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Part 2
JAPANESE NAVAL RAID.
5. It was, as it turned out, fortunate that such defence as was available was mainly in Ceylon, since a Japanese naval raid into Indian waters took place in the early days of April, in the course of which Colombo was attacked by carrier-borne aircraft on the 5th April and Trincomalee on the 5th April. Our defending fighters inflicted considerable losses on the enemy aircraft, which did little damage on land but they suffered some losses themselves and the Blenheim squadron, which was sent to attack the Japanese aircraft-carriers, was practically destroyed without accomplishing anything. Had the attack been renewed it would have been difficult to meet. Though little damage had been caused on land, two 8-inch cruisers, Dorsetshire and Cornwall, and aircraft-carrier (Hennes) and some smaller naval vessels had been sunk by Japanese aircraft in the waters around Ceylon.
In the Bay of Bengal Japanese light forces and aircraft, sank just on 100,000 tons of merchant shipping, dropped a few bombs on Vizagapatam—the first on Indian soil, and caused a panic there and elsewhere on the Eastern Coasts of India, which, in the absence of naval and air forces, were practically defenceless.
This was India's most dangerous hour; our Eastern fleet was powerless to protect Ceylon or Eastern India; our air strength was negligible; and it was becoming increasingly obvious that our small tired force in Burma was unlikely to be able to hold the enemy, while the absence of communications between Assam and Upper Burma made it impossible to reinforce it.
Fortunately the enemy naval force withdrew, and no Japanese surface warships have since appeared in Indian waters. It is conceivable that the Japanese raid was made with the object of securing Indian rejection of the proposals brought out by the Cripps Mission, which were then under discussion at Delhi.
6. On the 13th and 14th April I met Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, at Bombay and discussed with him the defence of India. He confirmed that with his present force he could do nothing to prevent the invasion of Southern India or Ceylon, and could not send naval forces into the Bay of Bengal to protect shipping or the east coast of India. He also informed me that practically the whole of the Eastern Fleet would be engaged in operations against Madagascar and would not be available in Indian waters.
An appreciation from the Chiefs of Staff in London was received on the 23rd April. It confirmed my general appreciation of the danger to India, i.e., that an invasion of N.E. India by sea, land and air was the most probable threat, while an attack on Ceylon was possible; it recognised the powerlessness of the Eastern Fleet to offer effective opposition; accepted that the land forces in India were inadequate by at least one Armoured Division, one Army Tank Brigade and four infantry divisions, which deficiencies could not be met till late in 1942; and gave the air squadrons required as 66 (there were in India at this time 15 operational squadrons, rising to a total of 25 by the end of June).
The telegram ended with the conclusion: —
'' If Japanese press boldly westwards without pause for consolidation and are not deterred by offensive activities or threats by Eastern fleet or American fleet, nor by rapid reinforcement of our air forces in N.E. India, our Indian Empire is in grave danger."
7. May and June seemed likely to be the critical months for India. It was, therefore, disturbing to me to find that at the end of April the Eastern Fleet, instead of being strengthened, was likely to be further reduced for operations in the Mediterranean to provision Malta, that two brigades of the 5th British Division, on its way to reinforce India, were being diverted for the capture of Madagascar, to which also was being sent an East African brigade which I had been led to expect for Ceylon; and that the Australian Government was demanding the return to Australia of the two brigades in Ceylon.
I protested with some vigour, but the Minister of Defence, who had to look at the whole picture, decided that the attempt to relieve Malta must be made; that Madagascar should be occupied to secure the sea route to the Middle East and India; and that it was necessary for political reasons to release the Australian brigades.
Events proved his judgment correct; and the danger to India never developed. Great efforts were made to build up our air force; and during the summer two British divisions (2nd and 5th) gradually arrived. By July, when the monsoon broke, the critical period for India had passed.
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