|
Part 1
Section XV: — The air situation.
101. The Air Officer Commanding Far East, Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, on raking over command at Singapore on the 26th April, 1941. was fared with tremendous difficulties. The aircraft at his disposal were still very deficient in numbers and few of them were of modern types.
102. The bulk of the fighters were the American built Brewster Buffalos, comparatively slow machines with poor manoeuvrability. The device by which the .5 in. machine guns with which they were equipped fired through the propeller was faulty and caused a lot of trouble. A large number of the machines were also temporarily unserviceable when war started. There was also a squadron of Blenheim night-fighters. None of these machines could be classified as modern fighters. For these fighters only a limited number of trained pilots were sent from the United Kingdom. The remainder had to be found from pilots, mostly New Zealanders, who arrived in Malaya with a minimum of flying training and no fighter training, or by transferring pilots from other types of aircraft.
103. The bombers consisted of two squadrons of Hudson General Reconnaissance machines and two squadrons of Blenheims. Some of these squadrons were below strength. There were no heavy bombers in Malaya.
104. There were two squadrons of Torpedo-bombers of the Vildebeeste type. These machines were obsolete. They had a very limited range, and a speed of less than 100 miles per hour.
105. There was one Flying-boat squadron of Catalina machines, which had also become deficient in numbers owing to casualties and lack of reserves.
106. There were no special Army Co-operation aircraft in Malaya. I arranged, however, with the A.O.C. Far East for some of the fighters to be made available for training in Army co-operation work. It was only possible, in the short time available and owing to lack of resources, for the most elementary training to be carried out.
There were no transport or dive-bomber air craft in Malaya.
107. There was a great shortage of spare parts, reserve aircraft, and reserve pilots. For this reason and in order to conserve resources flying was from May, 1941, onwards greatly restricted. In order to assist the Air Force, Army Officers, when travelling about by air, usually
used light machines belonging to the Civil Transport Line or to the Volunteer Air Force.
The Air Force in Malaya was drained. of trained personnel to supply shortages in the Middle East. Trained personnel were also withdrawn from the Australian squadrons to act as instructors in Australia.
The restrictions on flying and the shortage of trained personnel militated greatly against efficiency.
108. When war broke out with Japan, the total of operationally serviceable I.E. aircraft in Malaya was as under: —
- Hudson General Reconnaissance land-based 15
- Blenheim I Bombers 17*
- Blenheim IV Bombers 17*
- Vildebeeste Torpedo-Bombers 27
- Buffalo Fighters 43
- Blenheim 1 Night Fighters 10
- Swordfish (for co-operationwith Fixed Defences) 4
- Shark (for target-towing, recce, and bombing) 5
- Catalinas 3**
- Total 141
- * Including 8 from Burma
- ** Of which 1 in Indian Ocean
This contrasted with the 566 1st Line aircraft which had been asked for.
In addition to the above, there were a few Light Aircraft (Moths etc.) manned by the Volunteer Air Force.
109. This was the Air Force with which we started the war. There was in fact no really effective Air Striking Force in Malaya and the fighters were incapable of giving effective support to such bombers as there were or of taking their proper place in the defence.
The A.O.C. was fully alive to the weakness of the force at his disposal. He frequently discussed this subject with me and I know that he repeatedly represented the situation to higher authority.
110. In order to facilitate co-operation between the Army and the Air Force in North Malaya should hostilities break out, an air organization known as Norgroup was pre pared and a commander appointed. The functions of the commander were:—
(a)to command such air forces as Air Headquarters might allot to him from time to time;
(b)to act as air adviser to G.O.C. 3 Indian Corps and to command such air forces as might be placed under the Corps Commander.
Section XVI. - Summary of the situation on the outbreak of war with Japan.
111. When war broke out with Japan on the 8th December, 1941, there were some glaring weaknesses in the arrangements for the defence of Malaya.
112. The Navy no longer controlled the sea approaches to Malaya and there was a great shortage of craft suitable for coastal defence.
113. The Air Force, in place of a force of 566 1st Line Aircraft asked for by the A.O.C. Far East or of 336 approved by the Chiefs of Staff, had a force of only 141 operationally serviceable aircraft, very few of which were of the most modern types and some of which were even obsolete. There were no modern torpedo-bombers and no dive-bombers, the two types required for offensive action against an approaching sea-borne expedition, and no transport aircraft, the type essentially required for the maintenance of forward troops in jungle warfare. In addition, there were for reasons already stated comparatively few trained pilots and then' was a great shortage of spare parts.
114. The Army dispositions are most easily explained by comparing Malaya again to England and Wales (see Section I). It may further be assumed that an enemy with a superior fleet is in occupation of Norway and that Scotland is a neutral State, whose territory may not be entered unless the enemy is advancing with the obvious intention of landing in the South of Scotland or has violated any part of that country.
In Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire, then, there is one Division watching the main road and railway approaches from Scot land. On the east coast there is a strong brigade group in Northumberland and a weak brigade group at Hull. The Headquarters of this northern area are at Crewe. In the South of England there is one Division consisting of two brigade groups only. One of these is on the east coast about the mouth of the Thames, while the other is about the Oxford area. The Isle of Wight, where the Army Head quarters is situated, is strongly defended on the seaward side and has reasonably strong antiaircraft defences.
The Command Reserve, which consists of one brigade group only, is situated partly on the Isle of Wight and partly in the area of the Cotswolds where it has recently been carrying out training.
The abject of the defence is to protect the Naval Base of Portsmouth which, for purposes of the comparison, it must be assumed is situated on the north coast of the Isle of Wight.
115. The dispersion of the land forces and the lack of reserves needs no stressing. The dispositions on the mainland had been designed primarily to afford protection to the aerodromes, most of which had been sited without proper regard to their security. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no adequate Air Force to operate from them. It is true that, even without this commitment, it would have been necessary, in order to protect the Naval Base, to hold at least most of Malaya but, had it not been for the aerodromes, better and more concentrated dispositions could have been adopted.
116. As soon as the threat to Malaya developed in the summer of 1940 everything possible was done, both at Home and in Malaya, to strengthen the land defences. The fact that more could not be done was no doubt due to our Imperial commitments elsewhere. The time proved too short to put a country almost the size of England and Wales, in which there was no surplus labour, into a satis factory state of defence. The financial control also had a restrictive effect.
117. As regards the Army itself, the troops generally were inexperienced and far too large a proportion of them were only partially trained. There was a shortage of experienced leaders, especially in the Indian and Australian units.
Instead of the 48 infantry battalions and supporting arms (excluding the Volunteer Forces and troops required for aerodrome de fence) which had been asked for, we had only 32 infantry battalions and supporting arms. There were no tanks which, as the operations developed, proved a very serious handicap.
118. Nevertheless, there was throughout the Fighting Services, in spite of these weaknesses, a firm resolve to do our best, with the limited means at our disposal, to ensure the security of the great Naval Base. The Japanese did not gain either strategical or tactical surprise. Our forces were deployed and ready for the attack.
119. As regards Civil Defence, much had been done but, viewed as a whole, the preparations were on too small a scale. There were many who responded nobly as soon as the call came but it cannot be said that the people of Malaya were fully prepared for the part they were to play in a total war.
|
