X. CONCLUSION

109. Enemy Organisation and Methods. Perhaps the most important characteristic of the Japanese soldier is his ability to live almost entirely on the country and to dispense with the enormous administrative organisation in rear of the fighting troops that is required by most armies.

He achieves this by being tough. He can live for five days on the rice he actually carries and he has been taught that he must reduce his expenditure of ammunition to that which he can carry. He uses any means of transport available—porters, civilians, bullock carts, boats, captured M.T., etc., but has little in the unit. His troops do rnot expect to be carried everywhere in M.T. The other main point is his insistence on the offensive spirit and the tactics of envelopment. Quite small forces will work round the rear of a much larger force and may succeed in defeating it entirely by bluff.

They are very thorough. There is no doubt that their officers have carefully studied the terrain of Burma and know far more about the jungle tracks than our own troops. They have arranged long ago for an intelligence service, for local guides, etc. They do not hesitate to fight in plain clothes or enemy uniform if it suits their purpose and, although they may deny any deliberate policy of committing atrocities, both officers and men often kill or maim prisoners or wounded after capture in a most brutal and cold blooded manner. They neglect enemy wounded completely—even more than they do their own.

Owing to the weakness of their administrative organisation, there is likely to be a considerable pause between the main phase of an operation. Furthermore if they lose the initiative they may well run short of either food or ammunition, or both. They are extremely careless as regards protective dispositions and in the presence of an enterprising enemy could be made to pay dearly. They do not like being attacked and when the day comes to take the offensive there is little doubt among our troops of their ability to defeat them.

In the jungle they make great use of whistle signals and battle cries, a method which our troops have tried to imitate. It is worth considering whether bugle calls would not also be valuable. They make great use of night for infiltration and to avoid being caught in the open by armoured fighting vehicles

110. Reasons for Loss of Rangoon. The main reasons for the loss of Rangoon may be summed up as: —

(a) Reinforcement too late and in insufficient numbers.

(b) Inadequacy of defence preparations in practically every respect.

(c) Unsuitable organisation and training of our own forces.

(d) The superior numbers, preparations and training of the enemy.

The battle east of the River Sittang really settled the fate of Rangoon, but the enemy preferred to await reinforcements before pushing on. The decision that the 7 Australian Division could not be spared to go to Burma and the diversion at the last moment of the East African Brigade, a strong Brigade which had seen service, removed any prospect of retrieving the situation.

The inadequacy of the defence preparations in Burma has been sufficiently brought out by the narrative above. Without a sound foundation of this kind it is very difficult to make the best use of reinforcements thrown in at the last moment and throughout the campaign there has been the immediate menace of an administrative breakdown.

We had failed to secure the support of the local population or to arrest the leaders of disaffected elements. Owing to our failure to reinforce in time the enemy was nearly always a march ahead of us. It is easy to see that even one more infantry brigade received early in January would have sufficed to turn the scale in practically every battle from Kawkareik to Rangoon.

Throughout the operations the enemy was in superior numbers, usually about two to one on the actual battle front. Any idea that the Army in Burma during this period was driven back by inferior numbers is entirely incorrect.

111. Training. The lack of troops specially trained and equipped for jungle warfare, as compared with the specialist troops brought against them, or indeed troops sufficiently trained to take part in operations against an organised enemy in considerably superior numbers, was a very important factor.

112. Burma Rifles. Attempts had been made to turn the personnel of the Burma Rifles into regular soldiers of the standard pattern. Had they been suitably organised, trained and equipped as a frontier corps specially for jungle warfare, and "placed under selected officers they might have been invaluable.

113. Burma Frontier Force. The Burma Frontier Force came under Army control for operations only at the commencement of the war. The Frontier Force had recently been expanded and was composed largely of good Indian material, but had few officers. It would have paid to have sent many of the good E.G.Os. available to the Frontier Force instead of to the Burma Rifles. The fire power of battalions was restricted by an insufficiency of mortars and automatics, which were not available in quantity until after the war with Japan had broken out, and units were then required to employ them in action before they had time to learn the efficient use of them. Owing to the fact that in peace there were no major frontier problems in Burma, the Burma Frontier Force were not ready or trained for serious war and units were further handicapped during action by the fact that they had an excess of baggage and transport, and that their peace time system of administration was quite unsuitable for war. These factors affected the efficiency of the Burma Frontier Force and as a consequence it offered little resistance to the enemy.

114. Jungle War-fare. As regards the British and Indian Army units, the jungle has never, whether in India or Burma, been regarded as a " good training area." In the former this was understandable at a period when practically all the troops available were earmarked for Mid-East. In Burma it was incomprehensible. Jungle warfare was obviously inevitable if Burma were attacked and it is well-known to require a very high standard of training.

115. Organisation and Equipment. As regards organisation and equipment, most of the units in Burma, or which came to Burma from India, were on a mixed scale of M.T. and Pack. This I am now convinced was thoroughly unsound as units tended to get tied to roads and were unable to move across country with the same freedom as the Japanese. It introduced a road bound mentality among both officers and men. It has also provided the enemy with an admirable form of tactics, which consists in placing road blocks at suitable denies behind our lines, so placed that they had to be cleared up before M.T. could pass.

In a country like Burma, or in any country without many roads and not normally passable to M.T., battalions should be organised entirely on a pack basis, and not with an unduly high scale of transport. All M.T. should be concentrated into a brigade unit which is tactically and administratively self-sufficient and can, if necessary, be sent to another part of the battlefield. Unless this is done, even late in the day, we shall continue to have units tied to roads and incapable of operating away from them. This organisation is equivalent to the regimental organisation which exists in foreign armies, for which it is essential we should devise some adequate substitute.

116. It is for consideration whether the demand for mechanisation and a high standard of equipment has not been overdone in recent years. For service in Europe or in the Middle East, it is no doubt justified though the Germans still retain horse transport in the infantry battalion. The Japanese have shown that a highly trained and disciplined army can achieve great things with a very light scale of equipment and no M.T. This was not only the case in the jungle and hills, but also on the plains east of Pegu and latterly both north and south of Prome. The secret, I believe, lies in the N C.Os. of the Japanese Army, they are very highly trained, enforce very strict discipline and are given great privileges. Their soldiers are veterans and not raw recruits.

117. If all the Indian Army units did not show themselves to the best advantage in the campaign, it must be attributed to: —

(a) The presence of large numbers of recently joined and very young recruits in the ranks.

(b) A number of very recently joined officers who did not know their men and whose knowledge of Hindustani was hardly sufficient to get their confidence quickly.

(c) The effect of units being thrown into battle before they had time to collect themselves.

(d) The utterly strange conditions of warfare in the jungle.

(e) A distrust, often exaggerated, of units of the Burma Army.

As regards the latter many officers and men of all classes did well, and some units, but as a whole they were a source of serious weakness to the force of which they formed a large proportion throughout the operations.

118. Achievements of the Army in Burma.— There is no doubt, however, that although some units and some individuals may have failed, the Army in Burma, as a whole, fought extremely well. For many months they withstood the onslaught of superior numbers, with little reinforcement, no rest, and practically no hope of relief. During most of the time they have suffered heavily from enemy air attack and have received little or no support from our own air forces. They have had no canteens, few amenities and practically all lost their complete kit early in the campaign. The climatic conditions have been very trying. The fall of Singapore has undoubtedly had a depressing effect on morale. Discipline has naturally suffered to a considerable extent; this however has been largely due to the lack of any provost units to check straggling in the early stages.

Finally, it is fair to say that owing to the losses and hardships they had sustained, two brigades of the 17 Indian Division, i.e., about one-third the Imperial Forces that I handed over to General Alexander, were undoubtedly in no shape for a. long and arduous campaign in the defence of Upper Burma, and I should like here to express my admiration for what they have achieved under his leadership. The position, however, was by no means hopeless. The remainder of the force available consisting of the Armoured Brigade, the weak 1 Burma Division (containing the 13 Indian Infantry Brigade and 1 and 2 Burma Brigades), the 63 Indian Infantry Brigade and three British battalions, had not been heavily engaged and there was also every reason to anticipate that the large Chinese forces now appearing in the field would give a good account of themselves.

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