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II. CO-OPERATION WITH THE CHINESE.
20. Situation on Arrival On my arrival in Burma one regiment of 93 Division " Force Trellis “ was already moving towards the Southern Shan States with the object of taking over the defence of the Mekong River, west of the road Kengtung-Mongpayak, with H.Q. at Mongyawng.
The rest of the Division was located about Puerh in China and we were responsible for supplying it with rice.
The remainder of the Sixth Army, which included the 49 and 55 Divisions was stationed near Paoshan on the China road. The Fifth Army was on the Yunnan-Kweichow border. Shortly afterwards the 49 Division, " Force Zigzag," moved up to the border of Wanting in reserve.
21. Command. It had been laid down by the Generalissimo that all Chinese troops were to be under my command and he was most insistent that all breaches of discipline were to be reported to him personally. He was anxious, however, that they should be given their own area and not be mixed up with our own troops. We were to be responsible for the supply of rice and any other requirements that could -be spared including if possible medical stores and mosquito nets.
On about 15th January, 1942, I visited Kengtung and discussed the possible move of the remainder of the 93 Division from China to the Kengtung area. On igth January when the situation in Tenasserim area became serious, the move of this Division was ordered and I Burma Brigade gradually withdrew from their positions south-east of Kengtung.
It was laid down in my directive that no additional Chinese troops were to be brought into Burma without reference to H.Q. South-West Pacific Command (A.B.D.A. Command) On 2ist January, 1942, however, I obtained General Wavell's permission to bring in another Chinese Division, the 49; the Governor was consulted and agreed.
On 29th January it was decided that the 49 Division should come into the Southern Shan States via Lashio, and take over the area east of the River Salween about Takaw, and that 55 Division should move forward to Wanting (Chinese frontier) to complete training and equipment.
22 The Fifth Army. On 31st January I sent a personal cable to General Wavell saying that the Chinese appeared anxious to send us the Fifth Army and requested permission to make arrangements with General Hou for moving them to Lashio where they would be readily available either for the defence of Burma or for offensive operations against Thailand. I pointed out that such an arrangement would enable us to concentrate all our own forces for the defence of Rangoon, and to refute any accusations by the Chinese that we were unwilling to accept the assistance offered.
23. Stores and Equipment. Up till now, war stores for 93 Division had been brought in by the Puerh route. It was now suggested that everything should in future be brought via Lashio and an ordnance dump be established at that place.
About this time there was considerable difficulty over " Lease and Lend " stores. A crisis was precipitated by a number of Chinese lorries etc. being requisitioned by the Army and R.A.F. in Rangoon, with the agreement of the U.S A. representatives who discussed the matter with General Wavell. This was unfortunate but quite accidental, those concerned being unaware of the political importance of this material. The Chinese eventually agreed to a number of stores vital to the defence of Burma being released to Burma Army.
24. Meeting with the Generalissimo. On 2nd February I started for Chungking by air to meet the Generalissimo, but unfortunately my aircraft crashed at night on the way to Lashio. On arrival I heard that General Wavell was expected at Rangoon to meet the Generalissimo, but owing to the lack of any definite news of his date of arrival the latter, who had arrived at Lashio, decided to proceed direct to India and to settle with me the policy to be pursued in respect of co-operation. Our discussion was in every respect most satisfactory and he agreed to all my proposals and in particular to take over the front about Toungoo with the Fifth Army which was in readiness to enter Burma for that purpose.
The Chinese Minister for War issued orders for the move of the rest of the Sixth Army (less 93 Division already there) on 3rd February. In that order it was stated that " H.Q. Sixth Army after moving into Burma will come under orders of G.O.C. Burma."
On 11th February I visited Taunggyi and met the Chinese representative there. At that meeting it was decided that 55 Division would go to area Bawlake and not remain in reserve at Loilem. Chinese Fifth Army started moving to area Toungoo on about 29th February but only 200 Division arrived in Burma before the loss of Rangoon. It will be seen from the above summary that every effort was made to get more Chinese reinforcements into Burma. It is unnecessary here to go into the reasons for the delays that occurred. Many of them, due to administrative reasons, were inevitable, others were due to the Chinese system of command and administration which involved getting confirming orders from the Generalissimo before any move of importance could be carried out.
25. Liaison Arrangements. I was greatly assisted in these arrangements by General Dennys whose untimely death in an air accident was a serious blow to the cause of co-operation with the Chinese. As the Chinese had no transport and no administrative or medical services, and our own resources were already inadequate, we were forced from the beginning to improvise an organisation for them. A liaison staff was built up on the basis of one officer and one civil representative to be attached to each division and Army; these were added to later as occasion required. Each was supplied with W/T taken from our own meagre resources.
At H.Q. it was proposed to have General Dennys as Chief Liaison Officer, with Brigadier J. C. Martin as Chief Administrative Liaison Officer, and another Brigadier, who did not join till later, as G.S. Liaison Officer. The H.Q. staff consisted mainly therefore of Brigadier Martin, Colonel Hobson and Colonel Holmes who did magnificent work with most inadequate resources and spared no pains to smooth the way for our Chinese Allies. The fact that eventually we were able to move, feed and maintain an army of some 95,000 men including 28 and 38 Divisions, without the help of any regular administrative units at all, either British or Chinese, 'is a remarkable example of successful improvisation.
26. Medical. We were fortunate in being able to secure for the use of the Chinese an American Missionary Ambulance Unit under Dr. Seagrave. It was supplied by us with a certain amount of medical stores and did very good work. We were also able eventually to place a certain number of our own medical units at the disposal of the Chinese. There was in fact no possible alternative.
27. Armament. It should be noted here that while the Chinese units were fairly well equipped with L.M.Gs., mortars, etc., they had very little artillery. They had on the average only one weapon for three men so that the fire power of a division was about equal to that of one of our brigades. The balance of men were used as porters, for employments or for digging but were always available to replace casualties. The results of this organisation were not therefore as bad as might be expected.
28. Air Support. It was a great disappointment to the Chinese that throughout the operations we were unable to provide them with any effective air support. After their experience in China they placed great reliance on this factor and its absence undoubtedly affected their morale.
29. Policy as regards Employment of Chinese Troops. It was my general policy to concentrate as early as possible the whole of the Imperial Forces available in the south of Burma with the. object of holding up the Japanese advance in the area where they had the best communications and presented the greatest threat to Rangoon and the communications with China. Sooner or later I hoped to develop an offensive into Thailand based on Moulmein. At the same time I hoped that the Chinese forces would advance into Northern Thailand and keep occupied a considerable number of the enemy forces. Although communications were poor according to our standards the fact that an abundance of rice was available in Northern Thailand made this region particularly suitable for an offensive by the Chinese. Unfortunately this offensive, though practicable, never took place. The Generalissimo did not consider the Sixth Army by itself to be strong enough to undertake it, and the course of operations in the south rendered it more important to use the Fifth Army to relieve 1 Burma Division towards Toungoo than to deploy it further north on the chance that an offensive would be undertaken in time to relieve the situation. Actually the last division of Sixth Army had only just begun to reach its forward positions in the Northern Shan States at the time of the fall of Rangoon.
30. Relations with the Chinese. Finally I should like to pay a tribute to the Generalissimo for his wholehearted support and co-operation throughout the operations and to the senior 'officers of the Chinese forces under my command whose fighting spirit and appreciation of the problems involved, and the difficulties under which we laboured, evoked my warmest admiration. In particular I should like to mention—
Lt.-.General .Kan Li Chu, Commander, Sixth Army.
Lt.-General Lu Kuo Ch'uan, 93 Division.
Ma]or-General Fisher T. How, Chief Liasion Officer at my H.Q.
Colonel Gordon iW. K. Chu, Assistant Liaison Officer at my H.Q.
It may be desirable to mention in conclusion that we treated the Chinese throughout on a basis of complete equality and did everything possible to overcome the difficulties arising from lack of mutual confidence in the past and from the series of military reverses we suffered in Burma and elsewhere, which naturally lowered our prestige.
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