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I SITUATION ON ASSUMING COMMAND.
1. Staff and Services. I arrived in Rangoon on 27th December and assumed command forthwith. I should like here to pay a tribute to the endeavours made by my predecessor, Lieut.-General D. K. MacLeod, in spite of an inadequate staff and inadequate resources, to prepare the country for war.
Briefly, the position was as follows. The H.Q. staff was totally inadequate and a few overworked staff officers were struggling to compete with problems quite beyond their powers. This was especially the case with the General and Administrative staffs on whose shoulders rested the responsibility for the direction of policy. There was no intelligence staff worthy of the name. For a time there was a serious shortage of 'cipher personnel and clerks. This was eventually remedied by the employment of a number of women who were organised early in January in an enrolled unit of the Women's Auxiliary Service, Burma.
Such nucleus of services, base or L. of ,C. organisations as existed consisted of units raised in Burma, partially trained and very weak in Governor's Commissioned Officers (G.C.Os.) and N.C.Os. and with few trained reserves. While these units did useful work for a time they eventually became unreliable and there were a considerable number of desertions.
2. Intelligence. No arrangements had been made to provide for external intelligence before the war and as a result we were usually in complete ignorance of what was happening just over the Thailand border. The same applied as regards internal intelligence. The possibility that the country might be invaded and that it might be desirable to " leave behind " a suitable organisation to give us information had not apparently been considered Efforts were of course made at once to remedy the defect but it is not a thing that can be done in a hurry.
3. Responsibilities of Army Headquarters (A.H.Q.). A H.Q. Army in Burma was at the same time a War Office, a G.H.Q., a Corps H.Q. and a L. of C. H.Q. (owing to the absence of any L. of C. staff). A.H.Q. had, as such, responsibilities which covered exactly the same field as G.H.Q. in India.
This organisation, or lack of it, clogged the whole machine. It also imposed an intolerable burden on the G.O.C. It was impossible for me with my vast responsibilities to keep detailed control of operations on 17 Indian Division's front and it was necessary to allow wide discretion to the Divisional Commander. Unfortunately on practically every occasion when a serious situation arose, I happened to be away visiting some other part of my command. A Corps H.Q was essential from the first, it was eventually formed after the loss of Rangoon.
4. The Burma Rifles. The fighting troops consisted mainly of Burma Rifles. This force was in the process of expansion, a process which greatly accentuated its former weaknesses Consisting of four different races, Chins, Kachms, Karens and Burmese, speaking different languages which few of the officers understood, it was of very limited value in serious warfare. The G.C.Os. and N.C.Os. were all very junior and inexperienced, some of the former having only two years' service. The language commonly used in the Army was Hindustani whichwas a foreign language to all the personnel, including of course the officers; of the latter it was hardly likely that the best regular officers would be attracted by service in the Corps—though many of them did good work. The Emergency Commissioned Officers (E.C Os.) who formed the majority were of exceptionally good quality and consisted mostly of members of big firms, who had had extensive experience of conditions in the jungle. Their knowledge of local languages was in most cases good and many also had a smattering of Hindustani.
It was soon discovered that while these units were of considerable value for reconnaissance and patrol work in the jungle, they were not as a whole fit to stand the test of serious operations against an enemy like the Japanese. Eventually a large proportion of the Burmese and some of the Karens deserted, and the active battalions had to be reconstituted without them.
The Sappers and Miners, Army Service Corps, Hospital Corps, etc., were all of similar personnel, mostly Burmese, and the results were similar.
This question has been dealt with in some detail because it vitally affected the campaign. Instead of Indian battalions stiffening, as was hoped; the Burma Rifles, the effect was exactly the opposite However, as more than half the forces available consisted of Burma Rifles there was no alternative to making use of them even after their lack of training began to be disclosed.
The possible failure of the attenuated services behind the Army, especially M.T., was a source of constant anxiety. As regards equipment and transport the situation was equally serious and no units had their full scale and some, such as signal units and A.A. batteries, had practically none. The force, such as it was, was quite unprepared for war. Reserves were of course practically nil.
5. Levies. As regards levies or guerrillas, efforts had already been .made to start an organisation in the Shan States. This was now extended to the Karen country of North Tenasserim. Although started very late in the day it was undoubtedly of value in providing a foundation for larger scale operations in the future, a deterrent to Japanese infiltration of the hills in that area and a valuable threat to the so-called free Burmese of the plains below.
6. Burma Frontier Force. There was also the Burma Frontier Force .of the equivalent of six battalions which had only just been taken over by the Army from the Civil Administration, but the Inspector-General remained responsible for the administration of the force. It consisted for the most part of good Indian personnel but was numerically weak in officers and neither its organisation nor its training really fitted it to take part in active operations against a first-class enemy.
7. British and, Indian Troops. The remainder of the troops available consisted of two British battalions, two Indian infantry brigades and one Mountain Regiment.
8. Enemy Forces. Very little was known about the enemy owing both to the lack of intelligence and of aircraft for reconnaissance. The thick jungle country rendered air or even ground reconnaissance very unproductive. It was known, however, that there were three or four Japanese divisions available in Thailand of which at least two could probably be made available for operations against Burma. In view of the weak state of our forces and the approach of the monsoon there appeared to be every reason why the Japanese should invade Burma as early as possible.
9. Appreciation. A full appreciation of the defence problem of Burma was completed by me on loth January. It formed the basis of policy throughout the period of my command. I should like here to refer to the valuable help and assistance given me throughout my tenure of command by my B.G.S., Brig. H. L. Davies, whose judgment and military knowledge proved invaluable in dealing with a most difficult situation.
10. Bombing of Rangoon. On the 23rd December and again on the 25th December just before I arrived, .Rangoon was bombed by a large force of enemy aircraft. These attacks were directed against the dock area and in the neighbourhood of the power station. Extensive damage was caused by fires among the crowded wooden houses and huts in the bombed area and civilian casualties due mainly to antipersonnel bomibs were very heavy indeed, amounting to approximately 1,700-2,000 people killed. Very little damage of a military nature occurred and the only damage to the docks was the destruction of one transit shed.
11. Effects of Bombing. The bombing had, however, a very serious repercussion as servants, menials, all subordinate employees, and coolies including the dock labourers,, at once commenced to leave the town. As there were many ships loaded with military stores for the Army and with Lease and Lend stores for China waiting discharge, the results were serious.
Practically all Government offices, shops, markets, hospitals etc., lost almost the whole of their subordinate staffs as also did the Ordnance, Military Works, Transportation services, etc. For a time there was in some cases great difficulty in obtaining and preparing food as almost all servants, cooks, etc., had also departed.
Rangoon town was not raided again; thereafter the enemy directed all his efforts against the aerodrome at Mingaladon and that neighbourhood. As a result of this policy labour gradually regained confidence and a useful proportion returned to work.
Taken as a whole, however, the situation was never restored. Military units for essential work became available only to a very limited scale and the working of all transportation, works, labour, etc., for services was most precarious throughout the period prior to the fall of Rangoon.
12. The organisation of the A.R.P. services in Burma was carried out by Mr. de Graff Hunter who did most excellent work in spite of great difficulties in securing suitable personnel. This organisation, like others based on locally recruited personnel, soon showed a tendency to disintegrate in face of attack.
13. Fighter Successes. During the first two air raids over Rangoon the R.A.F. and A.V.G. fighters were most successful and not less than 61 enemy first-line bombers and fighters were claimed as destroyed on these two days. A further large number were shot down during subsequent raids.
It is significant to note that on no occasion were the oil installations in the Rangoon area attacked and later we were able to remove with confidence for use elsewhere a proportion of the A.A. artillery detailed for the defence of Syriam.
14. Observer Corps. I should here like to draw attention to the fact that until the Central Telephone Exchange in Rangoon closed down on the 28th February no enemy air raid reached the Rangoon area without warning passed by the Observer Corps posts. Until Tenasserim was lost the average period of warning was forty minutes but this of course gradually decreased as the enemy closed in on Rangoon.
In all cases the Observer Posts were manned by local inhabitants who passed the warning by pre-arranged codes over the Posts and Telegraphs or Railway systems, the average time taken to pass a warning message being about two minutes. The success of the system depended on the wholehearted support of the Posts and Telegraphs officials and in particular thanks are due to Mr. Nesbitt-Hawes the D.G., P. and T., who devised the communication system and who until the last was always ready to give his personal attention to any demand made on his Department, also to Major Taylor who was the officer in charge of the whole of the warning system in Burma.
15. A A. Artillery. When I arrived in Burma some A.A. equipment for the locally raised Burma Auxiliary Force (B.A.F.) units had just come from India. Later on, both British and Indian light and heavy batteries arrived and it was possible to organise a thin scale of defence for vital points. All -units acquitted themselves well and a very considerable number of enemy aircraft were shot down— including one by the third shot fired by the 1 Heavy A.A. Regiment B.A.F.
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