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IX—CONCLUSIONS.
92. It may be thought that after 3 years of war it is a little late still to be learning lessons from our enemies. The old proverb, however, should be a safeguard against this feeling, and after an unsuccessful campaign one must of necessity examine the causes of failure.
I do not propose further to comment on the events which led up to the loss of Rangoon since it was already too late to save that city when I arrived in Burma. I have stated earlier and I wish to emphasise again that in the absence of a road to India the loss of Rangoon virtually decided the issue of the campaign. Thereafter my task was to impose on the enemy the maximum delay possible with the means remaining at my disposal.
93 Training and Equipment. From what I had learned of the nature of the fighting since the beginning of the campaign and from my personal experience of the operations in Burma, I was impressed by the apparent ease with which the Japanese were able to outflank our forces by moving through thick jungle country, whereas our troops were tied to the roads.
The reason for this was that the Japanese were organised, equipped and trained for the type of country over which they fought whereas our troops were not. The Japanese also had the help of local guides and the assistance of many friends amongst the local population. In fact they had all the advantages which accrue from having a plan and from preparations made over a long period in time of peace.
The Imperial Forces were almost completely mechanised down to unit transport which made movement off the few roads almost impossible.
As the campaign progressed units supplemented their motor transport by the local purchase and requisition of bullock carts. This form of transport, however, is too slow and cumbersome for tactical use in the jungle where pack transport or porters are really required.
The technique of jungle fighting, as understood by the Japanese, was virtually non-existent in my force. Success in this type of fighting depends largely on the ability of parties to find their way through the jungle and to keep touch with one another. It demands a knowledge, of all types of signalling by visual and by sound and also requires a high scale of low powered wireless sets with infantry battalions. It demands also training to eliminate the sense of loneliness which so often saps the morale of those who are not used to it.
Quite apart from jungle fighting, however, the infantry were not sufficiently well trained in modern tactics which require above all else the ability to manoeuvre in small parties under the fife of their own weapons. Towards the end of the campaign, however, some formations had learned how to take the Japanese on at their own game.
There had been no training with tanks prior to the arrival of the 7 Armoured Brigade and it was not unnatural therefore that the armoured units did not receive the support from the infantry which they needed. The infantry, on the other hand, came more and more to rely on the tanks to get them out of a tight corner.
The country on the whole was unsuitable for the employment of armoured fighting vehicles. In the thick jungle country they were necessarily confined to the roads and tracks and even in the open country of the dry zone the small bunds surrounding paddy fields caused the tanks to slow down in order to avoid breaking their suspension. Nevertheless, the tanks did invaluable work and the reliability of the American MS or " Honey " was quite remarkable.
94. Power of the Offensive. It did not need the Burma campaign to prove the power of the offensive under modern conditions, more particularly in its effect on the civil population. Burma was singularly dependent on her poor communications particularly railways and I W.T. As has been explained at some length these soon began to break down and I wish to draw attention once again to the vulnerability m this respect of eastern countries where the ignorance and gullibility of the population renders them even more susceptible to the lying tongue of rumour than their western brothers.
This campaign was fought by comparatively small forces over a very large area and therefore militarily the offensive, coupled with air superiority and the help of the local population, enabled the Japanese to concentrate superior forces at the decisive point, since the defence had necessarily to be more dispersed.
The right method of defence was, I am convinced to hold defended localities well stocked with reserves of supplies and ammunition covering approaches and centres of communication and to have behind these defended localities hard-hitting mobile forces available to counter-attack the enemy should he attempt to surround the defence. When this method was tried in the battle south of Prome it was already too late, for by that time supplies were too scarce to be risked in any large quantity in the forward area and the fear of being cut off was already too deeply implanted in the minds of the soldiers.
95. Morale. Properly to appreciate the achievements of the Burma Army, it is necessary to know something of its experiences before my arrival. At the battle of the Sittang the 17 Division was cut off and had to swim the river. The equivalent of a brigade was lost and the remainder arrived on the west bank practically naked, with no equipment and with only some of their personal weapons. It is a high tribute to the Commanders in this formation that the Division was reformed and re-equipped and with the addition of the 63 Infantry Brigade fought gallantly for another three months before withdrawing into India. The 1 Burma Division suffered constantly from the disintegration of its indigenous units but it in turn reorganised to include battalions brought in from outside, and remained a fighting formation to the end. This clearly illustrates the influence which a few really good Commanders can exercise.
Practically every formation in these two Divisions had at one time or another been surrounded by the enemy and had fought itsway out. This had a cumulative effect. Further, the 17 Division fought for five months without rest and practically without reinforcement and for only one period of three days did it have another formation between it and the enemy. This was a big strain.
The loss of air superiority also had a moral effect out of all proportion to the damage done by enemy air attacks.
One of the biggest factors which influenced morale was the sense of being cut off from the outside world. This had an influence on the soldier which I did not appreciate until the closing stages of the campaign for, when the troops knew that they were no longer cut off from outside assistance, they fought with renewed vigour and gallantry.
The value of long training as a formation and the confidence resulting therefrom was well exemplified by the 7 Armoured Brigade which retained its cheerful outlook and fighting capacity throughout.
96. Air. I have already commented at some length on the air situation and I do not propose to say more except to record once again that the lack of aircraft in India, as in Malaya, was one of the causes of failure.
97. Unity of Command. There was no real unity of command of -the Allied Forces in Burma, although I had been nominally appointed the Commander of the Chinese Armies. Consequently full use could not be made of the forces available and I feel most strongly that, allied as we are to different nations, unity of command must be achieved in each separate theatre of war.
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