the Bureau. At the date of the formation of any headquarters, F.E.C.B. was somewhat unbalanced in that attention was mostly concentrated on Naval intelligence, while Army and Air intelligence took a minor place, the latter especially being quite inadequate. This, however, was steadily corrected, and I consider that F.E.C.B. fulfilled its functions and showed that a combined intelligence staff of the three Services is a workable proposition. What was needed, however, was a real chief of F.E.C.B., and not merely one whose main duty was acting as head of his own 'branch. The difficulty was in finding a really suitable individual, and this we had not succeeded in doing at the time war with Japan broke out.
Attachments to General Headquarters Staff.
9. A branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare known as the O.M. Section, was started on the arrival of Mr. Killery at Singapore in May, 1941. He and his staff were keen and capable, but they had no experience and very little knowledge of how to set about their work. Further, as in the case of intelligence, this is work that requires a great deal of preparation. In consequence of this, but through no fault of Mr. Killery or his staff, the O.M. activities really never got functioning properly by the time that war with Japan broke out. There was also a curious reluctance on the part of many people to have anything to do with these activities, or to help on the work. This was particularly noticeable in the case of intended activities in Siam.
10. Colonel Warren arrived in Singapore early in 1941 to assist in starting Independent Companies. The obvious disadvantage of these Companies is that they form a drain on infantry units, which were already depleted of many of their best non-commissioned officers and officers owing to the expansion and demands of other organisations.. As a result, it was finally decided to limit these Independent Companies to two—one for Burma and one for Malaya.
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